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 The three papers of this dissertation argue that our everyday aesthetic activities and 
experiences can be enlisted in our resistance projects. Ordinary decisions about how we 
get dressed and how we attend to our bodies can, when properly considered, help enable 
resistance to oppressive conditions or instances. Furthermore, there are some cases 
when everyday aesthetic activity actually constitutes resistance, rather than merely 
enabling it. By taking on these roles, everyday aesthetics and body aesthetics help 
promote our well-being.  
The first paper argues that aesthetic attention to embodiment helps those 
experiencing sexual objectification challenge objectifying narratives. This is possible 
because aesthetic attention to embodiment both makes subjectivity salient and 
encourages us to value it. The second paper argues that respectability politics are a 
significantly aesthetic strategy for anti-racist work. In addition to attending to self-
presentation as a part of racial uplift, respectability politics also linked personal beauty 
and antiracist work. The third paper argues that, although aesthetic labor is often 
intertwined with injustices and disparities of power, it is also an important mechanism 
in many kinds of liberatory struggles. Furthermore, aesthetic labor matters to our ability 





The three papers of this dissertation argue that our everyday aesthetic activities and 
experiences can be enlisted in our resistance projects. Ordinary decisions about how we 
get dressed and how we attend to our bodies can, when properly considered, help enable 
resistance to oppressive conditions or instances. Furthermore, there are some cases 
when everyday aesthetic activity actually constitutes resistance, rather than merely 
enabling it. By taking on these roles, everyday aesthetics helps promote our well-being 
in both macro and micro contexts. 
 The position outlined here contradicts a few related attitudes toward everyday 
aesthetic activity. First, it denies the idea that everyday aesthetic activity is merely 
frivolous. Second, it denies that everyday aesthetic activity is itself essentially 
oppressive or necessarily burdensome. Third, it denies that everyday aesthetic activity is 
not sufficiently aesthetic, particularly when contrasted with art and art-based activity, or 
sufficiently meaningful to deserve philosophical attention. The papers use a focus on 
aesthetic activity in the context of human bodies to refute these positions and advance 
their arguments. They aim to show some specific ways in which everyday aesthetic, and 
especially body aesthetic, practices are meaningful qua aesthetic practices, but also 
ways in which they are ethically and socio-politically significant. 
 In addition to their projects in aesthetics, the papers speak to issues in feminist 
philosophy, philosophy of race, and ethics. Because the papers treat human bodies and 
the experience of being a human in/with a body as an occasion for agency, rather than a 
hindrance to proper moral action, they aid a larger feminist and anti-racist project of 
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reevaluating philosophical and cultural approaches to embodiment. Additionally, the 
second paper, “Respectability Politics as Aesthetic Practice,” and third paper, “The 
Case for Aesthetic Labor in Everyday Life,” draw from specific instances and 
approaches to navigating embodiment and aesthetics under conditions of injustice. 
While I have more work to do on understanding the way race, class, ethnicity, sexuality, 
gender, and ability affect our relationship(s) to embodiment, aesthetics, and ethics, I 
hope that the focus on specific events helps to further that project for philosophy as a 
discipline. (I will discuss future work more fully in the dissertation’s conclusion.) In 
addition, these papers share an interest in the ways philosophy can help us understand 
and alter our relationships to other members of our communities. 
 The rest of this introduction will introduce some of the philosophical work in 
everyday aesthetics and body aesthetics that enables and informs the arguments made in 
each of the three papers. Then I will move to a discussion of the content and general 
argument each paper makes.  
1. Everyday Aesthetics 
As a disciplinary identifier, “aesthetics” often means “philosophy of art.” However, 
there has recently been a resurgence of interest in non-art aesthetic experiences and 
practices. There are a few important differences between artworld experiences and 
everyday ones, and, further, some distinctions between everyday aesthetics and 
aesthetic experiences of nature. I don’t want to deny that both art and the natural world 
can feature prominently in our everyday lives, but I do hold that when art and nature 
integrate into daily life our aesthetic experience of them is in a different mode than 
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when they are “special” occasions. The distinction between “special” aesthetic 
experience and aesthetic experience that can happen any time grounds everyday 
aesthetics as a philosophical category.  
 A few other characteristics of everyday aesthetics help differentiate it from art-
centered aesthetic approaches. Yuriko Saito differentiates art-oriented aesthetic 
responses from everyday aesthetic responses partly on the grounds that “unlike the 
quintessential spectator-like experience of art, everyday aesthetics is diverse and 
dynamic, as more often than not it leads to some specific actions: cleaning, purchasing, 
repairing, discarding and so on” (2007, 4). This motivational and dynamic aspect of 
everyday aesthetics also helps ground Saito’s claim that everyday aesthetics plays an 
important role in our moral decision-making. 
 Saito notes that someone might accept the existence of aesthetic experience in 
daily life, but hold that everyday aesthetics “concerns rather trivial, insignificant, and 
innocuous matters, not worthy of philosophical investigation. So what if we care about 
stains and wrinkles on our shirt, personal grooming, and the appearance of our 
properties and possessions? . . . Don’t these reactions indicate our preoccupation with 
superficial appearance, rather than with substantial and more important matters, such as 
political, moral, and social issues? (2007, 54) Against this position, Saito offers a few 
cases that explain the ways everyday aesthetics “often do lead to consequences . . . that 
affect not only our daily life but also the state of society and the world” (2007, 55). The 
cases reflect everyday aesthetics general orientation toward attending to and valuing 
aspects of our life we are generally encouraged to disregard and disvalue. 
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 Another key feature of the selection of everyday aesthetics literature that is 
relevant to my work is its comparative orientation. Though contemporary Western 
philosophy’s attention to the everyday is somewhat new, other philosophical traditions 
have made the everyday their focus. Saito cites Japanese aesthetics as valuing everyday, 
non-art experiences for their aesthetic qualities and “nurtur[ing] aesthetic appreciation 
of the mundane” (2007, 3). Confucian texts focus on ritual (li), an aestheticized and 
embodied mode of organizing and living one’s life.1 The result is a philosophy that 
“advocates for an aesthetic of ritualized social interactions in which participants act on 
norms of social etiquette” (Mullis 2017, 132). While ritual governs singular 
circumstances, like meeting a king and mourning one’s parents, it also guides 
practitioners through daily life. The result is not just an aesthetic appreciation of the 
mundane, but an ethical focus on it. 
 We might understand everyday aesthetics as a particularly engaged 
philosophical position. The mingled ethical and aesthetic commitments, and especially 
the interest in what we ought to pay attention and devote our time to, is best articulated 
in an exchange from a novel for young readers, Wise Child, set in post-Roman Scotland. 
The titular main character is a young girl fostered by a woman, Juniper. Wise Child is 
trying to get out of doing her chores: 
“I don’t like cleaning or dusting or cooking or doing dishes, or any of these 
things,” I explained to her. “And I don’t usually do it. I find it boring, you see.” 
“Everyone has to do those things,” she said. 
                                                 
1 There is more to be said about the way Confucianism views art practices as contributing to personal 
development, such that the practices required to master an art form become habitual and permeate the rest 
of one’s life and being, but it is too far afield from the current project. Interested readers can seek out the 
Mullis article cited here. 
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“Rich people don’t,” I pointed out. 
… 
“They miss a lot of fun,” she said. “But quite apart from that – keeping yourself 
clean, preparing the food you are going to eat, clearing it away afterward – that’s 
what life’s about, Wise Child. When people forget that, or lose touch with it, 
then they lose touch with other important things as well.” 
“Men don’t do those things.” 
“Exactly.” (Furlong 1987, 36-37) 
That Wise Child finds the chores she’s assigned dull is hardly surprising – given my 
sense of life in Dark Ages Britain, “boring” is probably a pretty mild way of describing 
the chores. However, part of the coming of age the book describes is Wise Child’s 
growing appreciation for the chores. They bring her into contact with her material 
environment, including books, furniture, and clothes, and with the beings around her: 
Juniper, for one, but also the goats, donkey, chickens, and cats that form a part of Wise 
Child and Juniper’s material community. Wise Child comes to aesthetically and 
ethically appreciate the features of and beings whose existence intertwines with hers, 
and in the process, she better understands herself and her world. Wise Child’s 
understanding of and appreciation for her world is another part of her growing up, 
taking her from a petulant, self-absorbed child to a less-petulant, balanced young adult. 
She is no longer at war with the practices that keep her alive and healthy, but has 
integrated them into her self-understanding and ideas about creating a meaningful life. 
 Everyday aesthetics gives us a way to calm internal conflict about the mundane 
and tedious practices that our existence often requires. Instead of stoking resentment, it 
gives us ways to find value and pleasure in maintenance work like cooking and 
cleaning. By drawing attention to our interventions in our environment, everyday 
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aesthetics helps ward off carelessness as well as resentment. Many of us may also find 
our bodies occasions of boring, tedious maintenance work, and the pleasures the body 
affords either narrowly understood or denigrated – or both. The result can be, similarly, 
a sense of boredom, resentment, and conflict with something we have only limited 
power to change. Furthermore, our body sets many of the conditions for our lives, and it 
is hard to think of something more everyday than our bodies. Given these 
commonalities with our everyday experiences, it makes sense to consider what aesthetic 
consideration and appreciation might do for our relationship with our bodies and those 
aspects of our ethical lives dependent upon bodies.  
II. Body Aesthetics 
Closely related to everyday aesthetics, body aesthetics focuses attention on, well, 
human bodies as sites of aesthetic experience and practice. At least in some cases, body 
aesthetics or, as Richard Shusterman prefers, “somaesthetics” is a practice of everyday 
aesthetics. In other cases, body/somaesthetics is as concerned with art experience as it is 
everyday experience. In the papers that follow this introduction, I do not focus on 
bodies in art contexts, though I do use some artworld examples to help explain and 
color my philosophical analysis and argument.2    
The relationship between body aesthetics and everyday aesthetics relies, in part, 
on the fact that “our own body is always available to us for aesthetic assessment . . ., 
and we assess and respond to the bodily appearances of others both consciously and 
unconsciously” (Irvin 2016, 2). But in addition to the body itself, we have many non-art 
                                                 
2 See Lipman 1957 for a preliminary treatment of bodies in art forms. 
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aesthetic practices that engage or rely on the body: getting dressed, hair styles, tattoos, 
dance, athletics, manicures, eating, and so on. Philosophers have also argued for 
understanding bodily experiences as aesthetic, sometimes in ways that are intuitive, 
such as dancing or getting a massage, but other times in ways that expand the scope of 
the idea of the aesthetic. For example, Sherri Irvin’s “Scratching an Itch” argues that 
itches and scratches may figure in aesthetic experiences. 
 Two facets of body aesthetics as a philosophical project are particularly relevant 
to these papers. First, body aesthetics treats human bodies as sources of meaning and 
value. Second, this value is not only aesthetic, but ethical and political, meaning body 
aesthetics often intersects with and speaks to issues of justice. Treating human bodies as 
worth serious, approbative attention and recognizing their relationship to issues of 
justice supports a counternarrative to a history of denigrating the body and treating it 
either as a distraction from or impediment to moral projects. In fact, one thing I aim to 
show is that bodies and body aesthetics are sometimes central to moral projects that 
require multifaceted resistance to oppressive structures. 
 Bodies provide opportunities for multiple kinds of aesthetic value and 
experience. The above list of different kinds of aesthetic bodily practices and aesthetic 
experiences helps suggest something of this diversity. I suggest we divide up aesthetic 
appreciation of the body into two modes: the first considers bodies as objects of 
aesthetic experience, while the second mode considers embodiment. By embodiment, I 
mean the first-personal sense of being/having a body. A focus on the aesthetic 
experience of being embodied offers an alternative to the mode of aesthetic appreciator 
as observer. Like Saito’s everyday aesthetic practice that require some intervention, 
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thereby making us a participant, a focus on embodiment as an aesthetic experience 
frustrates the object/observer dichotomy.  
Philosophers have found aesthetic value in the sensuous experience of being 
embodied. Though the aesthetics literature on embodiment is small, its contents are 
diverse. In addition to Irvin’s aforementioned “Scratching an Itch,” there are 
philosophical explorations of the aesthetics of sex (Shusterman 2012a), eating 
(Korsmeyer 2002, Shusterman 2016), and proprioception, our sense of our body’s 
movements and positioning. Proprioception and its aesthetic significance are recurring 
themes of Barbara Gail Montero’s work. Proprioception features in dancers’ evaluation 
of their movements, “they experience pleasure in moving beautifully or gracefully; they 
seem to apply aesthetic predicates to themselves merely on the basis of the feeling of 
movement” (Cole and Montero 2007, 303; see also Montero 2006). In addition to 
beauty, Montero also relates proprioception to effortlessness – a less prominent but 
significant aesthetic value (2016). Montero’s work is useful for gesturing at ways 
embodiment can feature in our experience of specific aesthetic standards, values, and 
concepts, though the approach I will take generally emphasizes the way aesthetic 
appreciation of embodiment directs us to a better appreciation and understand of our 
bodies and ourselves. That is, it seems to me that Montero’s work ultimately aims at 
aesthetics while mine ultimately aims at the body. I don’t take these approaches to be 
opposed, but note the difference in hopes it will be helpful for understanding the project 
here. 
 Body aesthetics does not always intersect with issues of justice in ways that 
actually promote justice. In some contexts, particularly where judgments of bodily 
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attractiveness operate, “aesthetic standards . . . serve a disciplinary function, 
maintaining oppressive norms of race, gender, and sexuality” (Irvin 2016, 2). However, 
body aesthetics does not just turn its attention to these oppressive aesthetic norms or the 
norms of the powerful: it also trains a philosophical eye on marginalized groups’ 
understanding of their own experiences. Sometimes, body aesthetics makes strong 
recommendations about ways to correct oppressive norms and promote the well-being 
of marginalized people. For example, A. W. Eaton’s “Taste in Bodies and Fat 
Oppression” notes the ways our cultural preference for thin bodies harms fat people – 
but Eaton also suggests ways to reorient our aesthetic taste and cultural preference. 
Similarly, Sheila Lintott and Sherri Irvin’s “Sex Objects and Sexy Subjects: A Feminist 
Reclamation of Sexiness” present an argument for and suggestion about expanding our 
idea of which kinds of bodies, and which kinds of persons, we find sexy. 
 My understanding of what kinds of aesthetic experiences are possible and the 
ways aesthetic experience enables resistance to oppressive structures relies on the work 
I’ve described here. Other issues in body aesthetics will surface in the three papers that 
form the bulk of this project, but all three papers share an interest in the ways body 
aesthetics in the context of our everyday life can make us better able to resist certain 
kinds of oppression.     
III. Aesthetic Strategies of Everyday Resistance 
In the following papers, I discuss three “strategies” that use the aesthetic to enable 
resistance to oppression. The first paper looks at sexual objectification and argues for 
aesthetic attention to embodiment as a way of resisting objectifying narratives, actions, 
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and experiences. In this paper, the aesthetic emphasizes subjectivity, thereby 
contradicting and resisting objectification. The second paper looks at respectability 
politics, a set of strategies for self-presentation (among other areas), originating in 
African American communities post-Reconstruction, that aim at protecting black 
women from sexual assault, and now are employed to protect black people generally 
from police violence. The third paper argues for the significance of aesthetic labor, 
despite the genuine burdens and injustices related to aesthetic labor. In addition to these 
injustices, there are prudential reasons, liberatory reasons, and flourishing reasons for 
retaining and cultivating aesthetic labor as a practice of everyday life. 
a.  “First-Personal Body Aesthetics and Objectification” 
Sexual objectification and the human body have both been a rich topic for discussion in 
feminist philosophy. The debate about sexual objectification, what it is and what kind of 
harms it does, informs my paper. However, the argument I make should be acceptable 
to all participants in the debate. Additionally, the paper incorporates Nancy Bauer’s 
discussion of self-objectification and her adaptation of Simone de Beauvoir’s concept of 
“ambiguity.” For Beauvoir, humans are basically ambiguous because we are basically 
both objects and subjects. I use the 1933 Barbara Stanwyck film, Baby Face, to 
investigate self-objectification, objectification, and exploitation.  
In addition to discussing feminist work on objectification, the argument in this paper 
draws from literature in everyday aesthetics and body aesthetics that emphasizes first-
personal aesthetic experiences. Because embodied first-personal experiences are so 
closely linked with subjectivity, they contradict experiences of objectification. 
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Aesthetically appreciating our embodiment habituates us into valuing these experiences, 
so we can reliably give them credence.  
One worry we might have about resisting objectification is that resistance can 
devalue the body, since our body is the “excuse” for our objectification, further, some 
analyses of objectification frame it as a reduction to the body. Aesthetically 
appreciating the body helps us avoid that trap and allows us to view the body as integral 
to our subjectivity. However, I also head off this worry by discussing feminist work that 
emphasizes the ways embodiment is integral to moral agency, rather than external to it. 
Adopting this understanding of embodied moral agency also helps clarify the ways in 
which our ethical and aesthetic lives positively influence each other. 
b. “Respectability Politics as Aesthetic Practice” 
The term “politics of respectability” originates in historian Evelyn Brooks 
Higginbotham’s work on the black church. Higginbotham used the term to describe a 
set of strategies that members of post-Reconstruction black communities used to ward 
off sexual assault from whites, particularly white men for whom black women worked 
in domestic roles. Higginbotham also links respectability politics with racial uplift 
strategies more generally, a link Victoria Wolcott and Brittney C. Cooper pick up and 
explore in interwar Detroit and early black feminist thought, respectively. 
Respectability politics is an interesting intersection for issues in philosophy of race, 
social and political philosophy, feminist philosophy and philosophy of gender, however 
it has not received much attention in philosophical circles. Nor have its aesthetic 
features received much acknowledgment or attention.  
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In “Respectability Politics as Aesthetic Practice,” I argue that aesthetic practices 
play a significant role in both historical and contemporary versions of respectability 
politics. I make a few claims about respectability politics, and about the philosophical 
insights it offers or problems it raises.3 First, I argue that respectability politics requires 
an aesthetics of racial/ethnic blandness and is, in significant part, a way of making black 
women’s hypervisible and hypersexualized bodies “invisible.” Second, I argue that 
respectability politics presents a problem for proponents of everyday aesthetics who are 
interested in the way everyday aesthetics allows us to understand the relationship 
between ethics and aesthetics. I suggest some ways of understanding this problem, and 
that focusing on other instances of respect as an aesthetically-communicated attitude 
can help us find a way out of it. 
In addition to Higginbotham’s, Wolcott’s, and Cooper’s historical analyses, I look at 
contemporary respectability politics used, in particular, by black men to avoid police 
violence. The paper also considers the ways in which advocates of respectability 
politics launched a campaign to expand beauty standards to include black women, and 
considers ways beauty, virtue, and respectability combine with race, class, and gender. 
c. “The Case for Aesthetic Labor in Everyday Life” 
The third and final paper picks up on a theme in the preceding two: while aesthetic 
experience and practice enable resistance to certain kinds of oppression, aesthetic 
standards also feature in certain kinds of oppression. Furthermore, the collection of 
everyday aesthetic activities I call “aesthetic labor” may lead us to participate in 
injustices. On the one hand, expectations for aesthetic labor fall disproportionately on 
                                                 
3 “Problem” and “insight” are close cousins in philosophy. 
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socially disadvantaged groups (women-identified people especially, but not uniquely). 
On the other, our everyday aesthetic labor belongs to the same consumerist, capitalist 
structures of economic imperialism. So, we might wonder if there are reasons to shuck 
aesthetic labor altogether. 
 I argue that there in fact several reasons to perform aesthetic labor. First, 
prudential considerations often dictate performing aesthetic labor. Second, aesthetic 
labor has been a central part of liberatory movements. Additionally, aesthetic labor can 
result in liberatory self-presentation even outside the context of an organized political 
movement. Third, aesthetic labor promotes our flourishing. I examine a number of 
personal essays from disabled writers who discuss the ways their aesthetic labor 
meaningfully and positively impacts their well-being, including discussions of the ways 
some kinds of aesthetic labor help them to value their disabled bodies. Our relationships 
to aesthetic labor are highly contextualized, reflecting many aspects of our social 
positions and personal histories. However, the idea that aesthetic labor positively and 
substantively impacts our well-being and self-worth runs through a diverse selection of 
sources and analyses of various kinds of aesthetic labor. I conclude the paper by 
considering ways people in positions of power can responsibly perform aesthetic labor. 
IV. Conclusion 
In addition to reorienting our understanding of the relationship between bodies and 
aesthetic experience, the three papers in this dissertation connect aesthetic and ethical 
activity through the human body. Presenting aesthetic attention to embodiment, 
respectability politics, and aesthetic labor as strategies of resistance to injustice and 
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oppression makes both the ethical and aesthetic insights concrete. The project thus 
highlights ways embodiment can be central to our ethical lives and allows a fuller 
understanding of the possibilities for our aesthetic experience and our ethical agency.  
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2. First-Personal Body Aesthetics and Objectification 
Here is something that sometimes happens to a woman when she walks down 
the street: a man leans in and hisses at her. It feels like something to be on the receiving 
end of this hiss and intrusion. Here is something that a woman sometimes does when 
she looks in a mirror: she puts on lipstick. It feels like something to do this, too. Both 
experiences are, at least sometimes, instances of objectification. In the first instance, 
objectification is something done to the woman on the street. The second instance is 
harder to categorize, but looks an awful lot like self-objectification. So, the two 
examples occupy points at different ends of a spectrum of experiences of objectification 
(not the ultimate ends of the spectrum, to be sure). It is important to pay attention to the 
phenomenology, the what it feels like, of objectification. More accurately, multiple 
phenomenologies arise from experiences of objectification. A common thread underlies 
these experiences. Picking it out, and figuring out what we should do about it, is the 
primary project of this paper. 
The commonality, as I see it, is this: Objectification and self-objectification rely 
on subjectivity, both that of the objectified and objectifier. Although objectification 
seeks to wrest subjectivity away from another person, or to somehow deny them their 
personhood, it requires a subject to be so denied. In the face of objectification, attention 
to embodied experiences affirms subjectivity. Attention to the embodied experiences of 
objectified persons draws attention to their subjectivity -- I urge particular attention to 
the aesthetic facets of felt experiences, thereby turning aesthetic and ethical attention to 
the human body and the facts of human embodiment. I focus on embodiment in part 
because the body features so prominently in our thinking about and experiences of 
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objectification, but also because embodiment and subjectivity intertwine, and because 
embodiment features prominently (though diversely) in other subjective experience, 
such as emotion. The ultimate claim of this paper is that the kind of subjectivity we get 
from aesthetic attention to embodiment helps us resist kinds of oppression that deny our 
subjectivity and seek to force us to deny it, too.    
The rest of this introduction discusses the negative slant discussions of the 
relationship between the human body as an aesthetic object and as a site of moral 
agency have historically taken. The negative view of the body’s aesthetic possibilities 
relies on a negative view of the human body tout court; keeping that view in mind helps 
establish both the motivation for and the history of my project. I also use the rest of this 
introduction to describe the sections of the paper, introduce some background in 
aesthetics, and motivate the paper’s project. 
My argument here is enabled by a frequently observed tension between 
aesthetics and morality. The idea goes back to very early philosophical works: Plato 
warns us off poetry, early Buddhists link the appreciation of physical beauty to samsara, 
and Confucius lamented he had “yet to meet a man who loves Virtue as much as he 
loves female beauty” (9.18). In the 19th century, Elizabeth Bennet has to learn that 
Wickham’s great personal charm and handsome appearance disguise his self-
absorption, as have many heroines before and after her. Within this tradition, the 
aesthetic generally deceives us on points of virtue, at worst leading us to our doom, and 
at best merely distracting our judgment and attention from things that really matter.  
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Alongside the longstanding mistrust of aesthetic experience (which is often 
sensuous experience), we often find a mistrust of the physical facts of human existence: 
the body is a prison for the soul in Phaedo, while Descartes finds himself unable to 
distinguish the body from the corpse. Philosophers are not unique in the dubious regard 
in which they have held the human body – they have both shaped and been shaped by a 
larger context in which human bodies, and ways of being human that take human bodies 
as central, are disvalued. Physical labor, for example, generally ranks below intellectual 
labor in social hierarchies. Physical labor includes both labor that relies on the body 
(cutting lettuce, building walls) and labor that both relies on and looks after the body 
(housework, caring for the sick). Even when physical labor allies with virtuous 
behavior, as in certain Christian traditions, the judgment of virtue relies on an 
expectation of purification. That is, careful attention to and work with one’s own body 
or the bodies of others is acceptable just in cases where it results in the purification of 
those bodies or one’s own. For example, though many saints are venerated for their 
work with the sick, this veneration usually tracks the saint’s willingness to sacrifice 
their bodily well-being for the good of others. Similarly, bodily mortification practices, 
though certainly rarer than in the past, center physical labor and attention to the body, 
but the practice aims at transcending the body or purifying the soul thought to be 
trapped within the body. Absent that transcendental context, work with and on the body 
belongs to socially marginalized groups: racial and ethnic minorities, immigrants, some 
kinds of women, members of the working classes or lower castes.4 
                                                 
4 Sherri Irvin points out that doctors work on the body and society places a high value on their work. I 
don’t know quite how to explain the difference in our attitudes toward what doctors do and other kinds of 
body labor, but there are a few things inform my thinking about it. First, medical work has become 
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More recent work, particularly by feminist philosophers, points out special 
aesthetic burdens borne by members of marginalized groups. Susan Bordo (2004) and 
Sandra Bartky (1990) critique the late 20th-century ideal of feminine slimness. Janell 
Hobson argues that black women’s bodies are aesthetically and ethically fraught, 
framed “as grotesque figures, due to the problematic fetishism of their rear ends,” 
facilitating the denial of black women’s humanity (2003, 88). In a way, my work relies 
on these critiques: it seems correct to me that the aesthetic is often in tension with the 
ethical. However, the goal here is to highlight one particular way the aesthetic and the 
human body are not enemies, but allies of self-understanding and projects of resistance 
or liberation.5 Neither the body nor our appreciation of it is merely something to 
overcome or negotiate around. 
The paper moves from the outside in. The surfaces of bodies, and, significantly, 
of other people’s bodies, are readily available to our senses, but especially to sight. So, 
there exists already a great deal of literature, both scholarly and (overwhelmingly) 
popular, on the aesthetics of bodily appearances, including how we ought and ought not 
present our bodies to other people. Surfaces are the most intuitive point of entry for my 
                                                                                                                                               
thoroughly intellectualized and treated as a science. This mean it’s not clear to me that we do think of 
doctors as people who work with bodies. We seem to think of doctors as people who solve complex 
biological problems. So, in high-value work on the body, the body is still a “problem.” Second, medicine 
has become a lot more reputable in the last three hundred years. So, while being a doctor has been 
primarily a masculine job, that job didn’t necessarily go to men who were otherwise in positions of 
significant power. It was certainly a job for the ambitious and the middle-class, but it took some time to 
get there. Third, the longstanding maleness of the field – though medical school graduation rates in the 
United States are approaching gender parity, only 34% of professionally active physicians identify as 
women, according to the Henry J Kaiser Foundation - might help block associations with bodies or mark 
medicine a special case. 
5 A project with more focus on historical sources would have the time to discuss the ways in which the 
same texts advocating a suspicion of the aesthetic as a sign of virtue also, generally, think aesthetic 
pleasure and activity (and even human bodies) have an important place in ethical projects. For example, 
in Pride and Prejudice, Elizabeth Bennet’s aesthetic pleasure in Mr. Darcy’s house and gardens tracks 
her improved opinion of him more generally, as well as cluing the reader into the fact that this improved 
opinion is the correct one. 
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project, capturing experiences of which many people are already aware, both as 
participants and observers. I am not interested in a hard and fast division between 
bodies-as-appearances and bodies-as-feelings; rather, I think the phenomenology of 
embodiment captures both visual and tactile sensation, both our experiences of what we 
look like and our experiences of being “in” our bodies.6 For instance, you probably see 
parts of your body as you read this paper: maybe your hands, maybe the outline of your 
nose or cheeks. So, although we might think that in order to see ourselves we need to 
look in a mirror, those of us who can see probably see some parts of our body all the 
time. Attending to the existing literature, with its emphasis upon the visible aspects of 
the body, helps lay a groundwork for the presence of the aesthetic in a non-traditional 
arena. Since I will, with plenty of help, stray even further from the tradition, starting 
with the familiar and moving toward the novel seems useful. My primary project draws 
attention to under-acknowledged parts of our experience as embodied moral agents, and 
so this paper always returns to felt experiences, which are one kind of under-
acknowledged experience.  
I also organize the paper so it moves through the relevant ways of considering 
the human body: first as an aesthetic site, then as an ethico-aesthetic site, and finally as 
a site of resistance. The next section of the paper reviews some work in aesthetics 
emphasizing somatic experiences as aesthetic experiences. I draw on recent work in 
aesthetics by Richard Shusterman, Sherri Irvin, and Yuriko Saito, especially, to 
establish the ways the body itself can be a site of aesthetic experiences, rather than 
merely the conduit for them. I then turn to feminist philosophy’s emphasis on bodily 
                                                 




experiences in the context of moral and aesthetic value. Our moral agency is embodied 
such that developing an awareness of bodily changes and sensations, and their aesthetic 
characteristics, improves self-knowledge, self-understanding, and our ethical lives. I use 
work of feminist philosophers such as Iris Marion Young and Nancy Bauer to suggest 
attention to an aesthetics of emotional experiences serves as a key component of 
resistance to processes of objectification and self-objectification. As a specific instance 
of the impact of our aesthetic environment on our moral lives, objectification illustrates 
the ethical significance of attention to the aesthetics of embodied experiences. Our 
experiences as embodied humans present a complex union of subject-object experience. 
We are object, both in the sense that we are physical beings and in that we are regarded 
by others, and subject – selves, persons, agents. For Beauvoir, this subject-object union 
is “ambiguity,” which Nancy Bauer use to complicate the dialectic on objectification. I 
argue that the aesthetic can contextualize this ambiguity in a way that facilitates 
resistance to oppressive structures – even if that resistance is primarily personal and 
internal. Ambiguity will receive more discussion in Section Four, but I mention the 
term here to signal the theoretical hook for the following sections’ focus on the ways 
subjectivity and objectivity relate in the contexts of embodiment and sexual 
objectification. 
II. Body Aesthetics: Outside and In 
Aesthetic analysis is comfortable in the rather narrow context of artworks and cultural 
products that might be artworks (television shows). Actually, aesthetic experience is, to 
borrow a term from Sherri Irvin, pervasive. In this section of the paper, I explore that 
pervasiveness and outline some aesthetic experiences specific to embodiment, 
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particularly felt experience. I focus on body aesthetics’ recognition of bodily 
phenomenology (first-personal experiences) as open to aesthetic appreciation and on the 
relationship between emotional, ethical, and aesthetic lives. Body aesthetics expands 
philosophy’s focus to include aesthetic experiences beyond those traditionally captured 
by aesthetic analysis, namely art-world experiences.7 By directing our aesthetic 
attention to bodies, the things people do to/with bodies, and the experience of having a 
body, body aesthetics makes conceptual room for an understanding of aesthetic 
experience as always, on some level, accessible. Our experiences as human beings are 
fundamentally embodied – our bodies are always with us. Because body aesthetics de-
emphasizes the notion of aesthetic experience as separate from or other than our day to 
day lives, in fact making it central to our day to day lives, body aesthetics occupies a 
place within the subfield of everyday aesthetics.  
Per Yuriko Saito, an aesthetics of the everyday directs attention to “sensuous 
qualities like size, shape, color, texture, sometimes smell, and the arrangements of parts. 
After all, it is these sensuous qualities with which we interact on a daily basis that, 
along with natural elements, make up the world in which we live” (2007, 2). Saito 
considers the sensuous qualities of quotidian experiences such as preparing and eating 
food, laundry, and landscaping. Such experiences include “aesthetic tastes and attitudes 
which often do lead to consequences which go beyond simply being preoccupied with 
the surface, and . . . affect not only our daily life but also the state of the society and the 
world” (2007, 55). I explore this effect in greater detail in the next section of the paper, 
                                                 
7 I don’t mean to discount the role the natural world plays in traditional accounts of aesthetics; certainly it 
has featured prominently in thinking on the sublime. 
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which details the link between our aesthetic and our ethical experiences; my goal in this 
portion of the paper is to survey the way body aesthetics analyzes embodiment. 
 Aesthetic values affect the visible features and practices related to the body. 
Aesthetic judgments inform what we put on and take off our bodies: clothing, makeup, 
hair, jewelry, tattoos, fat, skin, perfume. These practices of body modification and care 
intersect with self-understanding and self-expression. These practices express not only 
“one’s evaluative feelings regarding oneself and what would make one pretty, 
handsome, sexy . . .” but one’s cultural context and relationship to that context (Eaton 
2016, 42). Shirley Ann Tate, discussing black women’s beautification practices and 
their experiences navigating racialized beauty standards, writes that “[q]uestions of 
bodily practices such as those of beauty are always discursive and subject to the gaze of 
the other” (2009, 18). However, the “gaze of the other” is not definitive of these 
practices – nor of the practitioners. Tate describes specifically black practices such as 
wigs and colored contacts, which then filter into white women’s beauty practices (or are 
appropriated by white women) (2009, 25-27). Interpreting black women’s beauty 
practices as “aimed” at white culture norms misinterprets these practices. Firstly, white 
women tend to appropriate these practices and innovations – some white cultural-
aesthetic bodily practices are parasitic on black ones – making the direction of influence 
from black beauty culture toward white beauty culture. Secondly, interpreting any 
individual woman’s decision about self-presentation solely according to a black-white 
binary is reductive, even in instances such as respectability politics and civil rights 
struggles, where racial binaries and their attendant social capital are immediately 
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relevant to agents’ decision-making.8 Not only is the black-white binary insufficient for 
capturing many social positions with respect to race and ethnicity, but it frames beauty 
practices against an external backdrop, discouraging awareness of their internal 
meanings and origins. The meaning of black beauty practices like those Tate discusses 
originate in black people’s views of themselves. The gaze of the other matters, but so 
does the gaze of the self. 
 Body aesthetics further expands the scope of aesthetics by presenting felt 
experiences as aesthetic experiences. Attending to felt experience in this way limns the 
application of aesthetic idea(l)s to bodies and highlights aesthetic experiences bodies 
undergo. Writers on body aesthetics direct attention to aesthetic experiences of or 
through the body. For example, Irvin draws on a Deweyan account of “an experience” 
to help clarify why we should aesthetically consider activities such as “run[ning] my 
tongue back and forth on the insides of my closed teeth” (2008a, 30-31). Irvin has also 
argued for including experiences of itches and scratches as aesthetic ones (2008b). The 
scope of our aesthetic experiences is not limited to felt bodily sensations; the felt 
experiences that involve interacting with the world outside our bodies are also richly 
aesthetic. Apparently simple features of the world and our experiences of the world, 
such as the smell of a cat’s fur, can be quite complex if fully considered: “[w]hen I 
lower my face into my cat’s fur, my experience has subtle tactile, olfactory, visual, and 
emotional components” (2008a, 40). The complexity of meaning in this experience 
occurs in other felt experiences: scratching an itch, or the warm and coercive weight of 
the feeling of a cat sitting on the bed with you, or the beginnings of a headache. These 
                                                 
8 See the other papers for a more detailed treatment of these two topics. 
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cases do not encourage a clear phenomenological distinction between agents and the 
external world, but emphasize embededness and responsiveness to the world. Although 
I have discussed the cat cases as ones of bodies interacting with an external world, the 
division between the experience of body-with-other vs body-itself is conceptual rather 
than actual, teasing out a specific part of experience to examine it fully. 
As our emotional experiences figure prominently in embodied aesthetic 
experiences, our emotional lives figure prominently in our aesthetic experiences. They 
also share some similar structural features. Emotional experiences frustrate conceptual 
divisions between myself and the external world, between the feeling of our bodies and 
the appearances of them, between our physical and our psychological selves.9 Many 
emotional states leave visible signs on our bodies: we smile, we hunch our shoulders, 
we cry. Such visual effects are intuitively objects of aesthetic evaluation. Facial 
expressions fit into modes of existing aesthetic evaluation, perhaps because faces are 
already objects of aesthetic evaluation and labor. Here, I mean “object” both in the 
sense of “focus” and in the sense of “thing” – faces are both what we appraise and the 
“raw material” we transform, a relationship that generalizes to the body in general and 
will matter to the later discussion of objectification. Even our evaluation of faces at rest 
merges the aesthetic and the emotional using categories suggestive of both aesthetic 
qualities and emotional states: stern, austere, charming. So, it is also no surprise that we 
say someone has a lovely smile, meaning their smile is charming and transforms the 
face, but also suggests and evokes emotional states (happiness). I take these to be 
                                                 
9 I’m not trying to make any claims about mind-body dualism but refer to the experience of having a body 
and also a self with qualities that seem to be abstract or non-physical. 
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evaluations of the visual aspects of the bodily activities that accompany (or constitute) 
emotional states. 
However, I have much more access to the invisible records of the smile: air on 
my teeth and tongue, the stretch of muscles in my cheeks, jaw, lips, and throat. The 
emotional context of these physical activities/sensations alters their aesthetic character. 
The stretch of muscles in a forced smile has a different quality from the stretch that 
accompanies a joyful one. We might not even notice the tension in our muscles that 
results from a joyful smile, but find a forced smile unbearable. Our relationships with 
our bodies track both our understanding of what our bodies look like when they do 
things (an uncertain understanding) as well as what it feels like to do or undergo things. 
The rich and diffuse nature of bodily experience will be important for understanding the 
phenomenology of objectification and self-objectification.  
This division between felt experiences and visible experiences is not especially 
neat, even conceptually. Our tactile and visual senses are mutually entangled. My smile 
alters my field of vision as well as feeling like something to me. Further, it feels like 
something to see someone else smile, too. Sometimes it feels like tension easing, 
sometimes like a lump in the throat, and sometimes it feels like wanting to slap 
someone. When we find our bodies/selves undergoing these experiences, we learn 
something about our bodily responses, but we also learn about our orientation to the 
world around us. Such knowledge has important ramifications for our moral lives. And 
as I will argue in the rest of this paper, attention to the aesthetic dimension of felt bodily 
experience underlines subjectivity and, at least potentially, affirms personhood. For 
some of us, that affirmation might constitute new knowledge, but for others it will at 
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least be a useful reminder. Such a project could be of special importance to oppressed 
groups, who have a greater risk of objectification in their daily lives.  
Certain groups are vulnerable to objectification and, thereby, suffer moral harm 
because they do not enjoy the privilege of full moral consideration by the other 
members of their moral communities. Women, generally, have to deal with sexual 
objectification in ways that men, generally, do not. People of color and the 
economically vulnerable (a group that tends to include many women, as well as queer 
and disabled people, and children) also risk objectification and have limited means of 
responding to it. Members of these groups experience both the kind of sexual 
objectification I’m discussing here, and also a more general kind: diminished access to 
the kind of moral consideration set down in the second formulation of Kant’s 
categorical imperative.10 They are less likely to be treated as anything other than a 
means to someone else’s end. In less Kantian terms, members of these groups are more 
likely to find other people reduce their existence to the others’ own interests, rather than 
that interactions with others reflect diverse particularity. 
In outlining the aesthetic possibilities of embodiment, and the way these 
possibilities often feature in our emotional lives, I explained how it is that the body can 
be a source of aesthetic experience beyond the obvious (visual) ways. I also discussed 
body aesthetics as speaking to various social contexts: race, gender, class – these will be 
discussed more later in the paper. Throughout this first section, I also kept my case 
study, objectification in view, focusing for the moment on its social and aesthetic 
                                                 
10 Wesley Morris’s October 2016 NYT Magazine piece, “Last Taboo,” about representations of black 
male sexuality offers an excellent account of one kind of sexual objectification black men encounter. 
27 
 
aspects. But the focus on objectification requires a more thorough examination of the 
way the body, aesthetics included, feature in our moral lives. Objectification, after all, is 
primarily a moral wrong, not an aesthetic one.  
III. The Ethico-Aesthetic Body 
So: we have reasons to think of bodily experiences as aesthetic experiences, to consider 
emotional experiences as intersecting with aesthetic experiences, and to understand 
there are specific, under-explored kinds of aesthetic value permeating our embodiment. 
These aesthetic values may track our particular social context, including our racial, 
ethnic, and gender identities. The aesthetic values may also relate, sometimes quite 
closely, to ethical values as well. I still need to clarify how it is that our bodies feature 
in our ethical lives. It is easy to see how they feature negatively: consider your behavior 
last time you got hungry. But consider, too, handshakes and hugs. Drawing on literature 
in body aesthetics and contributions from feminist ethics, I argue here that ethico-
aesthetic consideration of the body affords a richer appreciation of embodiment and 
ethics. Framing our bodies as sites of ethical agency, rather than impediments to 
rational moral actions, allows us to work with our bodies, rather than against them. 
An aesthetics of embodiment addresses the convergence of the aesthetic and the 
ethical. Between them, Sherri Irvin and Yuriko Saito suggest at least two sites of 
convergence. First, attending to everyday aesthetic experiences can improve our 
appreciation of the world around us and our moral agency. A new focus on and 
appreciation for aesthetic experiences already available to us – including the full 
experience of embodiment – may make us less likely to search, irresponsibly and 
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unreflectively, for “new goods that make different experiences available. Perhaps we 
can discover that we already have enough, or even more than we need, to be satisfied” 
(Irvin 2008a, 42). Second, awareness of the ways our aesthetic values structure 
decision-making bolsters our self-awareness and transparency. Saito explores the 
second point in the context of environmental ethics. We have aesthetic tastes for smooth 
green lawns and bright white cotton t-shirts; acquiring and maintaining these things 
involves a great deal of money and hard work – but also, Saito points out, significant 
environmental harm (2007, 54ff). This is a good moral reason to adjust our aesthetic 
thinking and, thereby, our moral activity. Irvin suggests adjusting our sense of aesthetic 
value allows us reframe the moral project such that it no longer seems to hinge on self-
sacrifice (2008a, 42). For example, we can view reducing meat consumption “as a 
matter of finding different ways to indulge the tastes that were once satisfied by meat” 
(2008a, 43).11 Some of these experiences, such as the lawns, are largely external to 
bodies, others, such as the food and clothing, more obviously interact with or are 
incorporated into the body (although there is, of course, nothing in principle stopping 
you from bodily engaging with a smooth green lawn, and dogs certainly seem to enjoy 
rolling around on them). 
Some accounts make a special place for the body in our ethical lives. Here, I 
focus on Gail Weiss and Ami Harbin’s accounts. Weiss argues for an embodied ethics 
grounded in “bodily imperatives”: “ethical demands that bodies place on other bodies in 
the course of our daily existence” (1999, 5). Weiss’s bodily imperatives, which she 
contrasts with Kantian categorical imperatives and other abstract or transcendent moral 
                                                 
11 I’ve had good luck with chickpeas and smoked paprika.  
29 
 
claims, encompass the “physical and emotional responses that rise out of our complex, 
concrete relationships with other bodies” (5). Elsewhere, she writes that they “emerge 
out of our intercorporeal exchanges and . . . transform our own body images, investing 
them and reinvesting them with moral significance” (1999, 158). The central claim 
here, as I understand it, is that our self-conception, body included, relies in large part on 
our relationships with other people. A further key point of Weiss’s argument is that 
relationships with others are bodily/embodied, not the communion of abstract selves at 
the mercy of their bodies, or the bodies of others. Bodies are central and centered, are 
integral to personal identity and relationships. Equally important is that the effects of 
one body on other bodies are reciprocal.12 Relationships and moral communities have 
special significance for practices of moral self-cultivation “that can only be experienced 
and enacted through bodily practices . . .that both implicate and transform the bodies of 
others” (158). Weiss focuses and begins from bodies in their diverse particularity, not 
bodies abstracted away from or universalized into iconography (that must be 
overcome). She finds bodily histories and specific characteristics like age “as a source 
of respect both for the moral wisdom they can provide as well as for the that way they 
contextualize” our relationships (158). 
Exchanges in the social, rather than the biological, world often seem to sideline 
bodily imperatives. Death and birth are instances when the biological intervenes in the 
social with undeniable force. Weiss considers a few examples in her explanation of 
bodily imperatives: resistance to practices like sex-selective abortion, Simone de 
Beauvoir’s account of her mother’s death in Une morte très douce, relationships 
                                                 
12 I don’t mean that these effects are always positive, nor are they symmetrical.  
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between parents and children. Weiss notes that the relationship between maternal bodies 
and fetal bodies is one case where bodily imperatives are generally acknowledged and 
understood because “the intercorporeal exchanges between mother and fetus are too 
striking to be ignored” (1999, 168).13 The maternal-fetal relationship is recognizably 
intercorporeal, while in other contexts “the corporeal domain” tends to be “untouched 
as a distinctive, autonomous realm . . .described . . . in terms of relatively discrete 
bodies interacting with other discrete bodies” (168).  The bodily imperatives of a 
parent-child relationship include feeding and cleaning the child, the child’s need to be 
fed and cleaned and the mother’s need to feed and clean (though of course not all 
mothers experience these imperatives).  
Weiss grounds her explanation of bodily imperatives in Beauvoir’s case. 
Beauvoir describes her mother’s death as a situation in which relationships between 
people create clearly bodily needs and obligations. The bodily imperatives in 
Beauvoir’s situation are not as concrete as the bodily imperatives in the maternal-fetal 
or parent-child dynamic. Similarly, the intercorporeality is less literal, as no one is 
physically attached to anyone else. Weiss reads Beauvoir’s account of the death of her 
mother, Françoise, as containing bodily imperatives originating in Françoise de 
Beavuoir’s “deteriorating physical condition, which necessitates immediately, ‘life-and 
death’ decisions’” – bodily imperatives having to do with the body itself, and the kind 
of care to give it (158). However, Weiss also argues that bodily imperatives arise from 
the situation that don’t simply direct the participants toward the right treatment of 
Françoise de Beauvoir’s body, but toward the many people affected by and caring for 
                                                 
13 Of course, it’s not clear that the general awareness of the close relationship between mothers and 
fetuses is always for the best. 
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Françoise.  For example, Beauvoir’s mother refuses to acknowledge her looming death, 
even refusing to see a priest, despite her devout Catholicism. In Beauvoir’s telling, the 
imperatives, which require a kind of dishonesty, often make her and her sister 
uncomfortable – but they feel themselves compelled to meet their mother’s highly 
specific needs. Françoise de Beauvoir’s needs are not just for physical, but for her 
daughters to respond to and accommodate her psychological responses to the physical 
and emotional experiences prompted by the care. Her refusal to acknowledge that she is 
dying is one response, and the bodily imperative arising out of it is her daughters’ 
similar refusal, at least while they are in her company. Françoise de Beauvoir’s case 
also substantiates Weiss’s observation that we are subject to imperatives from our own 
body – our bodies do not simply require attention and responses of others, but from 
ourselves as well (167). These imperatives will not just have to do with our responses to 
birth, illness, and death, but more mundane occurrences like handshakes, meals, and 
bodily movements.   
 Bodily imperatives support a finely-grained ethics, making generalizations 
tricky. In this, Weiss’s proposal aligns with other ethical philosophies that view bodies 
not as obstacles to morality, but rather as media for moral action. For example, classical 
Confucianism insists on responsiveness to the particularities of human personalities and 
relationships and communicates moral regard through bodily behaviors. Confucius held 
that fulfilling filial obligations required more than meeting parents’ basic needs: “‘But 
even dogs and horses are provided with nourishment. If you are not respectful, wherein 
lies the difference?’” (2.7). “Respectful” is conceived robustly, clarified in the next 
passage when Confucius says, “‘It is the demeanor that is difficult’” (2.8). Anyone can 
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“go through the motions,” but moral regard must be embodied.14 Confucian sources 
emphasize personal integrity; in this case, integrity refers to the unity of moral 
requirements, emotional states, and bodily practice (2.4, 2.7-8). Ethics focused on 
relationships and community foreground “body images” as well as bodily imperatives; 
manners, comportment, and facial expressions are salient because these are aspects of 
our embodiment that give evidence of our emotional states to other people. Primarily, 
of course, they are visual evidence. How, then, can we return to a consideration of felt 
experience, and what role might it play in our moral lives? 
 Ami Harbin’s work on bodily disorientation, strongly influenced by Weiss, 
describes some of the possibilities for felt experience. For Harbin, disorientation refers 
to “experiences of shock or surprise, unease, and discomfort. They are often cued by 
feelings of being out of place, unfamiliar, or not at home” (2012, 262). Harbin 
emphasizes the everyday and the banal as aspects of our moral lives: “I take moral 
agency to be largely about day-to-day practices of interaction: with spaces, objects, 
living beings, events, projects, ideas, and norms” (263). Harbin argues that 
disorientation “experienced through complex corporeal, affective, and cognitive 
processes” is vital to moral agency (263). Experiences of bodily disorientation change 
our attentional patterns, highlighting aspects of our experiences that otherwise go 
unobserved:  
disorientations often make more visible the ways my well-being relies crucially 
on the work of others . . ., and this can support morally better, potentially 
reciprocal, interaction with them. As disoriented, we are more likely to stand out 
                                                 
14 See Sarkissian 2010 and Book 10 of Analects for an expanded treatment of this theme. 
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to others, to depend on them, and to appreciate their power in our lives; this can 
bring us into closer relationships in some cases and distance us from parts of our 
communities in others. (272) 
Harbin joins other philosophers (such as Weiss and Saito) who emphasize the link 
between attention and ethics: “we enact moral agency often through habits of attention 
and action” (273). And it is important to keep the body in view, as “processes of 
cognition and emotion cannot be theorized apart from embodiment” (276).15 These 
philosophical accounts of bodily experiences, bodily attention, and bodily imperatives 
shine a bright light on the habitual, preventing it going unremarked and 
unacknowledged. The habitual, after all, makes up the greatest part of our lives. I turn 
now to a particular kind of habitual experience: objectification. 
IV. Feminist Perspectives on Subjectivity and Objectification 
[W]hen might the whole problem – the whole thing – start happening to them again? 
The whole signs-of-mortality thing. The whole thing thing. Nobody likes it, thought 
Toby – being a body, a thing. Nobody wants to be limited in that way. We’d rather have 
wings. Even the word flesh has a mushy sound to it. 
We’re not selling only beauty, the AnooYoo Corp said in their staff instructionals. 
We’re selling hope. 
◼ The Year of the Flood, Margaret Atwood 
Bodies feature prominently in practices of objectification. Indeed, one way of 
conceiving of objectification is just as a “reduction to body” (Langton 2009, 228-29). 
Plenty of ink has been spilt on all the other ways of thinking about objectification, and 
when it is or isn’t a bad thing to do to another person. Kathleen Stock (2015) divides the 
                                                 
15 Even highly cognitive theories of emotion set aside some place for corporeal experience. 
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debate into two camps: the MacKinnon-Haslanger account (sexual objectification is 
categorically bad) and the Nussbaum-Langton account (sexual objectification is 
sometimes a good). The MacKinnon-Haslanger account links eroticism and 
subordination: “that women are to be sexually subordinated is experienced as what is 
erotic about women, both by men and by women too (MacKinnon 1987, 54)” (Stock 
192). Nussbaum and Langton do not link sexual objectification and gender as firmly as 
the MacKinnon-Haslanger account. Additionally, Nussbaum argues that objectification 
can be a positive experience, not damaging to humanity, in certain highly-circumscribed 
situations. For example, it doesn’t damage my lover’s status as a human being to use 
their belly as a pillow for my head as long as the relationship generally promotes 
respect and autonomy (1995, 265ff). 
Some philosophers question the framing of this debate over the nature of sexual 
objectification. Stock (2015) argues that the debate is illusory: the two camps are 
talking about different phenomena. On the other hand, Ann Cahill (2011) argues that 
both camps’ explanations of the harms in objectification perpetuate flawed notions 
about autonomy and moral worth, disvaluing human bodies in a way that erases the fact 
of embodiment and fails to dismantle harmful patterns of sexual exploitation. 
Furthermore, the traditional accounts neglect the way subjectivity features in practices 
identified as objectification. Cahill (like Weiss, though their projects are different) also 
rejects the idea of disembodied subjectivity, which perpetuates a mind/body hierarchy 
by abstracting away from bodily particularity. Cahill suggests, instead of continuing to 
use the concept of “objectification”, that we apply a new concept: derivatization, which 
involves seeing others as a reflection of our own interests (a derivative of us). Cahill 
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argues that derivatization explains the harms of reducing people to others’ interests in 
them, but bypasses the disvaluing of the body that the accounts of objectification can’t. 
I’m not here to weigh in on the conceptual gradations in various uses of 
“objectification” or alternative concepts – it seems to me that all the projects have 
merits and are promising in their explanatory power. Further, they all seem to agree that 
a similar set of sexualizing aesthetic evaluations that occur along gender lines are bad. 
That is, these accounts generally pick out the same kinds of phenomena and experiences 
but explain their bad-making properties differently. These experiences and events are 
bad because they reduce other people, particularly people in socially vulnerable 
positions relative to us, to their ability to fulfill our desires. Generally, the people so 
reduced are visibly members of a social group that is vulnerable to such reduction and 
whose membership in a vulnerable class is taken to justify that reduction. I think this is 
sufficient to get my project off the ground without alienating proponents of one or 
another definition of objectification or proponents of revisionist accounts. Borrowing 
Nancy Bauer’s argument that defining just what activities “count” as objectification is 
the kind of project that tempts philosophers without, necessarily, dispelling any 
confusion, I am going to let other people take up the ontological project (2015, 27). 
Human bodies aren’t by nature bad, and being embodied isn’t by nature bad, but as 
things currently stand, being identified with one’s body still counts as a reduction: not 
metaphysically, but socially and economically. Most of us can stand to get our 
metaphysics a little bit wrong for a while if it means we can focus on our well-being.  
My interest lies in the experience of navigating our moral lives under the risk, threat, or 
presence of objectification – or whatever.  
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Additionally, I think a perk of my analysis is its agnosticism about the concept 
of objectification (or derivatization) while nevertheless capturing a prevalent 
experience. Objectification, or something like it, affects our relationships with our 
bodies, our moral lives, and our self-understanding – generally for the worse. Because 
the burden of objectification intensifies when it intersects with oppressive structures, 
feminists have devoted a great deal of attention to exploring the harms of 
objectification. I will limit my discussion to the kinds of objectification that are 
harmful, whether obvious negative experiences that harm the objectified person (such as 
some kinds of street harassment) or more nuanced, less obviously harmful experiences 
(practices of self-objectification). I rely here on analyses of objectification offered by 
Iris Marion Young and more work by Nancy Bauer. Young and Bauer are, in turn, 
deeply influenced by Simone de Beauvoir and Sandra Bartky. I am also influenced by 
the work of bell hooks. My analysis and use of the existing work on objectification and 
related phenomena, and the experiences I use to ground the analysis, focus on the ways 
subjectivity and objectivity intertwine. As I understand it, my argument is relevant 
whether you think subjectivity and objectivity are mutually exclusive or mutually 
enmeshed – whether we toggle between them or experience them as woven together. 
 In her essay “Women Recovering Our Clothes,” Young gives a vivid depiction 
of the experience of objectification, prompted by an advertisement for wool clothing. 
The ad’s first panel shows a stylish woman in wool clothing; its second shows her 




And who might I be? An artist, perhaps . . .. Or maybe I will be a lecturer 
coming off the airplane . . .. Or perhaps I’m off to meet my new lover, who will 
greet me face to face and stroke my [clothes]. 
But who’s this coming up behind me? Bringing me down to his size. Don’t look 
back, I can’t look back, his gaze is unidirectional, he sees me but I can’t see him. 
But no – I am seeing myself in wool seeing him see me. Is it that I cannot see 
myself without seeing myself being seen? (63) 
Even in a consumerist fantasy, remember that men are evaluating you! Indeed, 
shouldn’t that be the consumerist fantasy? Young describes a complicated and upsetting 
experience, a sharp twist from subject-phenomenology to object-phenomenology with a 
noticeably aesthetic flavor. This disorienting experience differs from the kind Harbin 
valorizes.  
Enacting objectification is not the special province of actual men; women can 
and do engage in self-objectification and objectification of other women – I will discuss 
this a bit later in this section. And women certainly objectify men, for example 
Dietrich’s appraisal of Gary Cooper at the start of Morocco, or perhaps most vividly in 
contexts where class or racial privilege is made visible, such as Helena Bonham 
Carter’s brief appearance in Maurice. Playing an upper-class woman watching a cricket 
game, Bonham Carter frankly appraises gamekeeper Alec Scudder (played by Rupert 
Graves). The appraisal is communal, as Bonham Carter’s friend, of the same social 
class, points Scudder out to her, and both women take noticeable pleasure in his 
appearance – as the movie intends the audience to do. The pleasure turns into 
objectification when Bonham Carter’s character remarks, “perhaps with a haircut,” 
neatly reducing Scudder to his ability to fulfill her tastes and preferences. Not much 
hinges on Bonham Carter’s objectification of this lower-class man – the two characters 
don’t interact and we never see her again in the film – and I don’t think we can read the 
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Bonham Carter character as actually harming Scudder through her objectification of 
him. For one thing, her gender shapes her ability to harm him: even given the 
differences in their social class, she has fewer ways of enacting objectification than a 
man in her position would over a lower-class woman. For another, the film does not 
want us to agree with Bonham Carter’s reduction of Scudder; the audience reaction is 
something like, “yes, you’re right, we like to look at him, too – but that was quite a 
snobbish thing to say.”  
By contrast, the 1933 film Baby Face is 80 minutes of a woman exploiting men 
for her economic gain. Barbara Stanwyck’s Lily twists her vulnerability to 
objectification into an asset: that is, she bargains sexual allure for economic advantages. 
Lily’s method is self-objectification: understanding herself as an object. She knows that 
the men in her life objectify her (she wouldn’t use this word) and decides that she can 
exercise some control over what follows from these transactions. The film essentially 
tracks Lily’s progress from a focus of objectification to active self-objectification, 
though it keeps her subjectivity in view throughout. It accomplishes this in a few ways. 
First, the film treats Lily as an objectifier, although she does not sexually objectify the 
men in her life. Rather, she treats them as means to her ends. Second, the film positions 
her as a subject both through its narrative elements (plot, character development), 
Stanwyck’s performance (which is steely, but wry), and its visual strategies. Baby Face 
clearly sets up an environment of sexual exploitation and objectification for Lily, 
without actually encouraging the audience to view her as an object or suggesting that 
she really believes the narrative that her gender and social class ultimately define her. 
Lily consistently resists her marginalization – and the film endorses her resistance.  
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We observe Lily’s resistance and the film’s supportive attitude toward it in a 
few scenes. The first scene, early in the film, involves an altercation between Lily and a 
man who has just paid her father for a sexual encounter with her. The camera briefly 
adopts this man’s viewpoint for a lingering pan up Lily’s body, which receives an ironic 
puncture when it culminates in a close-up of her irritated, sullen face.16 She is clearly 
preoccupied with her own thoughts and resents others’ intrusions upon them. Rather 
than submitting to the sexual encounter, Lily pours coffee on the man’s hand as he 
gropes her knee. She offers a non-apology: “Oh, I’m sorry, it’s just my hand shakes so 
when I’m around you.” When he pursues her into her bedroom, she pushes him off, 
leaves, and pours herself a beer. When he comes up behind her, interrupting her first 
sip, she smashes him over the head with the empty bottle – and then, while he’s reeling 
from the assault, goes back to her beer. The men in her life may take her sexual 
availability for granted, but Lily never does. Further, Lily resents the attitude the men 
around her take, but her resentment does not lead to victimhood.17 I don’t mean that she 
has unwavering self-confidence or self-possession, as a scene discussed below makes 
clear, Lily’s sense of her options changes with the times. But, by presenting Lily at her 
own estimation and foregrounding her own view of herself and her projects, the film 
consistently presents her as a subject, rather than reducing her to an object. 
Because she melds self-objectification with transactional sex work that relies on 
an objectifying view of men, Lily’s experience explores a different, more complex kind 
                                                 
16 Warner Archive has excerpted this scene and put it on YouTube: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QqN8AZCGvnc  
17 A recent Indian film, The Dirty Picture, presents a similar narrative of self-objectification for material 
gain and, to some extent, psychological fulfillment. The Dirty Picture is a tragic melodrama, however, 
and so the story is also one of a woman being punished for sexual transgressions. In Baby Face, Lily gets 
away with it, which I think is the more interesting turn of events. 
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of tension between subject/object identity than Young’s. Young explores objectification 
originating in an appearance of the body. The cases of Gary Cooper in Morocco, or 
Rupert Graves in Maurice, or the woman/self in Young’s imagination only require that 
the objectified be visible to the objectifier, that the body and self be vulnerable through 
visibility. The other sensuous qualities of “Young’s” body are irrelevant to the 
objectifier, as are Young and her projects. The objectifying gaze makes that irrelevance 
clear, and the complete, rapid, and (for the objectifier) incredibly easy, isolation of the 
experience of one’s self from the appearance of one’s body is what makes this kind of 
objectification so striking. A look is sufficient to sever the connection between the 
visible evidence of my personhood and my personhood itself. Young describes a 
forcible switch from subject-experience to object-experience. There is something 
aspirational in the experience of identifying with the woman in the first picture; the 
second picture yanks identification away. While feeling herself to be a subject – a 
person – she is reminded that, for others, she is an object, a something-for-others. All 
through looking. 
Baby Face again presents quite a different situation. First, because Lily’s self-
objectification involves a series of sexual relationships, she cannot self-objectify simply 
through presenting her appearance. Rather, she puts the full spectrum of her body’s 
sensuous qualities on offer for her sexual partners/patrons. Indeed, the pan up her body 
at the start of the film, and the way the film subverts that generally lascivious cinematic 
technique, suggests that Lily is particularly resistant to visual objectification. Because 
the immediate result of the film’s nod to visual objectification is significant bodily 
injury to the man whose objectifying gaze the camera appears to adopt, the film 
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suggests that taking the appearance of Lily’s body as indicative of the things that may 
be done to her/body is doomed. Rather than having her subjectivity yanked away, it is 
both the necessary condition for her self-objectification and something continually 
intruding on the fantasy on which her sexual relationships rely. Lily’s self-
objectification requires simultaneously pretending to have very few personal desires but 
also having enough ambition to willingly engage in transactional sexual relationships. 
In order to make the relationship last long enough to secure, for example, a luxurious 
apartment, Lily has to maintain an environment of convincing mutual pleasure. In most 
cases, she drops the façade after securing a more powerful patron, thereby underlining 
the degree to which she sublimates her sense of self in the pursuit of her social and 
economic well-being.  
Lily’s situation further differs from that of the woman in Young’s paper because 
Lily is not forced between the roles of object and subject. Rather, the plot of the film 
relies on her choosing to adopt both roles at once. She follows the Nietzsche-inspired 
advice she receives at the start of the film, from Crabb, an old cobbler who recognizes 
her sexual appeal but displays no sexual interest in her, treating her as a mentee. After 
her father’s death, Lily briefly considers giving into the limited options Eerie, 
Pennsylvania offers: “Just as I was leaving the cemetery, Ed Sipple made me a 
proposition. And last night the manager at the burlesque house offered me a job in the 
chorus to do a strip act.” Crabb criticizes both her lack of ambition and sense of 
surrender, saying Lily is deciding to “let life defeat you, you don’t fight back.” Instead, 
she should recognize her “power over men. But you must use men. Not let them use 
you. . . . Exploit yourself! Use men! Be strong! Defiant! Use men to get the things you 
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want.”18 In some sense, Lily’s choice still represents a surrender: she agrees to go along 
with the role in which most men have cast her, rather than continuing to hit them over 
the head with beer bottles. She “gives in” to her objectification. In another sense, it’s 
impossible for viewers to deny Lily’s subjectivity. And, considering that the turning 
point in the film involves a jealous ex-lover’s murder of the man who replaced him, and 
then his own suicide, which turns into a scandal Lily bargains into a $15,000 payout (in 
1933 money!) and a job in Paris (at which she excels), it’s quite clear who’s come out 
on top. That is: we have to believe Lily is objectified by both herself and other people, 
but we would be quite wrong to believe she is taken advantage of. 
Lily’s juggling of subjectivity and objectification is human ambiguity. On 
Bauer’s reading of Beauvoir, “ambiguity” captures a “phenomenological dilemma” not 
just a metaphysical one (Bauer 47). Living as a human, a person discovers “she is a both 
a subject (a self-conscious being capable of moving beyond what nature and the world 
give to her, including her desires as they stand) and an object (an embodied being with 
characteristics, a style, appetites, and a history, all of which invite the judgment of 
others)” (Bauer 47). For women and other oppressed groups who have to consider the 
objectifying gaze of others if they wish to navigate the world safely, discovering the 
degree to which they register as objects is a poignant experience.19 Further, women 
                                                 
18 In a nice touch, the film reveals that Lily and Crabb stay in contact even after she’s “made it.” 
19 Ambiguity shares some features in common with double consciousness, in both the Du Boisian and the 
Emersonian uses, and some scholars suggest that Beauvoir was familiar with Du Bois’s work through 
Richard Wright (Simons 1999, Chanter 2000). See Bruce 1999 for a comparison of Du Bois and Emerson 
and McWeeny 2016 for an analysis of other kinds of two-ness in oppression. Ambiguity seems 
ontologically and phenomenologically distinct from double consciousness, with one important distinction 
being that ambiguity is at least in theory something anyone will experience and double consciousness 
originates in some specific historical instances. So, ambiguity seems like a precondition for varieties of 




have real motivation to engage in self-objectification because doing so earns praise and 
pleasure. Bartky argues that narcissism enables women to derive a kind of masculine 
pleasure in their own bodies. A woman is fully capable of “tak[ing] toward her own 
person the attitude of the man [objectification]. She will then take erotic satisfaction in 
her physical self, reveling in her body as a beautiful object to be gazed at and 
decorated” (Bartky 1990, 36-37). Bartky’s “erotic satisfaction” has a significant 
aesthetic component, too, and one which looks similar to traditional aesthetic 
expression: artistic expression. The objectified body is the raw material on which 
subjectivity may be expressed. 
Subjectivity also intrudes on self-objectification in more straightforwardly erotic 
contexts, such as sex. Bauer talks about self-objectification becoming a kind of sexual 
power in the context of unreciprocated oral sex amongst college students: “Being the 
object of the helpless desire of a boy you are about to fellate, especially when, at the 
moment, you’re the only one around to fulfill it, can be – excuse the pun – a heady 
experience for a girl. And the pleasure is only intensified if it’s quasi-sadistic” (2015, 
46). Again, Stanwyck’s performance in Baby Face comes to mind. Lily’s approach to 
sex is transactional, self-centered, and quasi-sadistic. Her pleasure at duping the men 
who seek to exploit her facilitates both her self-objectification and the project of 
exploiting men for her own needs. Lily’s self-objectification brings genuine material 
and psychological pleasures. For one thing, the project of taking men’s money both on 
and off the clock serves as a kind of revenge on the men in her hometown, including the 
memory of her father. Dropping one when a more rewarding target comes in view is 
also a kind of revenge on their venality and self-absorption. For another, she has 
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financial security, lovely clothes and pleasant surroundings, and peace of mind. She 
might have to manage the men she sleeps with, but she doesn’t have to worry about 
them. They are fungible, their feelings and desires important only inasmuch as they 
enable or obstruct her ability to achieve her own goals.  
As these cases show, subjectivity and objectification are complexly bound up in 
each other. In the context of sexual objectification in a patriarchal society, women’s 
subjective experiences seem to undergird a voluntary self-objectification from which 
they themselves derive no small amount of genuine pleasure. Sometimes that pleasure is 
somewhat solipsistic, as Bauer describes, but in the Baby Face case, the pleasure signals 
resistance to and manipulation of objectifying structures. Lily’s pleasure is mostly in the 
products of her objectification, or in the results of her subjectivity (her ambition and 
canniness), rather than the experience of objectification. Bauer’s case of self-
objectification differs again in that the pleasure is most significantly in the 
objectification, not its results. 
By contrast, other feminized activities might also make the list of pleasurable 
self-objectification without necessarily involving sexual exploitation. It is nice to have 
soft hands and moisturized lips. For one thing, when you “take care of yourself” in this 
way, you are more likely to be more physically comfortable and less likely to, for 
example, find your lips splitting during an animated conversation or your fingers torn 
apart by hangnails. Both experiences are painful and distracting. But these kinds of 
bodily maintenance fulfill traditional feminine aesthetic roles, even more traditional 
than Lily’s gradually acquired silk robes and bleached hair. The objects that enable 
women to fulfill those roles are sold as such, promising the appearance of youth, 
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beauty, and sexiness. My moisturizer tells me that by using it I “refuse to obey time,” 
because my face will not undergo the changes that a physical body left to the mercies of 
time and nature will. If you’re going to be an object (and you’re going to be), you better 
be a perfect one. Foundation won’t fix the problem – “the whole thing thing,” as 
Atwood put it in the quote at the start of this section – but it will do a pretty good job 
stopping other people from noticing the problem. A different strategy involves selling 
products as self-indulgent occasion for pleasure, that, despite their self-indulgence, are 
the kind of thing a woman owes herself. On this approach, failing to acquire or pursue a 
trim waist and new lipstick are signs that women are letting themselves down.  
This kind of self-objectification emphasizes subjectivity. However, emphasizing 
subjectivity happens by putting the body at a distance and positioning it as a problem to 
be solved or as a medium for sensuous attention. Neither the narrative of self-perfection 
nor the narrative of self-indulgence seems to capture the richness of women’s actual 
experiences of our bodies and the things we do with and to them. Although these 
strategies and patterns of self-understanding rely on ambiguity between object/subject 
existence as a basic human feature, since they would be impossible without ambiguity, 
they do not acknowledge or explore ambiguity. The body is once more the thing 
(object) transformed by our agency (subject). Nor do these manifestations of self-
objectification understand embodiment as a neutral fact of human existence. Whether 
the body is a medium for pleasure or mastery, it remains extraneous and inessential to 
subjectivity. At best, it throws subjectivity into sharper relief. 
Young’s essay “Breasted Experience” explores ambiguity, contrasting felt 
experience and objectification. Young argues women “experience our objectification as 
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a function of the look of the other, the male [subject] gaze that judges and dominates 
from afar” (2005, 77). Breasts are readily and easily objectified through their 
(mis)alignment with certain visual, phallo-centric ideals. Under Western patriarchy, a 
woman’s “fetishized breasts are valued as objects, things” and her value reduced to that 
of the (most) visible sign of her sexuality (78). Bell hooks describes a version of this 
objectification/appropriation in “Selling Hot Pussy.” Outside a dessert place with a 
group of white colleagues on a Friday night, other patrons refer to hooks as a “nigger.” 
Her attempts to draw her colleagues’ attention to the racist reaction receive no uptake. 
And then: “as we enter the dessert place they all burst into laughter and point to a row 
of gigantic chocolate breasts complete with nipples – huge edible tits. They think this is 
a delicious idea – seeing no connection between this racialized image and the racism 
expressed in the entryway” (1997, 122). Already facing solo status in her professional 
group, hooks is now doubly an outsider, reminded that not only that she, her blackness, 
is unwelcome, but that the “past when the bodies of black women were a commodity” 
resurfaces at any time (122). Perhaps hooks’ epistemic privilege also allows her to 
understand the dessert as objectification in ways her white colleagues do not; perhaps 
all it takes is knowing that those chocolate breasts look like her body, still, in many 
ways, the absolute of otherness for white people. Here are breasts for literal 
consumption, isolated from the body as a whole and from considerations of personhood. 
For many women, in a patriarchal context, the existing dialogue around 
“breasted experience” requires considering yourself and your breasts either as objects 
for sexual-aesthetic delectation or as problems to be solved. Even in female-dominated 
spaces, acknowledging breasted experience usually means discussing back pain, the 
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difficulty of finding clothes that fit properly, or the need to support the breasts during 
exercise – in short, the inconvenience of having breasts. They are obstacles to 
personhood or obstacles to day-to-day existence – surely a counterproductive attitude to 
have toward our bodies if we are seeking human flourishing. We need to push back 
against the pattern of objectification that dominates our understanding of embodiment. 
But how?  
Young argues for creating a “woman-centered meaning” for the breasts, 
constructing a value framed “apart from measurement and exchange” (80). Rather than 
prizing the way breasts look as they conform to patriarchal ideals, a woman-centered 
approach would consider their relative fluidity. Many of the complaints women have 
about their breasts hinge upon breasts’ protean characteristics: the need to keep breasts 
supported and relatively still while running, and the way they alter according to changes 
in hormones underline the ways in which actual breasts fail to meet the phallocentric 
objectified standards applied to them. These standards are inappropriate – of course we 
fail them. Women’s breasted experiences are already more diverse than the look-
oriented, objectifying approach to breasts and bodies admits, but it is the tensions that 
are easiest to discuss. Rather than foregrounding the frustrations of bodies failing the 
objectifying standards set upon them, a woman-centered approach acknowledges 
subjectivity and personhood in embodiment. Young takes breasts as a starting point, but 
the project could extend to the rest of our bodies.  
Exploring just how we might extend the project is the work of the following 
section. In order to flesh out these possibilities for subjectivity, I return to everyday 
aesthetics. Work in everyday aesthetics focusing on the body extends the project in 
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feminist philosophy of addressing issues of bodily objectification, both sexual and 
otherwise, while also highlighting the way subjectivity functions in these experiences. 
While the discussions in this just-concluded section of the paper meant to illustrate the 
ways subjectivity and objectification are intertwined with each other, the move to 
everyday aesthetics addresses somewhat pragmatic concerns. Focusing on aesthetic 
experience gives us some guidance as to how we can, in our own lives, “remember” our 
subjectivity and thereby resist objectifying narratives. 
V. Aesthetic Experience and Subjectivity 
The idea that paying attention is one way of acknowledging value recurs throughout 
philosophy of the everyday. I argue that paying attention to women’s experiences of 
objectification is one way of counteracting everyday instances of gendered injustice. 
My focus here is not on paying attention to women’s testimonies about those 
experiences, but on attention to phenomenology of objectification. Both examples that I 
mentioned at the beginning of this paper, street harassment and self-objectification, 
feature here as occasions when attention to embodied experience affirms subjectivity. 
Further, the aesthetic has a special place in the ongoing, many-layered project of 
counteracting gendered injustices and understanding one’s own condition. So, the 
attention I advocate is, at least in part, aesthetic attention. I will start by explaining why 
this is a project for aesthetics, not just ethics or political philosophy. 
 Our human ambiguity means that we are both subjects and objectified others. 
When you “toggle” from subject to object – or, as in the case of Young’s wool 
advertisement and other cases of objectification, are toggled – subjectivity lurks in the 
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background.20 Self-objectification also requires a subject-agent -- I suspect that is one of 
the reasons it bothers us. Despite its pervasiveness, objectification is not something you 
are supposed to accept when it is done to you, much less opt in to. An objectified person 
has had a harm done to them by someone else, but self-objectification looks like a harm 
one does oneself despite “knowing better.” Young’s phenomenology of objectification 
is transparent on the intertwining of subjectivity and objectification, because she clearly 
illustrates the switch from one perspective to the other, and also elucidates the 
discomfort that results. Because she writes as an observer not a participant, Bauer’s 
examples are more opaque – as, indeed, are many of our experiences of objectification 
and self-objectification. But the opacity of these other instances lends significance to 
felt experience, since it becomes one more source of information and meaning. 
Determining the specifics of bodily imperatives surely requires thoughtful attention to 
the specifics of relationships, the people in those relationships, and their contexts. 
Privileging the specific over the “universal” is vital to Weiss’s account: “There is no 
‘place’ to begin to examine a relationship except from within that relationship” (1999, 
163). Now, that is a very strong construction – perhaps too strong for my liking – but it 
does usefully center the interested parties, and prioritize the concrete circumstances of 
embodied interactions. 
There are three reasons for thinking we should understand my project as 
aesthetic, rather than “merely” ethical. First, aesthetic values play a large role in 
processes of objectification, such that aesthetic norms signal the value of certain kinds 
                                                 
20 It’s not clear to me if the reverse is also the case: if objectification is also always in the background. I 
am uncertain what to say on this point because I am not sure about the role power and privilege play. 
Objectification doesn’t begin and end with sexual objectification, and some people probably never have 
to consider receiving sexual objectification. 
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of bodies. Second, deviation from or adherence to these norms makes one particularly 
vulnerable to objectification. In the spectrum (there is at least one!) of feminine self-
presentation, the middle ground allows one to pass unremarked, but “ostentatiously” 
feminine or notably androgynous or masculine self-presentation “provoke” comments. 
But certain bodies get classed as “extremely feminine” or “androgynous” without much 
agential action at all: women have relatively little say about the size of their breasts or 
the width of their hips. Finally, the link between aesthetic attention and moral agency 
also means there is a particular need to counter aesthetic oppression with aesthetic 
liberation. I use the ethico-aesthetic norm of sexiness to illustrate the relevant dynamics. 
 Aesthetic values inform our judgments about our own bodies and the bodies of 
others, sometimes enabling objectification. We consider bodies in light of norms like 
sexiness, and alter bodies/bodily appearances to better align with them, or to flout them 
more dramatically. Though actual ideas about what “counts” as sexy are as diverse as 
the people who hold them, the cultural content of, or what A. W. Eaton calls our 
“collective taste” for/in sexiness is fairly limited.21 It readily acknowledges white, able 
bodies. It makes room, sometimes, for racially and ethnically “ambiguous” bodies, 
provided they meet or better the standards of white sexual desirability. In the aesthetic 
context of the 1990s, hooks argued that Naomi Campbell “embodies an aesthetic that 
suggests black women, while appealingly ‘different,’ must resemble white women to be 
considered really beautiful,” while also being photographed in highly sexualized 
contexts (1997, 130). Whatever racial progress has occurred since the 1990s, the sense 
that Lupita Nyong’o’s Vogue covers push the boundaries of mainstream beauty persists. 
                                                 




Vogue covers (in general) track a slightly different kind of desirability than concepts of 
sexiness do, and Nyong’o and Campbell are not treated as desirable, beautiful, or sexy 
in the same way Kate Upton is (they are high fashion in a way Upton is not).22 The 
ideas nevertheless intersect and overlap, and women find themselves navigating their 
relationship to each. For women of color, sexual desirability and beauty are fraught 
experiences – and often dehumanizing, objectifying in a surprisingly narrow sense. For 
example, Robin Zheng, writing about “yellow fever,” or white men’s “preference” for 
Asian and Asian-descended women, argues that “racial depersonalization inherent in 
yellow fever threatens Asian/American women with doubts as to whether they are or 
can be loved as individuals rather than as objects in a category” (2017, 408).23 And 
Asian/American women who find themselves outside the lines of “collective taste” for 
Asian/American female bodies might find themselves with doubts as to whether they 
can be loved as objects in a category, let alone individuals. Desirability seems possible 
only through the lens of the exotic and the subhuman. 
 Sexiness is oddly positioned in the context of gender. It sometimes permits 
male bodies to be desirable as bodies, rather than as people.24 However, the cultural 
content of sexiness still requires pouting lips, lush cleavage, and a dramatic hip-waist 
ratio, and none of these attributes traditionally fall within the domain of the male 
body.25 Most female bodies also fail to realize these attributes, and so women-in-
                                                 
22 Though Upton has also been on Vogue covers, her career relies on her ability to please a very 
traditional version of the male gaze in a way neither Campbell’s nor Nyong’o’s does.  
23 The phenomenon is not limited to heterosexual relationships. Alexander Chee (2017), a Korean-
American writer, has discussed dating a “rice queen” (he doesn’t recommend it). 
24 See, for example, the camera’s treatment of John Abraham at the beginning of “Shut Up and Bounce:” 
https://youtu.be/0akqVN4ts0w  
25 Sherri Irvin suggests it might be the case that there are simply different norms of sexiness for men. I 
think that’s true – but sexiness full stop still seems to be feminized to me. If you want to talk about male 
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waiting “must” learn to counterfeit them through purchases (lip gloss, elaborate 
lingerie) or postures (shoulders back, one foot forward, back arched). The norm here is 
visual: the goal is to create an appearance of sexiness, contemplated at a distance. This 
appearance of sexiness happens to be pretty useless for reciprocal sexual activity: it’s 
very difficult to remain sexy while taking off your Spanx. Failure to learn how to mimic 
the norm sexiness can have terrible consequences.26 So, too, can success. 
 The mode of judgment, conformity to, and rejection of such ideals as sexiness is 
paradigmatically visual. This is particularly true of other-directed aesthetic activity, but 
it is also true of much self-directed aesthetic activity. Applying red lipstick, for 
example, does seem like an act of distancing me from my body: it sets up the kind of 
object/observer dynamic that got us into this problem in the first place. However, felt 
experience is less easily categorized according to objectifying norms. Indeed, I suggest 
that felt experience offers a strong counter to objectification. Paying attention to felt 
experience foregrounds subjectivity by making salient those parts of our being which 
are specific to us individually: our emotions, reactions, histories, and the nebulous, 
sometimes mysterious internal sensations that only we have (total) access to. Only I 
know what the drag of the lipstick feels like. Only I know if it dries my lips. This is 
much more important to my experience of the lipstick than whether the lipstick looks 
                                                                                                                                               
sexiness, you have to specify that you’re referencing an alternative mode of sexiness. The situation is the 
inverse of “woman writer” or “female comedian,” which signals, through the gender label, that the person 
being discussed is an exception our cultural understanding that writers and comedians are male. 
26 This is of special poignancy for trans women, whether or not their self-expression leans toward 
traditional feminine aesthetics. A woman’s safety might rely on her being “convincingly” a “real 
woman.” But if she manages this too well, she risks hyper-sexualization and, perhaps, the assumption that 
she is a sex worker. And if she declines to present in a feminine way, she might increase her risk of 
encountering transphobic violence. 
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“perfect.” In public, only other people can see if it does, and other people are not very 
good at noticing.  
However, we do need to wear lipstick to create or provide an aesthetic 
experience for observers. Our bodies have visual and tactile features already, while we 
can move our bodies in ways that produce aesthetic effects. For us, these experiences 
have felt qualities, too. I don’t know what it is like to be Lily in Baby Face, but I 
suspect the beguiling smile she gives her patron has felt qualities inaccessible to him, a 
flavor only she perceives. She might be thinking with delight of the feeling of her full 
stomach and silk underwear, even as she also registers her contempt for the man who 
paid for those sensations. An aesthetic appreciation of these experiences might entail, as 
Irvin suggests about itches and scratches, “acknowledging . . . how they call attention to 
our somatic experience and how they color that experience in certain ways” (2008b, 
30). Lily’s experiences can only make complete sense if their aesthetic qualities are 
considered, too. The significance of her – compromised, grim, morally dubious – 
choices registers through the aesthetics of her felt experience. Or, since Lily is fictional, 
the full meaning of choices made by people like her manifest in the details of their 
subjective experiences.27 The way we experience our own embodiment matters, just as 
the way we experience other people’s embodiment matters. Some of that experience is, 
or can be, aesthetic. 
Recognizing the aesthetic aspect of embodiment is, on some level, just a 
response to the bare facts of human existence. At its most basic level, aesthetic 
                                                 
27 The situation has some echoes in the choices impoverished people make, which often look like bad 
ones to the financially secure. Lily, like many women, is poor at the beginning of the film.  
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appreciation of embodiment just requires saying, “I am embodied, and therefore there 
are sensuous experiences specific to my embodiment that I can pay attention to in ways 
that inform me about the world and myself.” But, as the discussion of aesthetic 
experience above highlighted, making the aesthetic aspects of our experience salient 
alters our way of valuing them. Calling attention to something’s sensuous qualities and 
fully attending to the specifics of sensuous experience, rather than screening them out, 
is a way of giving that experience value and weight. Aesthetic experience pervades our 
lives – but value pervades aesthetic experience. 
With this in mind, let me suggest a further arena where aesthetic attention to felt 
embodied experiences is morally valuable: when on the receiving end of that hiss I 
mentioned above. Such expressions seek to cut women down to size, reminding women 
they are first and foremost things for men to consider possessing. In fact, these 
“interactions” often seem to rely on a masculine assumption that he already possesses 
you. Receiving this kind of response can be humiliating.28 That humiliation has, I think, 
its own bodily phenomenologies. In the face of an objectifying hiss, my nausea, hot 
cheeks, and curled lip “color my somatic experience” and reaffirm my personhood – if I 
let them. These bodily reactions push back against the gaze of ownership, affirming my 
sense that a wrong has been done me and my sense that the wrong was moral. In 
communicating contempt through a curled lip and registering my anger by the heat in 
my cheeks, I redirect the negative emotional/moral reaction of shame away from my 
self and toward the person who has actually committed the violation. Simply noting my 
                                                 
28 Although it is also sometimes merely baffling. I don’t take bewilderment to be a morally better reaction 
to street harassment in general, but I suspect it is sometimes a kind of self-preservation. It’s not, in my 
experience, unusual to skip straight to contempt, bypassing humiliation altogether. 
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bodily responses is insufficient to make this shift, although it is of course important. I 
must also appreciate the bodily responses, must inhabit the experience. Otherwise, I 
risk distancing myself from the moral wrong. Or, I distance and alienate myself from 
the body (my body!) that received this moral wrong. I run the risk of habituated 
alienation from my body – which would again negatively impact my moral functioning 
and my well-being. 
Aesthetic attention is not the only attention that can achieve this effect, but 
reflecting on earlier arguments about acknowledging and seeking out aesthetic 
experience in daily life helps explain why the aesthetic can make this kind of resistance 
more effective. Attending to the aesthetics of something and recognizing aesthetic 
experience as a possible response to our interaction with a thing is a way of valuing that 
thing.29 A key component of those earlier arguments was that both seeking out aesthetic 
experience and appreciating aesthetic experience in areas where we don’t expect it helps 
change our orientation toward those areas. So, as the example above went, appreciating 
the aesthetic experiences unique to vegetables can help us appreciate vegetables more, 
and thereby facilitate adopting a vegetable-centric diet. Note that I am not suggesting 
we aesthetically appreciate being objectified, but rather that we cultivate an aesthetic 
appreciation of our bodily responses to objectification. Our bodies are the vegetables: 
aesthetically appreciating bodily responses, particularly the felt responses that are 
accessible only to us, is a way of valuing the body and our affective reactions to the 
world around us. In situations of oppression, we end up valuing our bodily counter-
                                                 
29 Aesthetic appreciation of something doesn’t preclude exploitation of it, but I think the case I’m 
considering is narrowly circumscribed enough to avoid that worry. The worry creeps up in other papers in 
this dissertation and is probably worth a more involved treatment at a later date. 
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testimony, helping us to resist the forces structuring that oppression. While other ways 
of taking stock of our embodiment provide us with the relevant testimony, attending to 
the aesthetic facets of the testimony help us cultivate an attitude of value toward that 
testimony. Aesthetically attending to the body also keeps ambiguity salient, thereby 
preventing us from perpetuating the subject/object split on which some kinds of 
oppression (such as objectification) rely. 
By inhabiting my experience fully, learning the quirks of embodied emotions, I 
learn to appreciate my body as something that strengthens my subjectivity. Bodily 
experiences, in the totality of their feeling if not their appearances are accessible only 
subjectively. They are not other-regarding, but private. In their privacy and subjectivity, 
felt experiences render objectifying comments and gazes incomplete. They offer 
immediate counter-testimony to the objectifying judgment and suggest other sources of 
self-understanding and value. In conditions of oppression, it is important to have ideas 
about what alternatives we might have or make in opposition to oppressive structures. 
Subjective experience, which says to itself, “but I am a person and it does matter how I 
am treated,” offers one such alternative. Aesthetic appreciation of that subjective 
experience, because of its close relationship with value and worth, gives persuasive 
power the counter-testimony of our embodiment. 
Finally, attention to felt experience helps render the body fully human rather 
than merely a precondition for objectification or impediment to moral action. It 
accomplishes this by adjusting our understanding of what having a body means. 
Embodiment still makes us, for example, physically and existentially vulnerable – and I 
don’t think altering our fundamental vulnerability is within philosophy’s purview. 
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However, focusing on the aesthetic possibilities resulting from our embodiment, in that 
embodiment makes sensuous experience possible, suggests other ways of 
conceptualizing and experiencing embodiment. On this approach, the body is central to 
our humanity in that it features prominently and, at least sometimes, positively in our 
moral lives. The body is furthermore a rich source of meaningful experience, singularly 
available to embodied beings. Pointing out the conditions of human existence and 
suggesting new ways to relate to those conditions certainly is within philosophy’s 
purview.  
VI. Conclusion 
By decentering the outward appearance of bodies and attending instead to the 
specificities of felt experience, we can foreground subjectivity. This reframes the 
aesthetic in a few ways. First, it makes the aesthetic an aid to our ethical and moral 
lives. Second, it accomplishes this union by using the aesthetic to redirect attention to 
our own embodiment and, thereby, our own subjectivity. Third, it presents a positive 
link between aesthetic experiences and bodily experiences, rather than simply placing 
the body at the mercy of (often-corrupt) aesthetic values. 
The paper further offers reasons to move beyond images of both our moral lives and our 
aesthetic experiences that, when they acknowledge embodiment’s role at all, denigrate 
the body’s role in moral or aesthetic processes. Instead, it suggests ways in which the 
body positively contributes to our ethico-aesthetic lives and is a worthwhile object of 
ethical and aesthetic attention. A key feature of these contributions is embodied 
aesthetic experience’s ability to facilitate resistance to oppression by reminding us, 
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when we experience certain kinds of oppression, of the counter-evidence we can 
marshal against oppressive narratives and structures. This resistance, as I understand it, 
is limited: it mostly has to do with our self-understanding, constructing an 
understanding that allows us to reject the version of ourselves that oppressive narratives 
and acts, like sexual objectification, propagate. Though it is clearly no replacement for 




3. Respectability Politics as Aesthetic Practice 
This paper serves as a philosophical examination of respectability politics, past and 
present. Respectability politics, I argue, are a specifically aesthetic set of politically-
oriented strategies adopted by members of marginalized groups to preserve their bodily 
integrity. I’ll look at two targets of respectability politics: sexual assault and police 
violence. Both sexual assault and police violence are, in the United States, particularly 
poignant risks for members of black communities. Consequently, black communities 
have a long history of everyday strategies for mitigating those risks. Respectability 
politics, as a distinct, self-conscious approach to the racialized, gendered violence, has 
used various methods of self-presentation to address this problem. While self-
presentation enables a variety of approaches, my focus will be on its aesthetic strategies, 
effects, and ideas.  
Specifically, I explore the way the aesthetic is implicated in communicating 
adherence to the racialized standard of respectability. Aesthetic choices in self-
presentation -- clothing, makeup, and hair styles -- were integral to respectability 
politics. Advice on and attention to these everyday aesthetic decisions made up a 
significant part of the politics of respectability. Additionally, respectability politics 
attempted to unify beauty and respectability, thereby expanding and challenging white 
supremacist notions of beauty and its attendant moral privileges. In this way, my work 
also contributes to the ongoing project in feminist philosophy on the role of aesthetic 
activity and labor in women’s lives, and the effect notions of beauty have on women’s 
possibilities. It also points us toward ways of looking at men’s everyday aesthetic 
activity and labor.  
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Indeed, I’ll start by considering a contemporary male account of resistance-
oriented aesthetic labor. This example helps us grasp what’s currently at stake in 
respectability politics. I’ll then both give a background for the term and explain its 
relationship with other ethical and aesthetic norms. The third section of the paper 
returns to the topic of respectable self-presentation, while the fourth looks at the ways 
notions of beauty, race, and respectability informed each other. The final argumentative 
portion of the paper (Sections Five and Six) turns its attention toward everyday 
aesthetics and the connection between everyday aesthetic activity and respect. 
Respectability politics helps, I argue, illuminate some issues proponents of everyday 
aesthetics need to consider in order to understand the way everyday aesthetic activity 
and everyday morality inform each other. Typically, everyday aestheticians focus on the 
positive potential for this connection, but respectability politics looks like a more 
complicated example than the everyday aesthetics literature usually treats. However, I’ll 
suggest that turning our attention to the longstanding relationship between respect and 
everyday aesthetic activity, and considering the multiple directions toward which each 
of us “points” our respect, helps to resolve the tension. 
I. Defensive Dress 
After moving from Kingston to New Orleans, the writer Garnette Cadogan describes 
self-presentation as survival strategy: 
I got out of the shower with the police in my head, assembling a cop-proof 
wardrobe. Light-colored oxford shirt. V-neck sweater. Khaki pants. Chukkas. 
Sweatshirt or T-shirt with my university insignia. When I walked I regularly had 
my identity challenged, but I also found ways to assert it. (So I’d dress Ivy 
League style, but would, later on, add my Jamaican pedigree by wearing Clarks 
Desert Boots, the footwear of choice of Jamaican street culture.) Yet the all-
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American sartorial choice of white T-shirt and jeans, which many police officers 
see as the uniform of black troublemakers, was off-limits to me—at least, if I 
wanted to have the freedom of movement I desired. (133 – 34)  
Cadogan chooses his clothing in order to avoid police attention (that is: police 
aggression). His description echoes the strategies endorsed by late 19th-century politics 
of respectability, as described by Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham. Like black Americans 
in the 19th century, Cadogan claims his respectability, and therefore his moral worth and 
his right to move through the world unmolested, through his aesthetic choices. 
However, Cadogan’s choices are constrained, reflecting a cultural context into which he 
has been thrust, and which he must negotiate. Like other uniforms, Cadogan’s clothing 
uses an aesthetic vocabulary to convey an ethical imperative. His clothing choices 
signal the proper way to treat him. Later, Cadogan describes an embodied, emotional 
respectability, having to behave calmly, passively, “non-threateningly,” when a group 
of NYPD officers bear him to the ground and rough him up because he (sort of) 
matches a description (139 – 41). This strategy is also familiar from accounts of black 
lives, old and new, particularly from contemporary discussions of black parenting 
practices: “Use your Sunday School manners” (qtd. in Hughes 2014). 
  The police did not arrest Cadogan, who is alive to tell us about his strategies 
and about having to employ them. He also knows, because the police captain tells him, 
that these strategies were effective in preventing his arrest. Cadogan’s careful selection 
of clothing and cultivation of an “un-threatening” manner attempt, in the first instance, 
to render him invisible (or at least unremarkable), while in the second, they aim at 
establishing his humanity. However, the kind of humanity Cadogan has to claim in 
order to survive unmolested in the United States relies on adherence to an inequitable 
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and unreasonable moral standard. If survival is resistance, and it often is, Cadogan’s 
strategies, which keep him alive, are resistant to white supremacy. But his strategies do 
not dismantle white supremacy and racial oppression, they only free up some space to 
live within them. Finding that space is important work, but it is the work of a reformer, 
rather than a revolutionary. Reform, by its very nature, can only achieve so much, and 
relies on institutional and cultural continuity, and common ground. Reform can expand 
and diversify the center, challenge the idea of what and who is marginal and what and 
who is central, but it rarely challenge the ideas of marginal and central. Distinguishing 
reform from revolution as approaches to solving problems of injustice, will be helpful 
for considering respectability politics’ historical evolution. The distinction also helps 
frame some of the limitations of respectability politics as a social and political means of 
redressing systemic racial injustices. 
 Finally, Cadogan’s essay describes his everyday aesthetic practice as an 
individual response to a social dynamic. As we will see, when respectability politics are 
taken to be the method of resistance, rather than one method that aids other forms, 
individuals assume disproportionate responsibility for their personal well-being. 
Cadogan’s account of his self-presentation is pragmatic, but critical. He recognizes the 
decisions he makes regarding his self-presentation as important to securing his safety, 
but also recognizes the disproportionate level of responsibility attributed to him for the 
results of his interactions with police officers. His approach accommodates the biases 
and aesthetic preferences of white society. Rather than adopting the “neutral” uniform 
of white t-shirt and jeans, Cadogan dresses “up” because he finds that in order to read as 
“neutral” he has to read as educated and middle-class – as “one of the good ones.” 
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Indeed, his reference to “Ivy League style” suggests that Cadogan understands he’s 
aesthetically claiming membership in an American institutional system of comparable 
power and significance to the police systems. His decisions about his clothing aren’t 
prompted by internalized racial shame, but by a learned understanding of the way his 
racial identity gets read and the consequences that can follow from that reading. 
Cadogan makes his accommodations in order to preserve his bodily well-being, another 
consistent theme in explanations of or justifications for respectability politics. 
 As a self-conscious strategic decision, respectability politics originated partly as 
a strategy of racial uplift, and partly as a strategy to help black women avoid sexual 
assault. The next section of the paper discusses respectability politics’ historical origins, 
its role in racial uplift, and its uses of the aesthetic. The third section looks at what 
respectable self-presentation involved during the post-Reconstruction and pre-Civil 
Rights eras. The goal of this first chunk of the paper is to explain the everyday aesthetic 
strategies respectability politics employed in order to achieve moral, social, and 
political goals – and also to explain what those goals were. Aesthetics’ role in social, 
political, and moral experience and progress has been much-discussed, but that 
discussion has focused primarily on artworks and artistic activity.30 However, everyday 
aesthetic activity has an equally long history as a tool in social, political, and moral 
movements – it has just not tended to receive the same level of scholarly attention, nor 
has it necessarily been recognized as an application of aesthetic concepts. 
 
                                                 
30 For example, A Room of One’s Own, “Poetry Is Not a Luxury” and “Criteria of Negro Art.” 
64 
 
2. Framing Respectability Aesthetics 
Although as a practice, respectability politics has a long history, the term is fairly 
recent. Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham coined “politics of respectability” in her work 
Righteous Discontent, a history of women’s work in the Black Baptist Church from 
1880 to 1920. Higginbotham ties the term to processes of racial uplift, which had a 
special urgency post-Reconstruction, amidst state plans of disenfranchisement (1993, 
4). In this context, “politics of respectability” refers to a strategy of racial uplift “that 
equated public behavior with individual self-respect . . .” (Higginbotham, 1993, 14). 
Advocates of respectability politics “felt certain that ‘respectable’ behavior in public 
would earn their people a measure of esteem from white America.” Higginbotham 
makes the complex dynamics of black politics of respectability clear: these strategies 
“rallied the poor working-class blacks to the cause of racial self-help” and support of 
the black middle-class, but “the effort to forge a community that would command 
whites’ respect revealed class tensions among blacks themselves” (1993, 14-15). In 
addition to engaging ideas about class and propriety, respectability politics also focused 
on notions of gender. In fact, Brittney C. Cooper argues that respectability politics 
“constituted one of the earliest theorizations of gender within newly emancipated Black 
communities” (2017, 19). In addition to its use of race, respectability politics’ use of 
class and gender contribute to its vexed reception in popular and academic work. 
The intra-racial class tensions respectability politics highlighted have been a 
focus of contemporary criticism of the practice, in part because “class policing that 
anchors respectability discourse remains persistent and troubling,” but Cooper argues 
this focus on “elitist class politics” sometimes obscures the important work 
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respectability politics does to address gender-based violence (2017, 15, 19). It also 
obscures other theoretical work black communities did on their own behalf. Cooper, 
whose book Beyond Respectability positions respectability politics within a broader 
context of race women’s public intellectual service and antiracist work, argues that “the 
sexual and gender policing at the center of . . . calls for respectability, conservative as 
they are, emerge as a reasonable, though not particularly laudable, approach to 
protecting the sanctity of Black women’s bodies” (2017, 15). While much of 
respectability politics’ strategic effect was to safeguard the well-being of black women 
when they entered the homes of white people, Cooper also points out that respectability 
had a certain urgency for black women who took up the roles of public intellectuals: 
“cultivating the public platform as a site for Black women to stand [required] making 
the space as safe as possible for Black women’s physical bodies, which would be 
publicly on display” (2017, 15). 
Respectability politics were and are a complex strategy, positioned with an eye 
toward promoting black flourishing – but using a narrow understanding of what 
conditions for flourishing might be. The goals of respectability politics are bourgeois 
goals, in both material and psychological senses. For example, Frederick C. Harris 
(2014) describes respectability politics as a way of framing “the virtues of self-care and 
self-correction . . . as strategies to lift the black poor out of their condition by preparing 
them for the market economy.” On this reading, respectability politics locates the 
underlying problem in poor and working-class black people, particularly their lack of 
facility with capitalism. Michelle Smith (2014) characterizes respectability politics as 
arguing, at bottom, that “marginalized classes will receive their share of political 
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influence and social standing not because democratic values and law require it but 
because they demonstrate their compatibility with the ‘mainstream’ or non-
marginalized class.” Smith notes that compatibility with the mainstream is affective and 
embodied: for example, in the post-Reconstruction United States, that meant not only 
practicing chastity but looking chaste. One goal of this section of the paper is to outline 
what embodied compatibility with the mainstream looks like, historically, and what 
kinds of behavior are taken as good evidence for that compatibility. 
The values of respectability politics were fundamentally Victorian and 
bourgeois; their exhortations were for “temperance, industriousness, thrift, refined 
manners, and Victorian sexual morals,” all the marks of “white middle-class propriety” 
(Higginbotham 1993, 14, 15). We must acknowledge that Victorian sexual morals make 
a lot of sense if one is, in fact, Victorian, or even Victorian-adjacent. We must also 
remember that a goal of respectability politics was to safeguard black women’s bodies. 
However, the primary strategy for achieving this goal was “to make Black women’s 
bodies as inconspicuous and as sexually innocuous as possible” (Cooper, 2017, 9).31 
Black women bore the responsibility for stopping white male objectification. Again, 
this approach makes a lot of sense: we have some control over our own actions, but 
only influence (and not always that) over the actions of others. An atmosphere of 
propriety discourages actions, such as sexual assault, that might violate that propriety, 
and respectability politics offered tips for conveying the idea of propriety. Further, as 
Smith writes, proponents of respectability politics assume “propriety breeds respect” – 
                                                 
31 Alison D. Ligon’s “Striving to Dress the Part: Examining the Absence of Black Women in Different 
Iterations of Say Yes to the Dress” discusses some contemporary, intergenerational contexts in which 
black women are discouraged from displaying their body. 
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respect for one’s status as a moral agent required (and sometimes still requires) 
adherence to a standard of propriety originating in the white bourgeoisie. Respectability 
politics didn’t just seek lip service to propriety’s ideals, but a thorough instantiation of 
them. 
Notions about impropriety were similarly robust. Improper behavior, at least for 
people of color, included ‘“gaudy’ colors in dress, snuff dipping, baseball games on 
Sunday,” communal activities respectability politics fails to acknowledge as “survival 
strategies . . .[,] spaces of resistance” (Higginbotham 1993, 15). Many strategies 
Higginbotham describes are familiar in spirit, if not in their details (who dips snuff 
anymore?), not only to contemporary black people but also to members of other 
oppressed or “deviant” groups – including women of any race. “What were you 
wearing?” is still a question asked of women alleging sexual assault, sometimes in 
court, the implication being that clothing either signals consent or renders consent 
irrelevant. As Cadogan’s earlier account of police-proof dressing and the discussion of 
hoodies later in this paper indicate, the focus on the way mainstream society “reads” 
clothing on the bodies of marginalized people continues to encompass both 
masculinized and feminized identities. “It is not lost on me,” writes Cadogan, “that my 
women friends are those who best understand my plight” (2016, 142).  
As Higginbotham writes, black women’s “race-conscious programs of self-help” 
took place both “in concert and . . . in conflict” with black men’s social and community 
organizing (1993, 8). Black women’s “self-help” was likewise ambivalently positioned 
with and against white views of black life. Respectability politics functioned as a rebuke 
to whites who claimed an inability to “imagine such a creation as a virtuous black 
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woman” (Higginbotham 190, Wolcott 15). In challenging whites’ claim that black 
women could not be virtuous, black reformers had to negotiate which aspects of whites’ 
accounts of virtue to retain. Disproving negative ideas about black women’s ethical 
possibilities required a common conceptual ground of ethical standards. As a result, the 
politics of respectability linked to racial uplift challenge a relatively narrow set of 
normative claims – mostly claims about what kinds of behavior were/are possible for 
black people – while accepting others, even (especially) racially biased claims, for 
example, about the good life, ideas of virtue, or what kinds of behavior earn respect 
from other people.  
 Mapping respectability politics’ sphere(s) of concern clarifies both its 
microethical focus and aesthetic orientation. By “microethical” I mean a collection of 
“frequently occurring situations in everyday life in which the stakes are seemingly low 
but in which there are nonetheless potential conflicts of interest between the individuals 
involved. Microethical situations are often strategic in nature – that is, the outcomes for 
each person involved depends [sic] on the actions of the others. . . . It is precisely in 
these everyday situations that one must regulate oneself” (Sarkissian 2014: 101). Now, 
sexual violence, police violence, and one’s economic prospects are not “situations in 
everyday life in which the stakes are seemingly low,” since the stakes are quite high. 
Rather, respectability politics are microethical because of the nature of their response to 
sexual violence, police violence, and racialized economic disparities. They are 
microethical because of the solutions they offer, not the problems they try to address. 
Respectability politics offers a proactive response, strategizing ways to forestall conflict 
or remove the possibility of conflict from everyday social interactions and adjusting the 
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mundane facets of one’s life in order to effect change. The other way in which 
respectability politics are microethical is in their focus on self-regulation. In the 
historical cases, the calls for self-regulation seem to follow upon a recognition that 
mainstream white society will not reliably self-regulate, and so blacks interested in 
preserving their lives took on a disproportionately large portion of the expectations of 
self-regulation. A more just society would distribute expectations of self-regulation 
appropriately. 
 “Respectability aesthetics,” by which I mean the aspects of respectability 
politics that use an aesthetic vocabulary to argue for an agent’s respectability, are a 
particular kind of microethical strategy. Neither Higginbotham nor Victoria Wolcott, 
the two historians on whom I will rely, explicitly positions the politics of respectability 
as a project of aesthetics. Nor do they use the term “microethics,” which is fairly recent 
in the philosophy literature. However, both Higginbotham and Wolcott emphasize 
moral or ethical dynamics expressed through certain kinds of everyday behavior and 
acts of self-presentation. For Higginbotham, as I have already mentioned, the arenas of 
respectability politics were primarily the social aspects of religious and domestic life. 
Wolcott’s analysis includes those spheres but extends to cover employment 
opportunities.32  
The next section of the paper highlights aesthetic significance in respectability 
politics. The aesthetic comes to prominence in roughly three areas of respectability 
politics: self-presentation, manners, and domestic labor. My focus here is on self-
                                                 
32 Of course, there are going to be subtle differences between the two accounts, since Higginbotham’s and 
Wolcott’s analyses focus on different time periods and geographic locations, in addition to the years 
separating their books. 
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presentation; however domestic labor and manners overlap, at least in the context of 
respectability politics, with self-presentation – so I’ll say a little bit about the aesthetic 
relevance of each. Thinking of manners, self-presentation, and domestic labor as 
aesthetic practices, or as practices evaluated and experienced through aesthetic 
categories, does not exhaust their philosophical interest, but aesthetic standards and 
experiences play a prominent role in each field. Self-presentation is probably the most 
intuitively aesthetic, since it encompasses things like dress and hair style, familiar 
objects of aesthetic interest. Manners are a kind of aestheticized behavior, particularly 
when the govern the way we display and orient our bodies.33 Manners also overlap with 
etiquette, a set of practices in which aesthetic experience play a significant role. Lastly, 
domestic labor in the context of respectability politics included not only work outside 
the home but the care of one’s own home. Values like neatness, cleanliness, and tidiness 
take on aesthetic significance in the home. Furthermore, decisions about the way one’s 
home looks and feels may, like getting dressed, simply account for baseline physical 
needs – but often involve elaborate sensory pleasures and experiences and allow the 
exercise of personal taste. 
Aestheticized behavior follows norms of respectability into public and private 
spheres. Higginbotham writes that the politics of respectability endorsed and enacted by 
19th-century black Baptist church women “equated public behavior with individual self-
respect and with the advancement of African Americans as a group” (1993, 14). On this 
approach, public and private patterns of behavior mutually inform judgments of 
individual moral character and the moral standing of one’s community. Randall 
                                                 
33 For more work on manners and aesthetics see Allen (1976), Stanek (2009), Stohr (2016). 
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Kennedy formulates the respectability politics with which he grew up as “a particular 
sense of racial kinship: in our dealings with the white world, we were encouraged to 
think of ourselves as ambassadors of blackness. Our achievements would advance the 
race, and our failures would hinder it. The fulfillment of our racial obligations required 
that we speak well, dress suitably, and mind our manners” (2015). Because 
respectability politics make one’s private life (dress, sexual morality and family life 
might typically be thought of as aspects of private, or personal, life) relevant to public 
life (the political status of one’s community), the aesthetic features of private lives 
purported to give good evidence for respectability – such as a clean home and children 
wearing neat clothes – become relevant to one’s experience of public life. In addition, 
much of the ethico-aesthetic respectability signaling is embodied, and therefore follows 
a person into their many social contexts. Respectability politics, in sum, are pervasive. 
My exploration of the relationship between respectability and self-presentation 
focuses primarily on clothing and hygiene. I also discuss comportment, particularly in 
the public sphere, which sometimes bleeds into self-presentation and which, like 
manners and domestic labor, received a great deal of attention from reformers. Section 
3 details what respectable self-presentation involved, while Section 4 discusses the 
relationship between respectability and beauty. Presenting black women as beautiful 
was a strategy for racial uplift (and remains an anti-racist project today) and was 





III. Respectable Self-Presentation 
Self-presentation is difficult to disentangle from questions of manners and civility, 
especially in the context of respectability politics. Likewise, self-presentation has a lot 
to do with the way one arranges living space, as well as the body. My divisions are not 
neat ones. One useful feature of respectability politics is the way it situates individuals 
against a wider communal context (of course, this is closely related to the harms it does, 
too). Furthermore, the guiding principles of self-presentation – that is, ethico-aesthetic 
ideals such as civility and cleanliness – manifest in the context of manners and 
domesticity as well as in ways of presenting one’s body and self to other people. I will 
start by looking at clothing, personal hygiene, and other material bodily aesthetic 
practices. Strategies of respectable self-presentation emphasized hygiene, dress, and 
comportment as methods of “contest[ing] the plethora of negative stereotypes” of black 
women (Higginbotham 1993, 191). These strategies adapted to respond to new 
situations and challenges, encompassing not just black women and their justified fears 
of sexual assault, but migrants to northern cities. Respectability also became important 
to middle-class black people as a way of preserving their class status and of being, in 
Kennedy’s phrase, “ambassadors of blackness.” Kennedy’s ambassador metaphor is 
helpful for giving us a clue as to the aesthetic impression (as opposed to the moral 
impression) that respectability politics aimed to achieve. The goal of respectability 
politics seems to be bodily neutrality, achieved through blandness.  
One strategy for persuading black people to take up the respectability project 
was the distribution of pamphlets describing how to be respectable. The Women’s 
Convention, leading the post-Reconstruction charge in respectability politics, 
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distributed “tract literature” guiding members of the black community through various 
everyday acts of self-presentation, including “How to Dress” and “Take a Bath First” 
(Higginbotham 1993, 195). For black women, conveying the image of respectability 
was a way of guarding against sexual assault (Higginbotham 1993, 193-94). In the 
process, women’s clothing – one of the most obvious and accessible means of aesthetic 
expression available – came under close scrutiny. It is not surprising to hear that young 
women were urged to modest dress (where modesty is defined by some “mainstream” 
source), but navigating the norms of respectable clothing required more than dressing 
modestly. The colors of women’s clothing mattered, too, with “bright colors and other 
culturally unique designs . . . characterized as dissipating the high ideals of young 
women” (Higginbotham 1993, 200). The thinking here seems to have been not only that 
bright colors would draw attention neutrals wouldn’t, and that brightly colored clothing 
suggested greed or sexual license, but also that aesthetic aspects of cultural identity 
were risky – perhaps anti-assimilationist, perhaps “uncivilized.” Guarding young 
women’s well-being, by supplying them with appropriate clothing and the proper habits 
of bodily care, became the responsibilities of mothers.  
 In the midst of the Great Migration, with African Americans pouring into 
northern cities in search of better work and wages, a division between “old settler” 
Northern blacks and Southern migrants developed. In part, this division was because 
migrants appeared disreputable and often lacked the resources to alter their appearance. 
Additionally, “city” dress and “country” dress might command different modes of self-
presentation. The contrast between these two styles of dress led the Detroit Urban 
League to view black women migrants as contributing to increased segregation because, 
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in the words of Forrester B. Washington, “loud, noisy, almost nude women in ‘Mother 
Hubbards’ standing around in the public thoroughfares” affirmed the image of black 
women as slatternly and indifferent to norms of propriety (qtd. in Wolcott 56). 
Washington made this claim in a speech establishing the Dress Well Club, the goals of 
which the club’s name made clear. Club members “distributed cards and pamphlets on 
the importance of dressing well to migrants arriving at train stations” as well as people 
already living in Detroit (Wolcott 57). The cards detailed the way women should dress, 
particularly that they should wear public clothes, not “bungalow aprons and boudoir 
caps” which marked the wearer as a domestic servant (qtd. in Wolcott 57). Other kinds 
of “distinctly Southern” dress, for example “wearing of work clothes in public spaces, 
not wearing shoes in public” attracted negative attention from black reformers, not only 
in Detroit but in other northern cities like Chicago (Wolcott 2001, 58).  
 Dressing well also meant wearing your hair in the right way. Respectable 
hairstyles became another kind of responsibility for mothers. The Dress Well Club 
advised women on ways to style their children’s hair – or rather, on styles to avoid 
(Wolcott 2001, 57). The cultural and moral significance attached to women’s hair is not 
news (hair has been moralized since, at least, the Bible), and its significance in anti-
racist activity extends into the current day. I discuss the ethico-aesthetic contextualizing 
black hair, and black women’s hair particularly, in more detail in “The Case for 
Aesthetic Labor in Everyday Life,” but the topic is a rich one.34 Respectability politics, 
as a strategy for racial uplift treated hair as a source of both pride and shame. Inasmuch 
as the way one wore one’s hair indicated pride in one’s racial identity, rather than 
                                                 
34 See Tate 2009, Gill 2010, Byrd and Tharps 2014, and Taylor 2000 and 2016. 
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bowing to white beauty standards, it coincided with notions of respectable self-
presentation. At the same time, simply leaving hair to grow naturally (whatever that 
might be), even if it is well-kept, was definitely disreputable.  
 The kinds of self-presentation demanded by respectability politics extend 
beyond bodily appearances. Another problem reformers tackled were “racist 
representations of black women as unclean, disease-carrying, and promiscuous, 
conjoined with representations of black households as dirty, pathological, and 
disorderly” (Higginbotham 1993, 202). Adherents of respectability politics were 
“helped” to order their bodies by practicing “good” hygiene. Though a pamphlet with 
advice on how to get rid of bed bugs is useful (depending on the advice, anyway), and 
perhaps even racially neutral, the white slur that blacks were fundamentally dirty 
renders advice about bodily care more fraught. Not only was the sight of flesh 
governed, but the smell of it. Before playing a basketball game against a white team 
from Grosse Pointe, the black girls from Center Girls Five bathed and donned freshly 
washed uniforms (Wolcott 2001, 63). It wasn’t simply a question of “smelling nice,” 
either – perfumes were risky. Too-generous applications of artificial scent at a 1921 
Detroit baseball game, attended by a racially mixed audience, earned comments in the 
white press (Wolcott 2001, 39). Cosmetics were an instrument of feminine rebellion in 
the 20s, acceptable if not quite respectable. In the 1920s, middle- and upper-middle-
class white women could publicly apply lipstick to signal their disregard for old-
fashioned values, including notions of feminine propriety, without necessarily signaling 
their sexual availability. For black women still wrestling with hypersexualization, a 
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version of modesty that directed attention away from the body took precedence over 
flouting traditional sexual mores.  
Other pamphlets offered guidance on how to behave while traveling, suggesting 
a body aesthetic beyond the visible (Higginbotham 1993, 195). The advice to travelers 
directs the reader through negotiating public space both physically and aurally: “Don’t 
stick your head out of the window at every station . . . don’t talk so loud to your friends 
who may be on the platform that a person a block away may hear you” (qtd. in 
Higginbotham 195). These pieces of advice do encourage a kind of consideration of 
other people’s comfort, but also suggest that for black Americans the best way to make 
other people comfortable is to be silent and invisible. Contemporary political scientist 
Michelle Smith (2014) describes an encounter between a young black man and an older 
woman of unidentified race in a public meeting about activism and the relationship 
between black communities and police departments. The older woman tells the young 
man, “It’s important to look respectful and talk in a respectful way!” Smith notes that 
the young man “lacked recognizable signs of decorum like belted pants, a collared shirt, 
disciplined speech and above all, calm” (emphasis added). That is, the young man did 
not present himself in the way Garnette Cadogan had learned to present himself. 
 In eschewing sounds, movements, smells, and colors, respectability politics 
often seems to offer lessons in total physical and aesthetic neutrality. That is, they are 
lessons in erasure – of culture, of self, of embodiment. In a society built on racial 
oppression, respectability politics provided a method of resistance to mainstream 
characterizations of black people and their communities, but in so doing upheld an 
unreasonable standard for personhood. White people did not have to meet the standard 
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of respectability in order to be considered persons. They did not have to strive for 
physical and aesthetic neutrality because whiteness was, and still is, neutral. 
 The next section of the paper addresses the role beauty norms played in racial 
uplift and respectability politics. Pushing out the borders of beauty was also an 
important antiracist and aesthetic project for advocates of respectability politics. 
However, arguing for one’s own beauty is quite a different aesthetic project than 
striving to make oneself physically neutral and aesthetically bland. The two aesthetic 
strategies share a motivating force, the motivating force common to the politics of 
respectability: claiming humanity for black people. For black women in particular, both 
blandness and beauty are ways to reject hypersexualization and sexual objectification 
by white society. The first strategy makes you invisible while the second re-
contextualizes your visibility. 
IV. Respectable Beauty  
The politics of respectability participated in a longstanding tradition of treating beauty 
as a sign of moral worth. The tactics of self-presentation on which respectability politics 
rely include, as we have seen, aesthetic activity aiming at something much milder than 
beauty; however, they also involved arguments that black women could be beautiful. 
Beauty, as well as beautification, played a significant role in the process of claiming 
respectability and its protections. In this section of the paper, I describe first the 
unification of beauty with respectability and second the way beautification practices 
aiming at more quotidian aesthetic norms informed judgments of respectability. In so 
doing, we can see both the place respectability politics can occupy in the existing 
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philosophical debate about the unity of beauty and virtue, and the way respectability 
politics helps flesh out aesthetic activity that does not aim exactly at beauty. 
 Roughly two kinds of beauty have been taken as signs or symbols of morality: 
artistic beauty and personal (or bodily) beauty. Both kinds cause problems, but I am 
concerned here with bodies not artworks, so I will leave those problems to the attention 
of others. In the interests of further narrowing this discussion to something like 
manageability, I will put to the side questions of male bodily beauty, particularly given 
respectability politics’ special focus on women’s bodies and self-presentation. 
Additionally, as Paul C. Taylor has pointed out, antiracist “aestheticist[s’] concern with 
beauty tends to be a concern with female beauty . . . since current social conditions 
make physical appearance central to the construction of womanhood and femininity and 
fairly peripheral to the construction of manhood and masculinity” (2016, 60). Like other 
conversations about beauty, the conversation at the center of what Taylor terms 
“antiracist aestheticism” “more or less reduces to talk about womanhood, femininity, 
and women” (2016, 57, 60). In 19th-century America, the link between aesthetic norms 
and gender norms meant that women were instructed to pursue virtue and beauty 
simultaneously. Virtuous women were beautiful women. Sometimes beauty constituted 
feminine virtue, sometimes the activity of being a beautiful woman (consistently 
meeting beauty standards takes some care) was the kind of activity in which virtuous 
women should engage. Beauty norms required self-presentation in accordance with 
middle-class aesthetic standards, and a woman’s record of according with those 
standards was supposed to be both evidence for her virtue and, in some cases, the 
proper activity of virtue. 
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The perceived link between beauty and virtue manifested in complex norms: as 
a belief that physical features conveyed information about character, as a distrust of 
beautification practices and artifice, as a debate about the kind of self-cultivation 
women could justify. Most importantly for tracking the influence conceptions of 
feminine beauty had upon reformers working for racial equality, the assumed link 
between beauty and virtue acted as justification for the way one treated individual 
women. Mainstream feminine beauty meant looking like a white, middle- or upper-
class, able-bodied woman, in concert with whatever individual quirks of appearance a 
woman might have, so a woman might be beautiful simply if she had sufficiently 
European features, an economic situation that provided her with attractive and well-kept 
clothing, and good luck with her personal health. She would look beautiful and virtuous. 
If a woman did not appear virtuous, she could fairly be treated as if she wasn’t. I 
suspect that line of reasoning sounds familiar to most of us, because it persists today. 
Furthermore, when the beauty standards, and related aesthetic judgments, that signal 
virtue are fundamentally white, excluding groups of people from beauty effectively 
perpetuates racial inequality and white supremacy. 
 In his review of Stephen Frears’ 1989 Dangerous Liaisons, Hal Hinson draws 
attention to Michelle Pfeiffer’s performance of the virtuous Madame de Tourvel. Virtue 
is tricky: “nothing is harder to play. . .and Pfeiffer is smart enough not to try. Instead, 
she embodies it. Her porcelain-skinned beauty, in this regard, is a great asset, and the 
way it’s used makes it seem an aspect of her spirituality. Her purity shines through her 
pores.” Madame de Tourvel appears virtuous, and this appearance of virtue is tied up 
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with her beauty.35 Were Madame de Tourvel’s beauty less “pure,” her moral character 
would take some discovering from the audience and, presumably, from other characters 
in the film, including the Vicomte de Valmont, who intends to seduce her. Tourvel 
would be a less striking target if either her purity or her beauty needed seeking out, but, 
as it happens, her moral purity coincides with an aesthetic purity, too. Hinson’s 
comment picks up on a pervasive theme in the unity of women’s virtue and appearance: 
“hair, skin, and eye color frequently stood as signs of women’s virtue” (Peiss 2012, 24). 
In addition to modest dress, an unpainted face (more on this later), and correct manners, 
a good woman had a good complexion. Good skin was white skin. 
Certainly, white skin’s desirability tracked multiple ways of understanding 
social and ethical value. White skin indicated class status: not only indicating a woman 
did not have to engage in bodily labor to support herself, but in the United States 
making her eligible for certain other kinds of genteel jobs (Peiss 2012, 232). White skin 
also tracked white women’s ethnicity and family history: “to be a lady is to be as white 
as it gets” (Dyer 57). The value placed on white skin reflected racist beauty standards. 
Indeed, Anglo-American beauty ideals “were continually asserted in relation to people 
of color around the world” (Peiss 2012, 31). But black Americans’ purported “ugliness” 
certainly formed the definitive comparison for white beauty, constituting the “antipode 
of the dominant American beauty ideal” (Peiss 2012, 33). Whites used stereotypes of 
“kinky hair, dirty or ragged clothing, apish caricatures, shiny black faces” to justify 
dehumanizing treatment of African Americans, including denial of full participation in 
social and political life (Peiss 2012, 33). That is, though Madame de Tourvel’s purity 
                                                 




might shine through her pores, and so too would the purity of women with pores like 
hers, black women were not afforded the same ethico-aesthetic privilege. While “the 
widespread assumption that bodily beauty and deformity covary with moral beauty and 
deformity as well as with general cultural and intellectual capacity” prevailed, black 
women’s skin color prevented their making any claim to purity, virtue or, even, 
humanity (Taylor 2016, 58). 
 No surprise, then, that physical beauty is a “long-standing preoccupation [of] 
African-American activists” (Taylor 2016, 57). In fact, claiming physical beauty for 
black women often coincided with claiming respectability, and with efforts toward 
economic empowerment and racial uplift. Black bodies, never exactly neutral in the 
history of the United States, became, in the context of post-Reconstruction civil protests 
“a subject in the debate over collective identity and action. As lecturer and author E. 
Azalia Hackley put it, ‘The time has come to fight, not only for rights, but for looks as 
well’” (Peiss 2012, 204). Beauty could not simply be assumed – it had to be, and was, 
fought for. The project was partly pragmatic, as when reformers sent black women who 
conformed, to the extent possible, to white beauty standards on job interviews, or 
prioritized light-skinned women’s opportunities over dark-skinned women’s. Women 
who looked less black, so to speak, were thought to have better chances at gaining jobs 
in factories or department stories that might not otherwise be open to women. By acting 
as the thin end of the wedge, these women, it was thought, would open up opportunities 
for other African Americans.  
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In other ways, the project was liberatory.36 By “fighting for looks,” reformers 
reclaimed beauty from its alliance with whiteness, even while they retained (though 
sometimes with a great deal of skepticism) the alliance of beauty with virtue. So long as 
beauty and virtue were seen, for women, as closely allied and, at least sometimes, as 
coinciding, pointing out that black women could be beautiful was a way of claiming 
that black women could also be virtuous. The claim to virtue mattered because it 
improved their moral standing in a racist society. The claim to beauty mattered directly, 
too – I’ll discuss this in more detail later. First, I want to draw a tighter link between 
virtue and respectability.  
 Virtue and respectability aren’t precisely the same thing, of course. In the 
context of 19th-century American women’s lives, however, they seemed to stand in for 
each other – in part because the standards for women’s virtue were so narrow. While 
masculinity offered any number of avenues to virtue, femininity was “bound . . .to 
ideals of sexual chastity and transcendent purity” (Peiss 2012, 24). Women who 
guarded their virtue were really guarding their sexuality, not aspiring to wisdom, 
courage, or hope (at best, wisdom, courage, and hope were variations on preserving 
sexual purity). Women who were categorically ugly – that is, ugly by virtue of their 
racialization – were presumed to have no virtue to guard. Like virtue, respectability was 
closely linked with sexual purity, and presenting as respectable was a way of presenting 
as ineligible for consequence-free sexual violence. Respectability, like virtue, is also 
complex, and encompasses various ways of relating to other people, caring for one’s 
                                                 
36 I explore this is more detail in “The Case for Aesthetic Labor in Everyday Life.” 
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physical-social environment, and fulfilling various social roles (particularly, in this case 
of respectability, feminized roles). 
 I want to close this section by recognizing a contrary, but similarly familiar, 
strand of thinking about the relationship between beauty and goodness. Though the 
mainstream view placed great faith in beauty, there is also a second narrative of 
suspicion of beauty: “beauty, or some near kin of it, is unsavory, a temptation that might 
get the soul off-track” (Higgins 2000, 89). On this view, beauty distracts, seduces, and 
deceives us as to the actual value of the object or person in which it inheres – it 
becomes like La Belle Dame sans Merci: beguiling and destructive. Kathleen Higgins 
suggests that “the impression that beauty is a cheap deception stems from our cultural 
failure to distinguish beauty from kitsch” and that this failure is clearly manifest in “our 
ideology regarding female beauty” (Higgins 2000, 92). She suggests we distinguish 
beauty from the related aesthetic ideals of glamour and flawlessness, both of which are 
ultimately ethically unsatisfying and, in the case of glamour, deceptive. Beauty, in 
Higgins’ understanding, has much more to do with our well-being, “an ideal of balance 
and health that is neither self-conscious nor a direct consequence of deliberate effort” 
(2000, 104). Both our love of beauty and our longing for it are (or ought to be) tied up 
with our ethical projects, “subordinated into the larger aspiration for wholeness as a 
human being, a goal that involves a whole ethical agenda” (2000, 105). In judging 
others to be beautiful, then, we see them as “radiant, and this radiance depends on a 
wholeness that we take to include the person’s inner life” (2000, 105). 
I don’t have time to unpack all of Higgins’ ideas here, so I want to explain the 
ways her argument speaks to the situation of respectability politics and, more generally, 
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the situation of disadvantaged groups who are disadvantaged in part because society at 
large denies them both the “purely” aesthetic judgments of beauty and therefore its 
ethical clout too. I agree with Higgins that mistrusting beauty relies on a mistake in our 
thinking about what the beautiful properly is. And, furthermore, Higgins’ position 
recalls the critical moves made by black reformers within the context of respectability 
politics. Well aware that those exemplifying white beauty standards might indeed be 
morally bankrupt, African Americans challenged the link between morality and white 
beauty standards, and thought carefully about constructing alternatives: both the need 
for alternatives, and how those alternatives might look. Higgins suggests that the proper 
approach to beauty is something like “tak[ing] our own beauty for granted” (2000, 106). 
Higgins draws a parallel between health and beauty, arguing “as it is healthy to assume 
that we are healthy unless we are sick” we should also assume we are beautiful (2000, 
106). This attitude prevents beauty or health from becoming a perverse obsession; it 
likewise removes the need to “prove” one is beautiful/healthy. When you assume 
beauty (or health) as a default setting, other people’s opinions on the matter carry much 
less weight.  
Higgins’s suggestion is appealing – but difficult to pull it off if the world around 
you is constructed to prevent the possibility of your being beautiful. Yet it may be the 
kind of attitude that enables a more thorough resistance. Some of the reformers 
“fighting for looks” must have taken their own beauty, if not precisely “for granted,” at 
least as self-evident. 
V. The Problem for Everyday Aesthetics 
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Everyday aesthetics is meant to have in its favor a capacity for enriching our moral 
lives. The arguments in favor of this capacity are convincing, and I do not want to 
discount them.37 Though this part of the paper articulates what I see as a problem for 
everyday aesthetics as a facet of ethics, my goal is to encourage conversation, not quash 
it. The problem I see is that everyday aesthetics gives us the toolkit for understanding 
what makes respectability politics effective and compelling as a response to oppression 
that makes concessions to the dominant aesthetic and moral viewpoint in the interests of 
facilitating certain kinds of resistance work, but does not help us see what is unjust in 
the intersection of aesthetic activity and ethical content. To contextualize the problem I 
raise, I’ll discuss some other worries people sometimes have about everyday aesthetics, 
before exploring the ways respectability politics both fails and perseveres. I then discuss 
the moral problem of respectability – specifically, enshrining unequal expectations and 
responsibility for alleviating oppression – and why it matters to advocates of everyday 
aesthetics. Section Five, by way of contrast, discusses a much more opposition mode of 
self-presentation and suggests it a model of resistant, but not reformist, activity. 
I am not the first to suggest that everyday aesthetics has to meet certain 
challenges. Yuriko Saito highlights one problem: the risk of aestheticizing, for example, 
such that poverty becomes “picturesque,” palatable to the privileged, and secure (2007, 
191ff). In Saito’s cases, the risk is that everyday aesthetics renders injustice beautiful, 
thereby encouraging the oppressed to accept their oppression. (The criticism gets 
leveled at certain kinds of artworks, too: for example, the film Slumdog Millionaire was 
accused of glamorizing poverty.) The problem I identify is different since, at least in 
                                                 
37 For example: Weiss 1998, Saito 2007 and 2016. 
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their historical contexts, respectability politics were a strategy of resistance, not 
complacency. That is, they did not encourage black Americans to dwell in their material 
inequality, but sought to teach them how to change it. However, there may be a second 
problem, for which respectability politics is a kind of case study, closer to the worry 
about complacency. Respectability politics called on black communities to value their 
material environment, particularly the home environment. In one sense, this might place 
special value on traditionally feminized and degraded work such that the entire 
community reevaluates both its attitudes toward gender and its attitudes toward its 
physical environment. However, the work still might remain “women’s work,” and its 
newfound value a way of keeping women in their place. A fuller exploration of this 
problem belongs to another paper. Again, the problem I focus on here has less to do 
with complacency than with resistance. 
In order to see the problem respectability politics pose for everyday aesthetics, 
we need to acknowledge that respectability politics are problematically constrained in 
their ability to resist gender- and race-based violence. Perhaps the claim that 
respectability politics don’t work reads oddly when I began this paper with a story about 
just how effective they still are at saving black men from trouble from the police.38 
Other counter-examples leap to mind: Rosa Parks, for one, made for an effective 
example in the Civil Rights movement because she was respectable, more respectable 
than Claudette Colvin, for example. What distinguishes Cadogan and post-
Reconstruction respectability politics from Parks is that Parks and her contemporaries 
used the appearance of respectability to make their resistance more effective. Their 
                                                 
38 Special thanks to Brian Soucek and Sherri Irvin for pushing this point and helping me clarify my 
thinking, and to whom I owe some of the counterexamples. 
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actual targets were institutional methods of perpetuating racial subjugation. However, 
the modes of dress and comportment urged by post-Reconstruction reformers actually 
constituted their resistance. It was not their only method of resistance, but it was a 
method in itself. Claiming respectability was the resistance, and it was resistance 
enacted through aesthetic methods. Cadogan’s clothing is somewhere between Parks’s 
self-presentation and the respectable self-presentation of post-Reconstruction era. 
Cadogan dresses the way he does to make his life easier, and to keep himself safe 
(which is like the original case), but his goal is not respectability. His goal is to avoid 
arrest, brutalization, and death. All three cases make concessions to mainstream values, 
but in the modern cases these concessions are pragmatic, not convicted.  
The modern cases are kin to the Talk, briefly referenced at the beginning of this 
paper, black families have with their children about how to behave in (or avoid) 
encounters with police. These Talks, as Jazmine Hughes’ work shows, are often about 
how to accommodate unreasonable demands from the police in order to avoid brutality 
of various kinds. The Talks instruct children to negotiate power structures from a 
disadvantaged position without conceding the legitimacy of those power structures. 
Based on the analysis of historians like Higginbotham and Wolcott, and on the words of 
reformers themselves, the goal of post-reconstruction reformers advocating 
respectability politics was to become part of the power structures. Respectability 
advocates affirmed the legitimacy of the power structures, even while they disagreed 
about who belonged in the echelons. They questioned the particular intersection of 
racism and misogyny, but not the belief in sexual purity (the whole point was that black 
women had a right to sexual purity as much as white women did), bourgeois comfort 
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(the project was supposed to make bourgeois comfort more widely available), or the 
(white) signs by which these values were communicated. 
Rather than breaking down a dysfunctional social system, respectability politics 
teaches disadvantaged groups how to navigate that system. While it is good to know 
how to walk around a city without drawing police attention, or how to discourage an 
employer’s sexual interest, it is much better to not have to worry about those things. 
Learning to navigate the system leaves the system in place. Effectively, respectability 
politics place an extra burden on an already over-burdened group. Respectability 
politics “attributed institutional racism to the ‘negative’ public behavior,” where, as the 
above discussions indicate, “negative” behavior could be fairly mild (Higginbotham 
1993, 15). Randall Kennedy, writing in defense of respectability politics, acerbically 
and critically describes the version he grew up with as dividing the black population 
into “Good Negroes” and “Bad Negroes.” Not only did it, at least sometimes, cast the 
oppressed as responsible for alleviating their oppression, but it also denied them the full 
enjoyment of their community by characterizing the community’s social life as 
dissolute. Respectability politics targets a symptom of injustice, rather than injustice 
itself. That symptom needed addressing, and respectability politics took important steps 
toward redress, but it does not step beyond the role of reform. Respectability politics 
made strategic sense in post-Reconstruction United States, with their vivid need for 
survival strategies and for counter-messages to the mainstream ideas about what 
African Americans were like. Respectability politics are an expedient and reformist 
response to gendered and racialized violence – in this sense, it is difficult to take issue 
with them. However, respectability politics took on significance beyond the strategic 
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and expedient. Respectability politics’ persistence and evolution give partial evidence 
for their more-than-strategic significance (and for the fact that racial and gender justice 
have not improved as much as they ought), but Brittney C. Cooper’s work suggests that 
respectability as an ideal and respectability politics as a method persist in part because 
of a conceptual confusion (that respectability and dignity are the same) and because 
respectability played an important role in creating ideas of gender and personhood 
within black communities. 
Cooper, drawing on Anna Julia Cooper’s work in Voice from the South, 
differentiates calls for dignity from calls for respectability. These differ in that 
“demands for dignity are demands for a fundamental recognition of one’s inherent 
humanity. Demands for respectability assume that unassailable social propriety will 
prove one’s dignity. Dignity, unlike respectability, is not socially contingent. It is 
intrinsic, and, therefore, not up for debate” (2017, 5). When both dignity and 
respectability are denied to a group, it might make sense to demand the two together, 
especially if a supposed lack of respectability is taken as permission for denying 
dignity. With Cooper’s distinction in mind, we can better understand the problems that 
arise when the politics of respectability become more than highly contextualized 
response to conditions on the ground. Recall that Cooper argues that the politics of 
respectability “provided a foundation for articulating what a Black woman or a Black 
man actually was” (2017, 21). By centering black communities’ awareness of their own 
humanity, respectability politics resisted the dominant dehumanizing narratives from 
the white mainstream. Respectability politics, therefore, did theoretical as well as 
practical work, both important projects for resistance and uplift. That practical and 
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strategic work no doubt contributes to their longevity, but Cooper suggests the theory is 
important, too: “ridding ourselves of respectability would mean completely upending 
the gender system that Black people, particularly Black women, theorized and created 
after Reconstruction” (2017, 21).  
In respectability politics, we have a set of practices that recognizes the 
significance of aesthetic behaviors for communicating with other people. The practices 
assume the intersection of everyday aesthetic activities like self-presentation with 
everyday morality and take that assumption as a starting point for redressing pervasive 
racial and sexual injustice. However, rather than correcting structures of injustice, 
respectability politics “corrects” individual behavior, specifically the individual 
behavior of the oppressed.39 The result is a complex series of behaviors: blaming the 
victim, excoriating the villain, offering strategies to head off further abuses. If a “perk” 
of everyday aesthetics is that by paying attention to our aesthetic reactions to the 
material qualities of the world around us, we can alter our patterns of behavior to be 
more in line with the dictates of morality – and let me reiterate that I do think this is 
something everyday aesthetics enables – then the case of respectability politics should 
bother us. At least in this case, everyday aesthetic activity may improve some of our 
lives, but it’s not clear that it makes us better moral agents, and it might make us worse. 
That is, the problem is not with the aesthetic side of everyday aesthetics, but with the 
moral purpose to which aesthetics are put. Investing in the everyday and its ethico-
aesthetic significance looks like it sometimes misleads us about where our attention 
belongs and about what actions further justice.  
                                                 
39 I don’t mean to deny that oppressed people can err, only that the oppressed bear the most responsibility 
for injustices committed against them. 
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In most cases, and definitely in the early iterations of respectability politics, this 
worry is distinct from worries about aestheticizing injustice and promoting moral 
complacency about the existence of certain kinds of injustice. The history of 
respectability politics is not a complacent history, but a highly motivated and tactical 
one. Pre-Civil Rights iterations of respectability politics had an acute awareness of 
sexual, social, and economic injustices, and were formulated as a response to those 
injustices. Cadogan’s contemporary account explains his choice of dress as both tactical 
and personally meaningful (not just in the sense that it preserves his well-being, but in 
the sense that he incorporates his Jamaican background by wearing Clarks desert boots). 
Like earlier practitioners of respectability politics, Cadogan uses self-presentation to 
resist violence. However, it seems clear that despite his resistance’s personal efficacy – 
which, again, I do not want to underrate – its scope is limited. Yet, in both Cadogan’s 
case and the early cases, cultivating respectability is a complex and time-consuming 
project. So, the worry is about how to prevent the aesthetic from misleading us on 
points of justice. In that case, we need some guidance to the intersection of justice and 
aesthetics, the individual and the structural. 
Here, I think those of us interested in everyday aesthetics and the promise it 
holds for resistance are well-served by turning our attention to the longstanding 
relationship between aesthetic activity and communications of respect, particularly in a 
more confrontational mode than that of respectability politics. We turn to this topic in 




VI. Aesthetics and Respect 
In “Should Black Kids Avoid Wearing Hoodies?”, Chike Jeffers considers what it 
means when black kids (particularly black boys) wear hoodies, but my interest is in his 
discussion of sagging pants, “a style popular among black kids that is undoubtedly, 
unmistakably controversial” (2013, 135). While there are official bans against sagging 
one’s pants in some places, Jeffers also notes “vociferous . . . opposition to the practice” 
within the black community, particularly among adults (2013, 135). Jeffers offers some 
ways of understanding this opposition without recourse to Eurocentric standards:  
one might see the practice as communicating . . . a basic message of disregard 
for oneself and others . . . it can be seen as symbolizing a fundamental lack of 
seriousness about life. Such a message is clearly one to be avoided if black kids 
are to avoid reproducing the old stereotype of black people as constitutionally 
lazy. (135-36, Jeffers’s emphasis) 
On these grounds, opposition to sagging pants is compatible with antiracist resistance, 
particularly if one’s resistance focuses on a sense of self-worth or, as Frederick Harris 
put it earlier, self-care and self-correction. Additionally, countering stereotypes 
(especially negative stereotypes) of one’s community is important resistance work, 
given the role stereotypes play in certain kinds of oppression. Jeffers also suggests 
another way of “reading” sagging pants: as communicating “an unruly sense of freedom 
and the refusal of black cool to be kept tightly bound. Such a message is not so much 
self-denigrating as it is pointedly anti-assimilationist” (136, Jeffers’s emphasis). Jeffers’ 
readings of both the pro-sagging and anti-sagging sides of the debate highlight the 
diversity of meanings either held within the practice or read into it by its practitioners or 
detractors. Both sides seem in agreement that self-presentation matters and helps 
communicate certain values but disagree on what values this particular practice 
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communicates. This kind of disagreement occurs in other contexts, too, and has for 
some time. After I finish discussing Jeffers’ analysis of the practice of sagging, I’ll 
discuss this kind of disagreement over aestheticized practices and the values they 
communicate. 
The opposition to sagging, as outlined by Jeffers, looks an awful lot like an 
updated respectability politics. One could imagine the members of the Dress Well Club 
handing out a pamphlet called “Wear a Belt.” Jeffers’ defense of sagging hinges on 
values firmly opposed to respectability politics as traditionally practiced: unruliness, 
black cool, and anti-assimilationism. On this reading, sagging does not communicate 
one’s respectability, but rejection of mainstream standards of respectability – and, 
perhaps, of the presumption, as Cooper put it, that dignity must be proved, that it can be 
proved by our physical appearance. Jeffers presents a reading of sagging pants that 
promotes some of the abstract goals of racial uplift, yet rebukes the assumptions of 
respectability politics, particularly the assimilationist assumptions. Sagging pants, 
which can become quite elaborate, definitely does not convey an aesthetics of blandness 
or neutrality. Though young men who sag their pants generally do not display much 
skin, the act does seem to call attention to, rather than downplay, the body. As a 
resistant, vibrant, and non-assimilationist aesthetic choice, sagging is similar to the 
promotion of natural hair styles among black communities after the Civil Rights 
movement. There are important differences – I’ve yet to encounter an argument that 
black youth have a moral/aesthetic obligation to sag their pants, while (perhaps because 
of its physical intimacy) the morally- and politically-focused discussion about proper 
treatment and arrangement of black hair in the United States dates, at least, to the 19th 
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century. The two strains of self-presentation share their anti-assimilationist bent, 
rejecting white standards of acceptable appearances for black bodies. I want to go 
beyond Jeffers’s discussion and suggest that both kinds of self-presentation tap into a 
longstanding assumption: respect inflects our everyday aesthetic practices, even in the 
case of sagging pants. 
Part of Jeffers’s defense of sagging pants points to the way they can be read as 
cluing into an “alternative” value system. That is, the wearers of sagging pants do not 
choose to valorize middle-class values, black or white – at least, not while they wear 
sagging pants: Jeffers points out that the same person may sag their pants on the street 
and wear a suit to their cousin’s baptism. By sagging their pants, black youths 
communicate a respect for the values of freedom and black cool. We might also read 
them as communicating respect for the oppressed community of which they are 
members and rejecting (at least sometimes) the purported benefits that come with 
assimilation. Perhaps there is something right in reading sagging pants as disrespectful 
or as confrontational, but this one-sided reading neglects to consider what alternative 
objects of respect are claimed by the practice. Jeffers suggests that the anti-
assimilationist reading of sagging pants should take priority – his reading privileges the 
way wearers of sagging pants understand their own actions, within the context of their 
lives. By contrast, dismissive or hostile readings of sagging pants privilege perspectives 
belonging to groups with more social security, who fall closer to (or even directly 
within) the mainstream and frame the young people wearing sagging pants in 
mainstream terms.  
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Jeffers and the wearers of sagging pants find an admittedly unlikely ally in 
Confucian philosophy (I am not going to speculate about what Confucius himself might 
have thought). Confucian philosophers, particularly in Analects and Xunzi, emphasize 
the importance of bodily comportment in conveying respect for people and institutions. 
Given the historical context of these texts, those people and institutions tended to be 
conservative: patriarchal family structures, rulers, and so on. Ritual, or li, is a frequent 
object of respect and veneration, and also happens to be the means of expressing respect 
(or other appropriate attitudes and emotions). Communicating one’s proper respect for li 
and the things li picks out as worthy of respect often requires body work. Li cares a 
great deal about comportment, dress, and ways of speaking, all of which can be done in 
better and worse ways. Confucius, Mengzi, and Xunzi encounter situations where 
expressing respect for ritual (for example, by observing ritual propriety) means, 
effectively, expressing contempt for people in power. A recurring theme throughout 
early Confucian texts is that the correct moral and ethical point of view may conflict 
(sometimes intensely) with the mainstream view and the views of the powerful. 
Confucius’s moral disapproval of the Ji family in Book 3 of Analects is important, but 
much less important than his high esteem for ritual. In fact, his contempt originates in 
his respect for li. The Ji family’s disregard for ritual represents a moral as well as a 
procedural failing. They repeatedly perform rituals above their station: “Confucius said 
of the Ji Family, ‘They have eight rows of dancers performing in their courtyard. If they 
can condone this, what are they not capable of?’” (3.1) Similarly, in 3.6, Confucius 
criticizes the head of the Ji family’s pilgrimage to Mt. Tai. By participating in such 
rituals, the Ji claim privileges and significance they are not properly owed. If the Ji 
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family behaved properly, or perhaps if they simply had an awareness of ritual’s 
significance, Confucius would still behave with proper concern for ritual propriety, but 
ritual propriety would no longer require he bemoan the current state of affairs. As things 
stand, Confucius’ display of disdain is a side effect of his respect. 
Jeffers’s reading of sagging pants seems to paint them as, similarly, a side effect 
of respect. Freedom, black cool, and racial pride are markedly different objects of 
respect than Confucian ritual – but they do overlap in their concern for embodiment and 
proper affective orientation. In highlighting the way perspectives and specific social 
situations influence evaluations of others’ behavior, both the Confucian examples and 
the sagging pants cases reveal the ambiguity of our behaviors. For one, the origins of 
sagging pants, as a practice, are contested and ambiguous (Jeffers gives some 
hypotheses), but for another their current meaning is ambiguous too – hence the need 
for Jeffers’ investigation. Jeffers suggests that the “correct” interpretation of sagging 
pants may require a lot of knowledge about the person doing the sagging.  
Imagine a young person . . . exemplary in just about every respect: he excels in 
school; he is active in his community through volunteering and mentoring 
younger kids; he is respectful of women, of elders, and of people in general; and 
he strives always to honor the legacy of his people. Now, imagine that, in non-
formal settings, he often dresses as many of his peers do, which includes 
sagging his pants. My intuition is that the message communicated by this young 
man’s style of dress involves the valuing of black youth creativity without any 
endorsement of the negativity often tied to the style through racist stereotypes or 
the effects of social disadvantage. (2013, 136-37) 
I suspect the volume of information Jeffers presents about this young man is partially 
defensive. However, this fairly rich descriptive activity, as a way of making sense of the 
young man’s clothing choices, could be done for anyone. In fact, it may be done for all 
of us, but perhaps for some people the world is structured to extend that description 
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ahead of time. Jeffers’ hypothetical young person shares a lot with Garnette Cadogan, 
except Cadogan’s self-description and explanation of his sartorial choices are first-
personal. 
Making sense of our actions, not to mention the actions of other people, requires 
a lot of context, but that context often goes missing. Confucian ritual propriety 
emphasizes outward expression of our inner character, prizing “consistency between 
ethical disposition and embodied aesthetic expression . . . informed by social context” 
(Mullis 2017, 144). Our relationships with other members of our moral communities 
depend upon the details of our embodiment:  
Upon receiving a gift from a good friend, my expression of gratitude is 
manifested by my unique facial expression, verbal expression of gratitude, 
gestures, and general comportment, and the resulting somaesthetic gestalt 
accrues significance since it focuses a broader field in which members of a 
community generally feel and express gratitude for generously given gifts and, 
more specifically, gifts given by one’s loved ones. (Mullis 2017, 144) 
We have control over some details: we can wear belts with our pants, or not, choose 
heartfelt words of gratitude, or say something dismissive. Other details are out of our 
control yet are interpreted as revealing deep truths about our character. Social 
interpretations of the brute facts of our material existence influence the interpretations 
of our exercises of aesthetic agency. Hoodies, as Jeffers notes, “mean” something 
different on white teenagers than on black ones: no one thinks white children in 
hoodies, qua wearers of hoodies, either are in special danger or are especially 
dangerous.  
The social meaning of our aesthetic decisions and our judgments of taste may 
alter as we move from one context to another. However, that alteration may be in the 
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sense that our self-presentation takes on additional meanings, rather than that one 
meaning replaces another. Sagging pants do mean low self-respect to certain sections of 
black communities. The meaning they bear for their wearers, which might be something 
like a respect for freedom and black cool but might also be something like wanting to fit 
in with one’s friend group, is likewise inescapable. The Ji family’s ostentatious display 
probably means, to them, that they are powerful – while to Confucius it means they are 
powerful and morally bankrupt. We want to recognize both meanings, but in order to 
decide which meaning to prioritize and how to respond to the disagreement, we need to 
consider not just first-personal experience but the context and history that shape that 
first-personal experience.  
Body movements are vital to communicating respect. Our everyday behavior 
like eye contact, facial expressions, handshakes, and posture communicate respect (or 
lack of it) for our fellows. However, these body movements are not neutral: they 
interact with and reflect race, gender, class, sexuality, and other social contexts that 
inform our judgments about bodies. Emily Lee has argued that “the history of 
colonialism . . . sedimented into . . . the very way one lives one’s body, in one’s body 
movement” (2014, 247). Jeffers and Lee share an interest in the way our histories and 
social positions impact the way we handle our bodies in social space. This observation 
is also key to Confucian accounts, though classical Confucian accounts focus more on 
guiding us into the proper moral attitudes for someone in our position within a 
hierarchy. Confucians are more optimistic than Lee about the sediment of history and 




In order to more fully describe the connections between positions like Lee’s, 
Jeffers’, 19th-century reformers’, and classical Confucians’, I’d like to turn our attention 
back to the Caribbean, though a different part of the Caribbean than Cadogan’s Jamaica, 
and consider the way female respectability and everyday aesthetics interact in Jamaica 
Kincaid’s short story “Girl.” Kincaid’s story doesn’t use the term, and the story is of 
course set in a distinct cultural and historical context from the ones I’ve been discussing 
– but I understand it to, nevertheless, offer insights relevant to both the specific context 
of post-Reconstruction respectability politics in the United States, the more general 
contexts, such as we find in Cadogan’s essay, and the relationship between moral 
judgments and everyday aesthetic behavior. “Girl,” and its treatment of femininity, are 
too complex for me to fully discuss here – I will take a rather narrow approach – but I 
want to make it clear that I am not presenting “Girl” as an argument for respectability or 
respectability politics. Rather, I take it to turn a critical eye on some facets of everyday 
life. 
Kincaid’s story, at just under 700 words, all of them dialogue, succinctly and 
powerfully illustrates the expectations for girl children, and the way in which feminine 
sexual purity links with feminized, and aestheticized, labor.40 The older woman in the 
story frequently rebukes the girl to avoid behaving “like the slut you are so bent on 
becoming.” The older woman explicitly links this fate with a few specific failures – not 
walking like a lady, letting a hem come down, behaving without proper care in the 
presence of unfamiliar men – but because Kincaid structures the story as a litany of 
imperative statements about how to be a respectable woman and an accomplished 
                                                 




housewife, “the slut you are so bent on becoming” implicitly fails in all the other facets 
of female experience. Girls who do not become “sluts” not only walk like ladies, but 
have mastered a host of domestic skills, including taking good care of clothing and 
keeping their bodies neat and clean: “be sure to wash every day, even if it is with your 
own spit.”  
The older woman’s guidance is markedly relational. The structure of the story 
first suggests a relationship through using the second person to convey advice from an 
adult/mother figure to a child. The relationship is confirmed by the time the girl breaks 
in to defend herself, but even if she never spoke up, the story would suggest a 
relationship between the older woman and the readers (who would take the “child” 
position). The content of the advice is also about how to relate to other people through 
self-presentation and care of the material world. The story explains how to elicit respect 
from other people by making oneself respectable. In Kincaid’s story, respectable 
femininity is a robust, highly-skilled way of being a human woman, but it is impossible 
not to notice the ways in which class, colonialism, and sexual inequality inform the 
ethical possibilities in the world of “Girl.” The characters in “Girl” navigate a 
Caribbean racial milieu, not an American one, so they are not conforming to white 
bourgeois standards with the same motives as women in Detroit trying to avoid sexual 
assault at work. Nevertheless, the effects of colonialism are evident in the very setting 
of the story, as well as the older woman’s admonitions about proper Sunday school 
behavior and how to iron khaki shirts and pants so they don’t crease. Class likewise 
informs the kind of work the women in the story must know how to perform, as well as 
the kind of sexual propriety required of them: women with more class and economic 
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privilege would presumably have to worry a bit less about how to behave with men they 
don’t know and might not have to manufacture their own abortifacients. 
Kincaid’s story teaches its readers strategies some people in some social 
positions use and have used to navigate the often-treacherous hierarchies that shape 
their lives. The story concludes with the following exchange: “always squeeze bread to 
make sure it’s fresh; but what if the baker won’t let me feel the bread?; you mean to say 
that after all you are really going to be the kind of woman who the baker won’t let near 
the bread?” The older woman in “Girl” wants the child in her care to know where the 
risks are – and where the tricks are, too. The baker’s character isn’t under the girl’s 
control – he might be an asshole – but there are kinds of influence she can extend. 
Further, there are ways of paying attention to the world, one’s body, and the bodies of 
one’s loved ones that communicate their importance: this is also some of the content of 
the guidance the older woman in “Girl” offers.  
Everyday aesthetic behavior is particularly effective as a means of 
communicating respect because of the way in which our everyday aesthetic behavior 
communicates the values we find in ourselves and the world around us. In Jeffers’ 
analysis of sagging pants, aesthetic choices communicate respect for anti-assimilationist 
values, though perhaps at the cost of respecting intergenerational harmony. Kincaid 
focuses on the way women’s care for their bodies and the bodies of others expresses 
respect for relationships, both in principle and in practice. She does this, like 
Confucians, by making clear the way respect and disdain can inform each other. 
Though these examples do not offer a definitive response to the problem I see for 
respectability politics, I do think they all point to the ways respect, and potential objects 
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of respect, reflect attitudes toward institutionalized power structures. The young men 
wearing sagging pants put themselves in opposition to institutional power structures, 
while respectability politics take a more ambiguous position. It seems likely that people 
interested in promoting justice will need to adopt both kinds of strategies, but I’m not 
sure if everyday aesthetics can help decide between the one or the other. 
VII. Conclusion 
The projects in this paper were fourfold. The primary project was to explain, using 
philosophical insights, the practice of respectability politics as resistant ethico-aesthetic 
strategy. However, giving respectability politics its due calls into question some of the 
most promising commitments about other convergences of aesthetic and ethical 
behavior, which make up such a significant portion of the developing field of everyday 
aesthetics. In particular, respectability politics raises questions about the ways aesthetics 
influence moral decision-making for people navigating structural or institutional 
injustice. Respectability politics resists oppression and injustice, but seems to do so in 
incomplete ways, even though it addresses multiple kinds of injustice (gender, race, and 
class). The discussion of physical beauty helped to set up the problem, while the 
discussion of respect will, I hope, eventually contribute to its solution. Focusing on the 
attitude of respect as one where the aesthetic and ethical converge and looking at both 
philosophical and literary examples clarified the mutually-informative relationship 
between respect and respectability. It also explained the abiding connection between 
social positions and embodied behavior.  
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4. The Case for Aesthetic Labor in Everyday Life 
Most of us engage in some kind of daily aesthetic labor, but some perform this labor 
under more pressure than others. Self-presentation can be a means of playful self-
expression, joy, and community-building. Self-presentation can be a method of 
preserving one’s safety or getting through the day without harassment, as for some trans 
and nonbinary people and some people of color.41 Self-presentation can likewise ensure 
one is taken seriously, as for many women in professional settings or positions of 
authority.42 Self-presentation is, often, expensive, time consuming, and fraught with 
objectionable social and cultural expectations. Furthermore, the expectations for 
aesthetic labor remain unequally distributed: members of oppressed groups are more 
likely to be expected to perform aesthetic labor in order to be afforded minimal 
consideration within the moral community. I want to explore why it might, 
nevertheless, be worthwhile for members of oppressed groups to engage in aesthetic 
labor in the context of everyday self-presentation. 
To do so, I first expand on the case against aesthetic labor, and explore three 
cases in its favor. First, the prudential case: aesthetic labor facilitates living with other 
people. Second, the political case: there is such a thing as liberatory self-presentation. 
Third, the flourishing case: like other kinds of aesthetic expression, aesthetic labor in 
the context of self-presentation does, in general, promote well-being. I conclude by 
considering what these observations might mean for socially privileged persons. 
                                                 
41 See Higginbotham 1993, Wolcott 2001, Hughes 2014, Cadogan 2016, for explorations of black 
Americans navigating self-presentation. See Alptraum 2017 and Saint Louis 2017 for discussions of trans 
experiences. 
42 It’s not unusual for students entering the work force to receive guidance on professional dress, where 




I. Aesthetic Labor and Opting Out 
This section of the paper characterizes the kind of aesthetic labor with which I’m 
concerned. It also explains the ways expectations for aesthetic labor fall more heavily 
on socially disadvantaged people, thereby motivating total disengagement from 
everyday aesthetic self-presentation. However, opting out is unfeasible. 
 By aesthetic labor, I mean a group of behaviors in which most people partake as 
part of self-presentation. Within this group, “upkeep” behaviors like cleaning the body, 
grooming hair, exercise, and using sunscreen have salutary effects, as well as aesthetic 
effects. Aesthetic labor also includes more traditionally aesthetic aspects of self-
presentation such as clothing, makeup, and skincare. My offered list is obviously not 
exhaustive, nor particularly limiting. Despite the amount of time and money devoted to 
aesthetic labor, ideas about what counts as aesthetic labor are not very robust. The 
critique of aesthetic labor is much better established. Before discussing the critique, I’m 
going to briefly explain the features of aesthetic labor most relevant to my argument. 
Each of the previous examples would count as aesthetic in their 
phenomenological context: taking a bath, for example, is a multifaceted aesthetic 
experience when we consider answers to the question, “what is it like to take a bath?” 
Both the sensuous qualities of the experience and our enjoyment or displeasure in them 
form the aesthetic experience of taking a bath. But I want to hit the “labor” portion of 
“aesthetic labor” hard – and it is not the sensuous experience of taking a bath that makes 
cleaning the body aesthetic labor. Rather, ideas of what clean and dirty bodies look and 
smell like, and attendant cultural expectations of/standards for cleanliness, make the 
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process of self-presenting as clean aesthetic labor. The way bodies are understood 
outside, or before and after, their baths makes cleaning bodies aesthetic labor. 
Cleanliness, in this context, is other-regarding aesthetic self-presentation.43 By contrast, 
taking a relaxing bath after a long day is not other-regarding aesthetic behavior. Though 
someone’s desire for a long, hot bath may originate after a series of interactions with 
other people, the point of the bath is the experience of being in the bath. A relaxing bath 
might only involve cleaning the body as a means of achieving another kind of aesthetic 
experience. For example, bath oils tend to leave a film on the skin if not washed off 
with soap, so a bather attempting to meet the usual standards of cleanliness doesn’t use 
bath oils. A bather using bath oils is probably pursuing aesthetic pleasures within the 
spatial and temporal context of the bath, so the behavior is more like aesthetic 
immersion or aesthetic appreciation than aesthetic labor. A bather pursuing the aesthetic 
effect of cleanliness (and any related ethico-aesthetic evaluations that attach to clean 
people) probably doesn’t frame the bath in terms of its aesthetic features or experiences. 
In fact, a bather interested in getting clean probably takes a shower. 
 Probably the most familiar articulation of the problem with aesthetic labor 
comes from feminist critiques of beauty. One needn’t be much of a feminist to find the 
expectation to be beautiful, and engage in beautification practices, burdensome for 
women. But feminists, in particular, “have often encouraged women to throw off the 
demands of beauty in order to gain social and political equality” (Cahill 2003, 42).44 
The critique’s hardest form is that groups of people subjected to unequal expectations of 
                                                 
43 I hope the rest of this paper complicates the division between other-regarding and self-regarding 
activities, but I think this is a good place to start. 
44 Feminist responses to problems of beauty and beautification have become increasingly complex. 
Cahill’s article is one instance; see also Higgins 2000, Craig 2006. 
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beauty labor should give up that labor. The feminist case against women’s participation 
in beauty labor made “unshaved legs and unadorned faces . . . a symbol of ‘liberation’” 
(Rhode, 2016, 82).45 Talking about aesthetic labor widens the scope of this kind of 
critique, because much aesthetic labor doesn’t aim at beauty, exactly, but at a whole 
scope of other ethico-aesthetic qualities (like cleanliness and professionalism). In the 
process, aesthetic labor becomes a prerequisite for participating in society. And if you 
and I need to devote more time, money, and thought to the process of simply being 
perceived as acceptable by groups of people who, due to social privilege, hardly need to 
think about these things at all, much less spend money on them – well, why should we 
do that? Why not just opt out?  
Further, the ethico-aesthetic norms to which aesthetic labor caters may be 
regressive or oppressive, making participation in them harmful to other socially 
disadvantaged groups. As Janell Hobson (2003) has shown, aesthetic norms about 
feminine bodies, and the way such bodies may be treated, contribute to black women’s 
oppression. Expectations of thinness, and the idea that certain kinds of thinness are 
beautiful, harm women across the racial spectrum by contributing to alienation from 
their bodies, as well as facilitating physical harm.46 Additionally, anti-fat attitudes track 
class and racial biases, since “[l]ow-income and minority individuals have 
disproportionate rates of obesity” (Rhode 2016, 85).  Low-income people of all races 
are multiply stigmatized not only for their class status and racial identities, but also for a 
perceived failure to meet aesthetic standards or, given the perceived alignment between 
                                                 
45 I take Rhode’s quotations to be usage marks, not sneer quotes. 
46 See Lintott 2003 for a discussion of eating disorders and Bordo 2004 for an account of the relationship 
between weight and gender. 
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looking thin and being healthy, ethical standards. It is, probably, bad for us to 
experience our bodies as in need of “fixing,” an orientation encouraged by current 
aesthetic norms and our cultural attitudes toward those norms. As a result of the idea 
that “almost all areas of the female body are in need of something,” women’s energies 
are directed toward “self-improvement, rather than social action” (Rhode 2016, 83).  
If you think victims of oppression have a “responsibility to resist, to show signs 
of power” (Boxill 2010, 11) to each other, if not to their oppressors, then you might also 
think aesthetic labor isn’t worth much. The situation is more complicated than the hard 
version of the critique allows. The next section explores that complication by looking at 
the relationship between aesthetic labor and labor practices. 
II. Who Does the Work? 
Considering aesthetic labor as labor also requires considering it as physical work for 
pay. Though some kinds of aesthetic activity, such as waxing, can be risky, expensive, 
and time-consuming for customers, in general, the most striking dangers or harms are to 
the workers. Ethical concerns arise in many contexts in which aesthetic labor takes 
place. These concerns include the standing of particular aesthetic practices and/or 
industries in the context of larger social, economic, and political relations of power. 
Some concerns about the harms of aesthetic labor as an occupation relate to the negative 
effects of a product or industry on the physical environment. Some kinds of aesthetic 
labor directly or indirectly endanger or harm the people who perform the labor or 
produce the products others use in aesthetic labor practices. Power relations, both global 
and local, are such that risky, low-value work is most available to people in precarious 
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positions – so, effectively, vulnerable people in local and global communities are made 
more vulnerable by their mode of employment.   
In the context of clothing, “there may be moral, socio-economic, and political 
concerns” such as environmental costs (fur, chemical contamination) or “the prospects 
of economic colonialism” (Hanson 1990, 108). At least in principle, these harms may be 
only contingently connected with aesthetic labor: “political and social issues connected 
with textile and apparel manufacturing can . . . be directly addressed . . . as political and 
economic problems” (Hanson 1990, 108).  We can build factories that don’t collapse or 
catch fire, and provide workers with acceptable conditions. Some harms seem to 
originate more clearly with capitalism and political aspects of colonialism than with 
aesthetics. It is quite possible to make, market, and buy a t-shirt without oppressing or 
physically harming anyone. Other harms are more difficult to extricate from the 
aesthetic process. A variety of hair treatments can physically harm stylists.47 Nail salon 
workers are also exposed to potentially harmful levels of acrylic dust and 
formaldehyde.48 Sometimes the kind of labor might be at fault: manicurists and 
pedicurists work long hours in physically limited positions, and even well-paid, fairly-
treated workers making false lashes may still encounter eye strain and back problems.49 
If aesthetic labor, at least in some cases, not only presents a risk of harm to oneself but 
also puts others at risk, usually people in a more precarious social-economic situation 
than oneself, then we have a compelling reason to avoid at least that kind of aesthetic 
labor. 
                                                 
47 Brazilian blowouts are a noteworthy instance: see for example Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration 2011. 
48 Nir 2015b chronicles the harmful chemicals to which nail technicians can be exposed. Acrylic dust may 
be less risky in a salon with ventilation designed to address the issue. 
49 See Chamberlain 2013 for interviews with Indonesian women making false lashes. 
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However, the harms of aesthetic labor qua labor exist alongside the benefits of 
aesthetic labor to oppressed communities. Tiffany M. Gill, in Beauty Shop Politics, 
provides a compelling account of the role work in the beauty industry played in 
bettering black women’s conditions in the United States. In addition to whatever 
financial benefit beauty work brought to black communities – and for some women, like 
Madam C.J. Walker and Annie Malone, the individual and communal financial benefits 
were significant – beauty shops offered women a venue for political action and 
community alongside aesthetic expression. As Gill points out, the aesthetic and the 
political aspects of black women’s work in and patronage of beauty shops intertwined. 
Despite the frequent perception that the beauty industry “undermin[ed] women’s 
political possibilities and . . . racial solidarity, the black beauty industry must be 
understood as providing one of the most important opportunities for black women to 
assert leadership in their communities and in the larger political arena” (Gill 2010, 2). 
Black beauty shops created spaces for black women to validate each other as beautiful 
and attractive, provided economic security and, because segregation rendered the salons 
invisible to whites, facilitated intra-community political action. 
Gill’s cases highlight the intersection of aesthetic enjoyment, aesthetic labor, 
and labor. Many beauty treatments require the direct labor of one person upon the body 
of another. For the person receiving this labor, the experience might be both delightful 
and luxurious, and contribute to the ongoing ethico-aesthetic project of self-
presentation. For working class women of all races, luxury and leisure are hard won. 
For black women, who often had to care for white families, “salons themselves served 
as place of rest” (Gill 2010, 104). As bell hooks explains, black beauty salons provided 
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“the one hour some folk would spend ‘off their feet’: a soothing, restful time of 
meditation and silence” (hooks 1996, 112). Black beauty shops were not simply sites of 
capitulation to white ideas about acceptable black people, nor locations to conform to 
strategies of respectability politics. Black beauty shops often rebuked white desires: 
they were a place for black women working in white homes to refresh themselves – in 
effect, to make sure black women didn’t look like downtrodden servants (Gill 2010, 
105). Further, by the time African-American communities identified as “B/black,”  
“these Black people overwhelmingly chose to adopt a new, Black-identified visual 
aesthetic,” particularly in the context of hair styles (Byrd and Tharps 2014, 50). These 
intimately embodied acts of aesthetic resistance followed on long-standing strategies for 
asserting lives and identities beyond the stereotypes of maid, cook, or nanny included 
refusing to wear uniforms in the streets, only changing at work. 
Gill documents black women’s work in the black beauty industry. The history 
she offers stands in contrast to the history of black women’s work for/on white women 
and white families. The history of black women’s exploitation by white families is a 
paradigm case of racial and class inequity compounded by, rather than challenged by, 
labor arrangements. I’ll return to this topic in the final portion of this paper, which 
addresses the intersection of aesthetic labor and social privilege. For now, I want to note 
that the costs of aesthetic labor practices qua labor can vary across social contexts. 
III. Prudential Arguments for Aesthetic Labor 
The prudential considerations regarding aesthetic labor are useful background for more 
detailed arguments later in the paper. There are a few kinds of prudential arguments for 
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aesthetic labor: social cohesion, economic or financial security, and expedience. I 
consider these prudential cases because they all use aesthetic labor as a way of 
safeguarding individuals’ interests, though they are often troubling in other ways. 
The pragmatic case for participating in aesthetic labor, even when the standards 
by which that labor is evaluated are generally oppressive, is that conforming to social 
norms facilitates existing with other people. Someone who seems physically clean and 
smells nice is a more pleasant companion than someone who seems physically dirty and 
smells rank. Since we can’t reasonably hope to exist without other people, if some kinds 
of aesthetic labor grease the wheels, then, especially for people occupying social 
positions surrounded by a lot of squeaky wheels, engaging in aesthetic labor makes 
good sense. More drastically: accommodating oppressive aesthetic norms may well 
keep me alive. In such cases, it is unreasonable to ask oppressed people to opt out of 
aesthetic labor.  
 In addition to considering aesthetic labor as a method of social cohesion or 
personal survival, the discussion above about working as an aesthetic laborer make 
clear that prudence often speaks directly to personal finance. Aesthetic labor on behalf 
of others may be the best financial decision some groups of people can make. None of 
us has, in fact, perfect freedom to choose our jobs: I can’t choose to become a Supreme 
Court Justice. For people in communities with few employment options and/or firmly 
gendered or racialized divisions of labor, their economic survival may require their 
participation in aesthetic labor. 
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 We cannot reasonably require oppressed people to opt out – not as a matter of 
general moral policy. Further, if we do think oppressed people have some obligation to 
resist their oppression, we may think that aesthetic labor, for all its pervasiveness, 
makes a less important target for resistance than, for example, voting rights. Other kinds 
of resistance might also be more urgent, and conventional aesthetic labor could very 
well facilitate some of these projects. An unfriendly or indifferent legislator, for 
example, might warm up to a neatly dressed group of thoughtful people advocating for 
voting rights. Advocating effectively in non-ideal situations is a worthy prudential 
consideration, and prudence and resistance are not wholly incompatible with each other. 
Indeed, as the next section explores, aesthetic labor in the context of self-presentation 
and resistance to oppressive structures have historically been bound up with each other. 
IV. Liberatory Self-Presentation 
While liberatory self-presentation is a fairly widespread instance of aesthetic labor in 
practice, it is an instance of aesthetic labor where resistance and prudence sometimes 
conflict. Though the kinds of practices I’m calling liberatory self-presentation are 
pragmatic, rather than “purely” aesthetic, they are often risky. Clear visible 
identification with a marginalized group puts one at risk. In the United States, African 
American political and social movements often clearly illustrated the tensions between 
resistance and prudence. This section of the paper will consider formal and informal 
cases of aesthetic labor in the service of liberatory projects. In addition to culturally 
black aesthetic practices, I’ll consider the role of self-presentation in predominantly 
(white) male academic environments. In both contexts, liberatory self-presentation by 
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marginalized people sends a social or political message to members of the dominant 
group and members of one’s own group.50 
Hair care and styling are a common theme in African American political and 
cultural life. Post-Reconstruction blacks “began . . . shaping their collective identity. 
And the politics of appearance was to play a pivotal role” (Byrd and Tharps 2014, 26). 
Successfully achieving the initial project, “access to the American dream,” required 
“mak[ing] White people more comfortable,” through, for example, presenting according 
to Eurocentric aesthetic standards (Byrd and Tharps 2014, 26). These early twentieth-
century strategies represent a convergence of resistance and prudence, because the 
object of resistance was, in part, racist physical caricatures that helped justify (or 
rationalize) harsh oppression of Blacks and prevented their socio-economic 
advancement. Alongside politics of respectability, the “New Negro” aesthetic offered 
“an alternative, oppositional appearance. . . . Both an aspiration and an ideal, . . . the 
New Negro was a hybrid of retaliation and pride” (Byrd and Tharps 2014, 28).51 A 
hallmark of the New Negro aesthetic was straightened hair. Successful methods for 
straightening black hair, particularly black women’s hair, made beauty entrepreneurs 
like Annie Malone and Madame C. J. Walker rich and laid foundations for the beauty 
culture Tiffany Gill documented in Beauty Shop Politics.  
As Black political mobilization developed and evolved, “hair shifted from style 
to statement. . . . Blacks and Whites came to believe that the way Black people wore 
their hair said something about their politics. Hair came to symbolize either a continued 
                                                 
50 I don’t mean to suggest that either dominant or marginalized groups of people are homogenous as far as 
their political viewpoints or their relationships with other groups of people.  
51 I discuss respectability politics in the previous paper, “Respectability Politics as Aesthetic Practice.”  
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move toward integration in the American political system or a growing cry for Black 
power and nationalism” (Byrd and Tharps 2014, 50). Straightened hair (or, sometimes, 
hair that appeared to be straightened) had been explicitly associated with racial self-
hatred early on by both Black radicals and more assimilationist figures like Booker T. 
Washington, such that entrepreneurs who provided it, like Madame C.J. Walker, were 
sometimes met with, but pre-Civil Rights the “right” thing to do with Black hair was 
unkink it (Gill 2010, 23-24, 41-42). With the rise of Black power movements, 
straightened hair “read as . . . the most obvious marker of one’s attempts to emulate 
Whiteness” (Byrd and Tharps 2014, 51). The total refusal of white beauty standards, 
and the project of valorizing specifically black modes of appearance, severed liberatory 
practices from prudential practices. Presenting as undeniably racially Other, and as not 
only unashamed of that Otherness but proud and pleased by the physical facts of it, 
centers the lives of racial Others and rejects the perspectives of dominant 
communities.52 
Natural hair placed aesthetic labor in a new political context. For some, adopting 
natural hair was an explicitly collective choice, expressing membership in a politically-
oriented group and furthering the aims of Black liberation. I want to suggest that, 
regardless of someone’s involvement in traditional political arenas, the shift toward 
                                                 
52 I am interested in, but do not have the space to consider here, questions about aesthetic authenticity and 
Otherness in the context of racialized groups and dynamics. There are some kinds of authentic self-
presentation by racial Others that, purposefully or not, cater to white notions of and tastes for the 
“exotic.” I’m thinking here about some kinds of Orientalist gazes and practices, including sexual fetishes. 
I think one reason Black liberatory self-presentation seems to (mostly) avoid this issue is that it treats the 
authentic and the modern as compatible. Reviving and reclaiming African braiding styles, for example, 
coincided with and sometimes communicated a commitment to black and women’s liberation movements 




accepting and embracing natural hair constitutes liberatory self-presentation.53 The 
primary reason for thinking so is because of the historical context which normalized 
natural hair, and because of the profound changes required to normalize natural hair. 
While the Afro was significant to Black Power movements, its aesthetic and political 
significance outlasted the political context that took it up. Natural hair outlived Black 
Power. Allowing Afros and other kinds of natural hair to move beyond political symbol 
and into everyday life and self-expression enriches everyday intersections of aesthetics, 
politics, and human bodies.  
Natural hair’s transition from statement to style also signals a kind of social 
progress: some goals of midcentury black liberation movements were met, even if only 
partially. By the time natural hair, and Afros in particular, became one style among 
many Blacks might choose, it still signaled “an alternative, African-derived aesthetic” 
had firmly entrenched in aesthetic culture (Byrd and Tharps 2014, 62). Radical politics 
shouldn’t be a precondition for natural hair. Analogously, a middle-class woman who 
opted not to wear a corset in 1910 made a strong political statement by adopting 
liberatory self-presentation. But women as a whole are better off when corsets are 
something we opt into, rather than out of. Liberatory self-presentation and aesthetic 
labor in the service of political goals aim at shifting targets, particularly if the political 
goals are even partially met. Liberatory self-presentation, as the move from 
respectability to Black power illustrates, also employs flexible methods, and often puts 
those methods in conversation with each other. 
                                                 
53 I don’t want to suggest that the embrace of natural hair styles is total and complete, even in 2018. 
There’s plenty of evidence that natural black hair remains controversial, both within black communities 
and in integrated contexts, but that controversy clearly differs in character from that of the 1960s. 
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In “Should Black Kids Avoid Wearing Hoodies?” Chike Jeffers considers the 
arguments against young black men wearing hoodies in the contemporary United States. 
Jeffers notes that there may be good reasons not to wear a hoodie, for example “in some 
context where it is known that wearing a hoodie is extremely likely to make one a target 
of violence” or in contexts where a hoodie would be inappropriate, such as many 
workplaces (2013, 38). In other contexts, “we should accept the wearing of hoodies as 
part of black youth culture and even applaud those who express themselves in this way 
while exploding stereotypes through their pursuit of excellence.” Jeffers suggests that 
for black youths to present themselves one way while acting in a way allegedly 
inconsistent with that self-presentation is a liberatory strategy. 
 Jeffers’ examples and analysis – he talks about sagging pants as well as hoodies 
– offer one way in which the aesthetic labor involved in self-presentation bolsters 
efforts toward liberation. Wearing hoodies and low-slung trousers is an aesthetic and 
ethical refusal to disavow blackness, a strategy similar to forms of bodily aesthetic 
resistance such as refusing to straighten one’s hair or cosmetically lighten one’s skin. 
Such methods of self-presentation resist anti-black notions of “acceptable” and 
“unacceptable” black people. Self-presenting in a way that upsets people who hold such 
notions might be a good in-itself, but liberatory self-presentation does not boil down to 
anti-assimilation. Community building matters to liberation, and self-presentation has 
long been a way of declaring community membership. 
 Self-presentation and its attendant aesthetic labor does not always aim at making 
marginalized people attractive to dominant groups. Sometimes it aims at personal 
pleasure, and sometimes it aims at fellow marginalized people. Sometimes, regardless 
117 
 
of our intentions when getting dressed in the morning, an aspect of our self-presentation 
can reassure another member of our moral community. A woman who joined my PhD 
program a year after I did told me she felt more confident in the environment after she 
saw me wear red lipstick to class. She meant, I think, that she found it reassuring to 
know being taken seriously did not require conforming to a narrow aesthetic standard (a 
non-feminine one), that a variety of self-presentations were compatible with the 
peaceful pursuit of philosophical study. 
 The link between aesthetic labor and liberatory practices, as I think the examples 
I’ve used hint, also links the pragmatic case with the case I’ll discuss next: the ways 
aesthetic labor contributes positively to our human flourishing. Liberatory practices are, 
in a sense, pragmatic ones too: they respond to the conditions on the ground using the 
means that will be effective at the time. Liberatory practices are also conducive – one 
hopes – to our well-being, that is, they are also a way of bringing about flourishing 
(eventually!). The next section outlines the role of aesthetic labor in human flourishing. 
V. Flourishing and Aesthetic Labor 
There are already traditions linking aesthetic experience and human flourishing: 
Confucius, Aristotle, and Kant all acknowledge its significance. Writing from 
marginalized positions, Audre Lorde, W. E. B. DuBois, and Virginia Woolf offer 
compelling arguments for the importance of artistic work. Lorde, in particular, moves 
art out of the “luxury” category and makes it a necessity (1984/2007). Indigenous 
communities around the world have used filmmaking as both a method of cultural 
preservation and source of income, combining aesthetic, cultural, and economic 
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empowerment.54 In (post)colonial contexts, this kind of aesthetic practice takes on 
liberatory urgency, but underlying that urgency is a more traditional significance. 
Pointing out the pervasive significance of artistic-aesthetic labor to a good life helps to 
introduce aesthetic labor in the context of self-presentation. Aesthetic labor can promote 
flourishing and well-being, both in community and in solitude. 
 We have already seen that aesthetic self-presentation can be a kind of liberatory 
practice, resisting both oppressive norms and their social-political context. Aesthetic 
labor can also contribute to oppressed people’s flourishing by affirming the value of 
their bodies. This happens in a few ways: by framing the body as desirable to others, by 
positioning it as a source of pleasure (particularly first-personal pleasure) and agency, 
and by allowing the cultivation of personal taste. I’ll take each of these in turn. 
Historically, the range of people admitted to the category of “desirable” has 
been quite narrow. “Desirable” means a few things. We have a version of desirable that 
means something like “sexy.” Sheila Lintott and Sherri Irvin (2016) have explored both 
the narrowness of sexiness and argued for our need to expand it. For people who have 
been shut out of the category of sexy/desirable, claiming that designation for themselves 
is a kind of claim to full humanity. The writer Kayla Whaley (2016) uses a power chair 
and presents as femme, thereby “explicitly and visibly claiming the womanhood I’ve 
always been denied because of my disabled body – not least through constant 
infantilization and desexualization.” Whaley’s highly feminized self-presentation 
juxtaposes an “undesirable” body with the signs of a desirable one. In the process, she 
                                                 
54 See Wood 2008, Evans 2010. 
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claims her value and contradicts narrow views of where aesthetic/erotic pleasure can 
reside.  
A more basic, still carnal, sense of “desirable” more easily accommodates our 
everyday body aesthetics. A body, including the person in it, has positive value. For 
people with “undesirable” bodies, taking care of and making the body a site of display 
contradicts social structures that have urged those with normative bodies to look away. 
Taking even basic care of certain kinds of disabled bodies resists cultural narratives that 
suggest disabled bodies are not worth living in. By focusing on pleasure, agency, and 
moral consideration, this kind of care denies that disabled people’s physical experiences 
can only be defined by suffering, passivity, and futility. Keah Brown, a black woman 
with cerebral palsy, writes compellingly of the significance aesthetic labor has to her 
self-worth. Brown describes an intimate link between aesthetic labor, including other-
regarding labor affecting the ways others see her, and her well-being. I will look at 
Brown’s discussion of aesthetic labor in three contexts: putting her hair in a ponytail, 
wearing lipstick, and creating the hashtag #DisabledAndCute. Brown’s account is both 
highly personal and community-oriented, self-regarding and other-regarding – her 
perspective offers insight into the links between liberation and flourishing, and the role 
aesthetic labor can play for oppressed persons constrained by simultaneous expectations 
of aesthetic labor and assumptions of their unsuitability for aesthetic appreciation and 
pleasure. 
 In her essay “The Freedom of a Ponytail,” Brown describes the accomplishment 
she feels on learning, at age 24, to put her hair in a ponytail. The inability to put her hair 
up was one of the many ways she felt dissatisfied with her disabled body, but not the 
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only one: she describes “resenting everything about” her identical twin sister, Leah, 
“from the shape of her face to the tips of her toes. . . . I wanted a body with completely 
functioning hands and feet, . . . without a right leg that was shorter than the left. I 
wanted to wake up glad that I had woken up.” Putting her hair in a ponytail required 
help from a family member or, in college, from friends. Brown sees this reliance on 
others as a persistent theme in her life, impeding her independence and barring her from 
desirability: “I imagined boys thinking, She can’t even put her hair up. Why would I go 
out with her?” In college, where she was the only black woman in her friend group, 
asking non-black women for help putting up her hair also emphasized Brown’s racial 
otherness. 
 After graduating college, Brown decides “I was going to learn how to do a 
ponytail, no matter what.” She finds plenty of guidance through YouTube videos on 
forming a one-handed ponytail by disabled women. But the women are all white – their 
tricks don’t transfer. Brown has to figure it out for herself, from the ground up: “I 
practiced for weeks in the same chair . . . with tear-stained cheeks.” It takes her three 
weeks. The “new sloppy ponytails” represent a breakthrough in Brown’s self-
sufficiency: “I no longer have to ask my sister for help [getting dressed] unless I want a 
ponytail that will last a while, or a touch of makeup. My ponytails feel like a 
revolutionary act, a celebration of disability and of me. . . .I feel less like an outsider 
and more like the badass, black, disabled feminist I am.” I’ll return to the “touch of 
makeup” later, as Brown herself returns to it in a different essay, but first I want to 
explore Brown’s account of this extremely basic form of aesthetic labor and its impact 
on self-conception and satisfaction. 
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 Brown describes the ponytails with reference to aesthetic and ethical concepts. 
Putting her hair up is a kind of minimal aesthetic labor: less elaborate and, generally, 
less fraught than wearing red lipstick or getting a manicure.55 In the context of her 
physical disability and, later, her race, the ponytail becomes even more complex: 
closely related to the way other people respond to her physical presence (the boys who 
won’t think she’s cute, but also the friends who will comment on her hairstyle), 
intertwined with familial and friendship relationships. By performing this aesthetic 
labor, Brown does not reject her relationships with other people, but she does reframe 
her relationships with them and with her own body. 
 In another essay, describing the importance she finds in lipstick, Brown (2017c) 
more explicitly engages with beauty standards: “There is an urgency to meld myself 
into what beauty standards . . . ask of me and to change until I fit while knowing the 
truth, which is that I will never fit.” The ableism prevalent in beauty standards precludes 
Brown’s being considered “beautiful,” even if it does not exempt her from beauty labor. 
Actually, she wouldn’t want it to: “I never saw myself as worthy of beauty or love . . .. 
However, there has always been one thing that softened the blow, and that is lipstick.” 
For Brown, while beauty labor intersects with beauty standards, the labor is distinct 
from its cultural context. Further, the cultural context of this work doesn’t stop at 
aligning with or against standards of beauty, but includes other ideals as well. Brown 
differentiates the beauty concept from aesthetic labor, recognizing multiple, everyday 
aesthetic concepts. She describes lipstick as signifying not just physical beauty but, 
                                                 
55 It seems to me that the cultural politics around hair intervene prior to Brown’s wanting to put her hair 
in a ponytail, so the ponytail itself is less fraught that the decision to straighten or wear hear natural 
(Brown hasn’t, to my knowledge, written on this issue). I am perfectly happy to be dissuaded from this 
view as I don’t think anything rides on it at this point. However, see Paul Taylor’s Black is Beautiful for a 
discussion of the possible significance of black women wearing their hair in ponytails. 
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“maturity, attractiveness, and a sense of self,” as well as “confidence and control.” 
Beauty plays a role, but that role is not, for Brown, definitive – she is not simply trying 
to be beautiful, but also trying to realize a more complex sense of personhood. As with 
the ponytail, Brown learns to apply lipstick on her own, but she notes that lipstick has 
“felt like armor even when I felt too scared to wear it, even when I felt I wasn’t worthy 
of it.” Brown’s body-confidence and self-confidence grow alongside her expertise. 
Brown finds lipstick opens possibilities to her even when she believes its power to 
bestow beauty is out of her reach. Whether or not she is “beautiful,” she can be a mature 
and confident woman, in control of her life and with a sense of herself.  
 In her concise accounts of the specific importance two kinds of aesthetic labor 
have had on her well-being, Brown pushes back on the idea that aesthetic labor is 
always and simply another way of oppressing already oppressed people, either through 
engaging them in self-objectification and self-deception, or through requiring they 
devote their time and money to behaviors that trap them in a double bind. They are, on 
the one hand, socially required to perform these tasks, but the tasks themselves are 
frequently disvalued. As Brown shows, engaging in aesthetic labor helps her to 
understand her body and self – what she likes and dislikes, what kind of (embodied!) 
person she is. Additionally, aesthetic labor helps Brown reframe that embodiment as 
replete with subjectivity. Not only does aesthetic labor allow Brown to understand her 
body as malleable, versatile, and a source of pleasure, but she comes also to understand 
it as something other than an obstacle to happiness. By working upon her body, Brown 
positions embodiment between (self-)objectification and total rejection of the physical. 
She no longer experiences herself as at the mercy of her gender, race, or disability - at 
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the mercy of her body.56 This switch is important because it emphasizes the context-
dependent significance of the body, and the way embodiment functions in oppressive 
structures. Brown’s trouble didn’t originate with her body, her race, or her gender so 
much as it originated with the world in which that raced, gendered, disabled body 
operates. 
 The world is full of diversely disabled people – but Brown’s experience and 
self-conception intersect with and overlap with the experiences of other disabled people. 
To magnify these experiences, Brown started a Twitter hashtag, #DisabledAndCute. 
Her account of this process describes the significance of aesthetic concepts and 
aesthetic validation in promoting oppressed people’s flourishing. Brown (2017b) frames 
this essay, like her others, as an account of personal development: she starts by 
establishing the significance “cute” had for her, writing, “there are three things I never 
thought I’d be: tall, successful, or cute.” Cuteness is more complexly related to personal 
agency than success or height. Like other aesthetic evaluations, being “cute” depends on 
the shape of the world around you and the way you fit into it, encompassing “bare 
facts” of the way you look and self-present and the social meaning of those facts, and 
your own self-estimation. For Brown, “feeling cute” happens after her success is 
established and she’s stopped caring about being tall: “something shifted in me when I 
looked in the mirror and felt cute.” Nothing about her appearance had changed, only her 
relationship to herself and the world around her. When the feeling persists, she creates 
the Twitter hashtag #DisabledAndCute, a channel for other disabled people to express 
aesthetic self-worth. Most of the contributions are selfies. 
                                                 
56 We’re all at the mercy of our bodies, of course! But Brown, and people like her, are negotiating a 
special, socially constructed vulnerability, one often cast as particularly terrible. 
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 Brown, by her own admission, started engaging in aesthetic labor from a place 
of self-doubt and low self-esteem: she was not living a flourishing life. The popular 
assumption, as I understand it, is that aesthetic labor and aesthetic ideals would be 
meaningful largely for the role they play in putting Brown, and people like her, in that 
place of low self-esteem. Brown’s testimony highlights the impacts of messages that 
black disabled bodies are aesthetically lacking. But if racist, ableist, misogynist 
understandings of “cute” impeded Brown’s flourishing, other aspects of her life pushed 
back until she could claim “cute” and “disabled” simultaneously and publicly. Brown’s 
self-confidence and belief in her cuteness predate the hashtag, which, though I don’t 
want to overstate the impact of internet activism, contributed to the development of an 
aesthetically-empowered disabled community online. The hashtag, which remains an 
ongoing project for the disabled community/ies on Twitter, is a particularly good 
example of the way aesthetic experience can link human flourishing and liberation. The 
hashtag creates a loose community of disabled people who both affirm the existence, 
pleasures, and value of disabled people and push back against stereotypes and narrow 
aesthetic ideals. 
 Brown’s accounts of her ongoing negotiation of aesthetic labor, gender, race, 
and disability offer insights into the connection between community/personal 
relationships and aesthetic ideals and experiences. Brown’s exploration of the 
significance aesthetic labor has had in her life and on her capacities for flourishing 
routinely acknowledges the importance of relationships with other people. Her 
relationships facilitate her physical movement through the world by allowing her to 
present in a way more in line with her self-conception, but they also impact her 
125 
 
psychological states more generally. Relationships help shape the self-conception she 
uses aesthetic labor to (partially, of course) realize. An answer to the question of my 
title, grounded in Brown’s work, looks like this: for certain kinds of oppressed people, 
engaging in aesthetic labor helps to improve quality of life by reframing their 
embodiment and their relationship to embodiment such that “undesirable,” 
“unaesthetic,” or “aesthetically negative” bodies can be envisioned as aesthetically 
pleasurable and meaningful, both as objects of aesthetic experience and as sites of 
ethico-aesthetic agency. Brown’s writing describes a primarily self-directed trajectory. 
Her understanding of aesthetic labor overlaps with liberatory aesthetic projects, but by 
recognizing the complex relationships between an individual (qua individual) and her 
social environment, she offers a more generous account of the significance of aesthetic 
labor than the liberatory account does. Further, Brown foregrounds the judgments, 
pleasures, and experiences of oppressed people, rather than of the privileged.  
 Brown’s description of her aesthetic labor and aesthetic community building 
both mirrors and contrasts with Kayla Whaley’s account, discussed earlier. Whaley, 
though not subject to Brown’s racialized experiences, also found that, by virtue of her 
disability, “femininity as an expression of womanhood wasn’t meant for me.”  While 
Brown’s projects around aesthetic labor focus mostly on herself or are (primarily) 
internal to the disabled community, Whaley makes a point of positioning “femme” as 
something that contradicts the way the able-bodied world interprets her. Whaley’s first-
personal account acknowledges the role aesthetic taste and experience play in her 
flourishing, but she finds the most significance in countering facile ideas about what it 
means to be disabled. Aesthetic labor for Brown and Whaley comes at a high cost: there 
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are lots of barriers to their participation in complex, semi-mandatory frivolity. However, 
they do not frame these barriers as a reason to opt out of aesthetic labor, but rather as 
deepening the meaning of their participation in aesthetic labor. 
 Lastly, aesthetic labor allows us to cultivate our personal taste in ways that 
enrich our lives. Consider perfume. Perfume is a very efficient kind of aesthetic labor: a 
quick application lasts most of the day and a bottle several years. Wearing perfume is an 
intimate, rich, and highly varied experience – it unfolds, often idiosyncratically, over 
time. Very often, the full experience of a perfume is available only to the person 
wearing it, and sometimes it is only over repeated applications – perhaps even over 
several years – that someone can “understand” a scent. A perfume like Zoologist Bat, 
smelling of fruit, dirt, and minerals, challenges and expands our judgments about what 
it is pleasant for a body to smell of. Perfume does not simply mask “unpleasant” smells 
– that is, it does not simply disguise corporeality the way deodorant does. Indeed, 
Richard Shusterman argues that perfume does not function to disguise, since “the 
desired olfactory style means more than simply eliminating unpleasant bodily odors. A 
totally odorless body, if indeed possible, would be unattractively bland, antiseptically 
devoid of a character. A merely pleasant scent will also not suffice” (2012b, 328). 
Sometimes, as with Papillon Perfumes Salomé, which has distinct notes of sweat and 
urine, perfume highlights the bodily scents deodorant covers up. Additionally, perfume 
interacts with the body and the environment to create something new and ephemeral. 




 Wearing perfume, then, is not necessarily a means of acceding to a culture with 
oppressive ideas about acceptable ways for the human body to smell (particularly 
women’s bodies) – perfume does not (necessarily) promote shame. In its intimacy, it 
frustrates ideas of aesthetic labor as conceding to the pleasures and tastes of other, more 
privileged groups of people. Instead, wearing perfume and cultivating a taste for it is 
like cultivating taste in music, literature, or food. As such, perfume and fragrance “is an 
assertion of one’s own taste and an appeal to be appreciated not just sensually but also 
cognitively for expressing one’s own singular taste in style” (Shusterman 2012b, 328). 
Wearing Chanel No.5 today, with its sharp aldehydic opening, means something 
different than it meant in 1924, when the perfume was introduced, or in 1954.57 No. 5 is 
no longer edgy or surprising for its use of synthetic ingredients – it is, though, an 
unconventional, un-trendy choice. 
Complex, on-going processes like reading novels aesthetically enrich our lives 
and play important roles in moral agency. Similarly, when it comes to perfume, “the 
style expressed is more than a mere superficial matter of surface body scent or olfactory 
connoisseurship, but also an expression of one’s deeper character or ethical style” 
(Shusterman 2012b, 328). Cultivating a taste in perfume might encourage a kind of joy 
in and acceptance of our bodies’ complexity and interdependence. For example, in a 
community of fellow perfumistas, one becomes aware of the nuances and changes of a 
single scent. Zoologist Beaver, with a (synthetic) castoreum note, recently made the 
rounds amongst four of my perfume-interested friends. Natural castoreum is a secretion 
                                                 
57 We’ll put to the side issues of reformulation. It may well be that Chanel No.5 is no longer the same 




from beavers’ castor glands; it smells something like feces and something like phenol. 
The castoreum in Beaver, distinct from the other notes, smelled profoundly unpleasant 
on two of us, smelled interesting on a third, and was totally absent on a fourth. 
Although the fecal note in Beaver was definitely unpleasant on two of us, it occurred 
simultaneously with a lovely watery linden blossom smell – the composition of the 
scent made the whiff of shit aesthetically rewarding. On the third wearer, the musk’s 
fecal and phenol notes balanced beautifully with the aquatic floral aspect.  
The process of trying, sharing, and comparing the scent with others emphasized 
the diversity of the perfume’s aesthetic effects. Additionally, it called our attention to 
features of our bodies that are often elided or treated as shameful, namely their 
fleshliness. Beaver’s castoreum note, with its more-than-a-whiff of shit, was of course 
partly responsible for the fleshly orientation. In addition, the act of passing a sample 
around, applying it, and noticing differences, played a role. We applied Beaver from a 
spray sample, but dabber samples, requiring skin contact, would have emphasized 
fleshliness even more. Even the spray sample, which leaves scent molecules in the air as 
well as on the skin, requires contact: smelling something means it is in contact with 
you, however attenuated. Smelling someone else’s perfume, while they wear it, is also a 
reminder of their bodily presence. Unless they are a very inconsiderate perfume-wearer, 
or they are wearing a “sillage monster,” smelling someone else’s perfume requires close 
proximity with them.58 Additionally, people generally apply perfume at pulse points, 
where blood is close to the skin, so a purposeful investigation of someone else’s scent 
might mimic gestures that generally only occur in erotic contexts, such as sniffing 
                                                 
58 Sillage describes the degree to which a perfume “projects” itself above the wearer’s skin.  
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wrists and necks. Finally, in addition to emphasizing a perfume’s diverse facets, 
smelling it on other people can remind us of human diversity. Even if a scent smells 
similar on two bodies, it might not suit them equally.  
These experiences of wearing perfume cut against the anti-aesthetic labor view 
in two cases. In cases of largely self-directed labor, such as wearing perfume to work, 
perfume can contribute to our flourishing by enriching our day to day aesthetic 
experience, providing an outlet for the development of personal taste and a pleasurable 
experience of everyday embodiment. In cases of inter-relational and collaborative 
aesthetic labor, wearing and appreciating perfume with other people builds personal 
relationships, puts individual bodily features in context, and adds depth to one’s 
understanding of a perfume’s aesthetic effects. Sampling perfume in a group is 
analogous to other collective aesthetic experiences, where aesthetic appreciation takes 
place in relation with others. Perfume differs from a seminar or concert, however, 
because it directs aesthetic attention to the appreciators, who are here participants as 
well as audience members, as well as to an aesthetic “object.” 
 None of these cases testifying to the link between aesthetic labor and the 
promotion of well-being is meant to deny that aesthetic labor’s opponents have a good 
point. There are many kinds of aesthetic labor that undermine our well-being, that 
inhibit our flourishing. Such harms may be historically and culturally contingent – but 
they are still harms. Though benefits may be similarly contingent, recognizing them 
points us toward an understanding of aesthetic labor that might enable us to 
reconceptualize what we want from our everyday aesthetic activities. Recognizing 
aesthetic labor’s contributions to a flourishing human life also helps explain the ways in 
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which groups of people generally not “expected” to perform much aesthetic labor might 
find such practices a worthy focus of their attention. The final section of the paper 
makes a case for aesthetic labor among privileged groups, as well as discussing ways of 
performing and approaching that labor. 
VI. Privilege and Responsible Aesthetic Labor 
JACK: I have to look perfect. When it comes to hair, no one is more bitchy than 
conservative males.  
◼ 30 Rock, “Somebody to Love” 
I’d like to begin the discussion of privilege and aesthetic labor, and the final part of this 
paper, by considering a passage from Elif Batuman’s novel The Idiot. In this passage, 
the novel’s narrator Selin, a second-generation Turkish immigrant in her first year at 
Harvard, describes a trip to the men’s section of a department store: “The men’s 
department made no sense, the way nothing seemed designed to surprise or delight you, 
and everything looked the same. How could anyone choose between so many gray 
jackets?” (2017, 136).  Though Selin keenly observes a friend’s aggressively chic Paris 
makeover, she is not herself much interested in fashion. Her reaction to the 
disappointing selection reflects not so much her own personal taste in clothing 
(whomever it might be designed for) but her expectations about the kind of pleasure 
everyday aesthetic experiences allow us. The pleasures the men’s department offers are 
certainly not aesthetic pleasures as Selin understands them. In fact, she seems to think 
“so many gray jackets” present a difficult puzzle to their prospective wearers and a 
mystery to others. The jackets’ aesthetic effect on Selin mingles baffled disappointment 
with the judgment that “there was something ridiculous about their sobriety and self-
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importance” (136). At the same time, Selin finds herself compulsively “touching the 
broad shoulders” and in the midst of “a wave of longing” (136). 
 In the context of the novel, Selin’s wave of longing is pretty clearly linked to her 
crush on an older student, Ivan. She longs for him, and for the things he represents (the 
novel also makes this cluster of longings pretty clear). Further speculation on what this 
instance means to the novel will have to take place in another essay; what is interesting 
for us in Selin’s responses is the way her expectations of aesthetic pleasure are 
thwarted, and the masculine aesthetic vocabulary that greets her instead. Expecting 
surprise and delight, Selin finds sobriety and self-importance, and endless subtle 
variations on a theme. The aesthetic effects produced by menswear and the 
environments in which it is sold are markedly different from the aesthetic effects 
produced by womenswear and its commercial environments. While women’s fashion 
(which is to say, fashion) elicits traditional aesthetic responses and interacts with 
traditional aesthetic values like beauty, men’s fashion, at least the kind of men’s fashion 
Selin considers, seeks an entirely different set of ethico-aesthetic responses. I’ll explore 
these responses in more detail below, but for now I want to note that the grey jackets 
Selin (along with, I suspect, most of us) finds uninspiring and dull both present a barrier 
to the uninitiated and, through their aesthetic pseudo-neutrality, uphold the power 
structures that make aesthetic labor a “problem” in the first place. Although we might 
think that people in positions of privilege aren’t expected to perform aesthetic labor, 
Selin and Ralph’s trip to the department store complicates this idea. The aesthetic 
vocabulary “so many gray jackets” offer is limited, but it is a vocabulary.  
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Finally, the self-presentation Batuman describes in this part of the novel is 
communal. The community relationships appear at a few levels, among them personal 
(friendship, friend groups) and social or institutional (university and pre-professional 
networking). Selin is in the men’s department to assist a male friend, Ralph, with 
finding suspenders. That is, she is engaged in collaborative, or charitable, aesthetic 
labor (I don’t mean to suggest that Selin and Ralph’s personal interaction constitutes a 
gendered outsourcing of aesthetic labor). Since the novel is a bildungsroman, its 
instances of aesthetic labor also constitute a kind of self-making process: Selin and 
Ralph are in the store to find the clothes for a kind of person Ralph wants to be. 
Looking like you belong is an important step in belonging. Their trip to the department 
store allows Selin and Ralph, already students at Harvard but social and temperamental 
outsiders, to more fully integrate themselves into the power structures to which their 
university affiliation gives them special access. Neither Selin nor Ralph is a particularly 
sophisticated sartorial, or social, analyst, so they operate according to a squishy sense of 
which colors “belong” together. Their muddling along underlines the ways in which 
they are, though in a limited sense, outsiders seeking entry into a rarified world. 
Menswear has altered since the 1990s, when the novel is set, but not by much. 
Even in the 90s, there were certainly aesthetic subtleties in menswear that go mostly 
unnoticed by 18-year-old women like Selin. But those subtleties also go unnoticed by 
many of the men buying menswear. There is little awareness that sober gray jackets 
produce just as much of an aesthetic effect as Kayla Whaley’s makeup, in part because 
the ethico-aesthetic effect of sober gray jackets is so different in character from the 
effect of red lipstick or a well-cut silk blouse. The aesthetic labor involved in “choosing 
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between so many gray jackets” is effectively invisible, though it may also be noticed 
and found unwelcome. The gray jackets Selin observes with puzzlement align with 
ideas about white masculinity, and white men are not, according to the cultural 
consensus, objects of aesthetic appreciation. They are not objects at all. 
Indeed, there is little awareness that white men produce an aesthetic effect 
through their presence – in part because, as John Berger has noted, a cisgender white 
man’s presence communicates “a power which he exercises on others” rather than 
declaring how other people may treat him (1972, 46). A cisgender white man’s decision 
to wear pants that do not fit reads not as indicating low self-respect or self-esteem, but 
that he doesn’t have to care about what his pants mean.59 Berger means that a white 
man (other things being equal) doesn’t signal how other people can treat him because 
his cultural context is such that everyone already knows how to treat him. Any account 
of the relationship between aesthetic labor and social capital has to consider not just the 
people at the bottom of a hierarchy, but also the people at the top buying boring gray 
jackets, and people in the middle, trying to distinguish amongst those boring gray 
jackets and resenting the boredom and the work. Even quite powerful people cannot 
effect total revolution on their own, all at once – so in their daily lives must consider 
how to responsibly manage their social power and privilege.  
 One strategy might be a uniform, such as Barack Obama adopted while 
president, and the raw materials of which Selin contemplates with mournful boredom. 
President Obama adopted uniform dressing to avoid decision fatigue, sticking mostly to 
                                                 
59 That is, the cultural content of white men in clothes that don’t fit is not “low self-respect.” Of course, as 
the discussion of Queer Eye later in this section might suggest, plenty of white men do wear poorly fitting 
clothing because of low self-esteem and poor self-image. The social consequences for this group of 
people are, however, different. 
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blue or gray suits: “You’ll see I wear only gray or blue suits. . . . I have too many other 
decisions to make” (Lewis 2012).60 But while Obama’s strategy might be the judicious 
one for someone in his position, that position is so singular that I’m not sure we can 
usefully generalize from it. For everyday people, the strategy seems to rule out both a 
wide variety of aesthetic pleasure and personal agency.  
While unequal expectations for aesthetic labor and self-presentation persist, as 
they are likely to, privileged groups opting out of aesthetic labor only confirms the 
status quo. For example, a tenured white male philosopher who pays no attention to his 
self-presentation – if we can imagine such a person – might effectively help maintain 
the class-bound, racially-isolated, gender-biased conditions of contemporary 
professional philosophy. A uniform approach to dressing is at least transparent on the 
need to perform some kind of aesthetic labor. A uniform even acknowledges that this 
aesthetic labor (again, we are not simply considering health and hygiene here) is 
important, and may communicate something about oneself to other people. Given that 
surely very few white male tenured philosophy professors face daily decisions on the 
same magnitude as the President of the United States, for members of this group and 
groups like them to make a point of classifying aesthetic labor concerning self-
presentation as frivolous or, worse, a drain on more important daily activities can seem 
pretentious or obtuse. Though adopting a uniform acknowledges the pragmatic need for 
aesthetic labor, it does not necessarily admit the role aesthetic labor can play in 
                                                 
60 Obama did wear a too big tan suit once during his presidency and it briefly made the news: see Izadi 
2014, Gonzales 2017, Woolf 2017. He might also, as Sherri Irvin reminded me, have an interest in 
avoiding racialized characterizations of his clothing as “flashy.” Considering that the tan suit was judged 
“unpresidential,” he might indeed be trying to head off racialized criticisms. However, the white men 
who quote Obama’s uniform approach to justify their own are not worried about racialized criticisms. 
135 
 
liberation or flourishing, nor does it necessarily allow for much pleasure in everyday 
aesthetic experiences oriented toward others.  
Karen Hanson has argued that “fashion is inherently associated with change” 
and this association sparks suspicion: “what real value can there possibly be in 
something virtually defined by changing desire?” (1990, 108-9, emphasis original). 
That uniforms, including uniform dressing, avoid the changeability of fashion is surely 
part of their appeal. Much more could be said on the aesthetics of uniforms and uniform 
wardrobes than I can explore here, so I will draw attention to a few aspects of their use 
before moving to another problem for aesthetic labor in the context of privilege and, 
finally, the constructive part of the project. First of all, uniforms signifying all kinds of 
status – from military uniforms to nurses’ to maintenance workers’ – anonymize their 
wearers and unite them to the institution with which they work. Second, as Nancy 
Sherman has argued, uniforms can convey an “aesthetics of character.” The contours of 
that character differ across uniforms and contexts, but the example of Robert Mueller, 
as explained by Troy Patterson, is instructive.61 Mueller, the former FBI director, stays 
within a narrow, “reticent” range of clothing: “a modest rotation of discreetly striped 
Brooks Brothers suits,” cut “relatively trim,” worn with a starched white oxford-cloth 
shirt, red or blue foulard tie, and a “hideous” black plastic watch (Patterson 2018). 
Patterson finds “refinement” of Mueller’s foulard ties “balance” the watch, which we 
might expect to be a kind of aesthetic splurge – watches are masculine jewelry. But 
Mueller’s watch neither suggests financial excess (it costs about $50) nor provides 
                                                 
61 Other writers have observed Mueller’s personal style, and Patterson’s analysis references their work. 
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obvious aesthetic pleasure.62 Mueller’s personal style conveys “an incorruptible 
constancy,” continuity with institutional traditions, “rectitude,” “heroic values,” and 
“the good, clean, honest look of an extremely civil servant, unaffected, and, therefore, 
inimitable” (Patterson 2018). The uniform tells us about Mueller’s personal character 
(or, at least, the kind of person he wants to look like) and also allies him with 
institutions of power in the United States: Ivy League schools, the military, the FBI. 
Privileged groups have long used interest in and attention to aesthetic labor to 
exclusionary effect. Rather than aiming at respect, even minimally, privileged groups 
use self-presentation and other kinds of aesthetic labor to secure their borders. Ralph 
and Selin, in their search for suspenders, try to navigate a way through those borders. 
But even if Ralph and Selin make their way inside, the details of keeping up with 
aesthetic labor can unsettle an individual while preserving the group’s status. The 
example quoted at the beginning of this section – “When it comes to hair, no one is 
more bitchy than conservative males” – illustrates this principle. Similar cases include 
dress codes at country clubs and restaurants. Patterson’s account of Robert Mueller’s 
attention to others’ dress at the FBI is a related phenomenon. As FBI director, Mueller 
insisted on white shirts – not officially, but in practice, “mocking subordinates in staff 
meetings” who wore colored shirts.63 
The question about what responsible aesthetic labor looks like for the privileged 
remains a thorny one. Philosophical sources that foreground the relationship of social 
                                                 
62 This is not to say that, like ugly sneakers, this kind of watch won’t ever achieve hipness among 
extremely fashionable people. “Dad style” is having (another) moment, see Berlinger 2018. 
63 From Garrett Graff’s 2008 article on Mueller: “Colored shirts are worn at one’s own peril. The head of 
the bureau’s public-affairs division, John Miller – a former ABC investigative reporter who interviewed 
Osama bin Laden in the 1990s – tries to sneak in a colored shirt on occasion, but Mueller will look down 
the table at the 9am staff meeting and ask, ‘John, what exactly are you wearing?’”  
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privilege to aesthetic labor (or simply aesthetic experience) and well-being focus either 
on aesthetic labor in the communal and civic contexts, such as Aristotle’s account of 
magnificence, or on what the social elites owe to their superiors, as in classical 
Confucianism. These ancient sources are useful to people occupying the upper echelons 
of explicit hierarchies, but less useful for contemporary contexts of dispersed, 
overlapping privilege and oppressions. Aristotle and Confucius are simply not 
interested in adopting dispositions that facilitate the dismantling of social inequality. 
Responsible exercise of social power in the context of aesthetic labor looks, for the 
junzi and the virtuous person, like graceful paternalism.64 Graceful paternalism is just 
not going to cut it in 2018, but the idea of grace does have, I will argue, distinct 
possibilities. 
Grace is still worth considering in the context of the privileged people’s 
obligations. In turning our attention to grace in everyday contexts, I want to focus less 
on the sense of grace as effortless action – and certainly do not intend to evoke its 
religious connotations – than on the sense in which graceful action smooths out rough 
patches.65 It may well be effortful, and that effort may be seen: tactful corrections often 
leave a little space for the trespass to register, but even so they promote graceful social 
behavior. The kind of grace I’m picking out will not be analogous to the grace of the 
ballet dancer as observed by the audience. Rather, it will be more like the grace that 
manifests among the many participants of a set dance. In a set dance, most dancers are 
aware that the other dancers are working hard to remember the moves, be attentive to 
                                                 
64 Certainly, contemporary scholars have taken efforts to expand the idea of what virtue and the junzi 
mean, for example: Chan 2000, Tessman 2006.  
65 For grace and/or effortlessness see Schiller 1882, Baxley 2010, Montero 2016, and Saito 2016. 
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their partners, and keep the dance flowing smoothly. They make accommodations for 
each other. 
In the context of oppression, the powerful have an obligation not only to 
dismantle the system that distributes power so unequally, but also to make existing in 
that system less painful for the oppressed. The obligations have a far wider scope than 
aesthetic labor does, and may, in a finite world with limited resources such as the one 
we occupy, compete with obligations in the context of aesthetic labor – the question of 
“what to do?” in those cases is beyond the scope of this project.66 Instead, I want to 
hang on to grace not only for its aesthetic components, but because it may be the closest 
we can get to a general recommendation. The recommendation is not to adopt a certain 
kind of aesthetic labor, but rather that people perform their aesthetic labor with a certain 
kind of approach, attitude, or style. Additionally, grace, grounded as it is in the physical 
body, calls attention to the fact of embodiment, a fact privilege often erases.  
Grace, poise, and tact contextualize behavior as much as they dictate it. As 
Fanny Burney observed, “Generosity without delicacy, like wit without judgment, 
generally gives as much pain as pleasure” – even our best behavior needs mediation. 
White people wearing dreadlocks are not performing their aesthetic labor with grace, 
even if they may be dismantling racial prejudice (though of course it is not clear that 
they are doing this). Likewise, the straight white man making an extended point of his 
uniform approach to dressing, is not behaving with grace – however interesting or 
aesthetically pleasant his uniform might be. I do not object to his lack of pleasure in 
clothing, but to the attitude of resentment that seems to fuel his approach to the minimal 
                                                 
66 The scope is quite broad enough already. 
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requirements for aesthetic labor his social position affords him. The writer Chiara Atik, 
in a piece describing her own foray into uniform dressing, notes “menswear is 
practically already a uniform (shirt plus pants, repeat).” While Atik’s description of her 
uniform and the context in which she employs it (on a “water bottle tour” of Los 
Angeles to sell a script) is certainly tinged with resentment toward the way her gender 
seems to necessitate packaging herself along with her work, while her male colleagues 
can just sell their work, she also takes some pleasure in the uniform she chooses. Her 
pleasure is not merely in the fact that she’s front-loaded her aesthetic labor, nor does she 
present the uniform as a way of outwitting a foolish and shallow system, but rather in 
the peace of mind the uniform gives her and the aesthetic pleasures of the clothes 
themselves. In a social world filled with and perhaps shaped by small tensions, micro-
inequities, misunderstandings, human fallibility – but also, and often simultaneously, by 
trust, responsibility, hopes, and friendships – grace, poise, and tact are useful tools for 
accommodating mutual vulnerability as well as responding to unequal distributions of 
power. I’d like to conclude this paper by looking at two examples, one philosophical 
and one from reality television. The first, Yuriko Saito’s reading of Sei Shonagon’s 
description of the proper way for a man to leave his lover’s bed; the second, the Netflix 
reboot of Queer Eye. 
Yuriko Saito’s article “Body Aesthetics and the Cultivation of Moral Virtues” 
deals with a case of self-presentation, but aesthetic labor is certainly not exhaustive of 
the activities she offers. Saito’s reading of Shonagon’s text focuses on embodiment and 
treatment of the material world as ways of cultivating relationships with others. To set 
up the paper, Saito gives a reading of the passage in The Pillow Book where Sei 
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Shonagon contrasts two ways of “leav[ing] a lady’s chamber after a night of 
lovemaking,” one “hateful” and the other “elegant” (2016, 228-29). In the first example, 
the lover 
Is so flurried . . . upon leaving he bangs into something with his hat. Most 
hateful! It is annoying too when he lifts up the Iyo blind that hands at the 
entrance of the room, then lets it fall with a great rattle. If it is a head-blind, 
things are still worse, for being more solid it makes a terrible noise when it is 
dropped. There is no excuse for such carelessness . . . When he jumps out of 
bed, scurries about the room, tightly fastens his trouser-sash, rolls up the sleeves 
of his Court cloak, over-robe, or hunting costume, stuffs his belongings into the 
breast of his robe and then briskly secures the outer sash – one really begins to 
hate him. (Quoted in Saito 2016, 229) 
One might forgive a lover’s noise in the morning if it signals he is not trying to sneak 
out, but Sei Shonagon describes a man who can’t even be bothered to sneak out. His 
noisy clumsiness almost seems to indicate that he has forgotten the woman in bed. In 
addition, “even if unwittingly, he is forcing a negative aesthetic experience on her 
through his body movements and the sounds he makes” (Saito 2016, 229). Shonagon’s 
second example offers a correction: 
A good lover will behave as elegantly at dawn as at any other time. He drags 
himself out of bed with a look of dismay on his face. . .. Once up, he does not 
instantly pull on his trousers. Instead he comes close to the lady and whispers 
whatever was left unsaid during the night. Even when he is dressed, he still 
lingers, vaguely pretending to be fastening his sash. Presently he raises the 
lattice, and the two lovers stand together by the side door while he tells her how 
he dreads the coming day, which will keep them apart; then he slips away. 
(Quoted in Saito 2016, 229) 
Here, Saito focuses on a common act of aesthetic labor: getting dressed. The good lover 
uses his morning toilet as a way to underline his emotional commitment. It matters that 
he “slips away,” rather than leaving noisily: “a gentle and elegant bodily movement 
implies a caring and respectful attitude” (Saito 2016, 229). Graceful conduct, in these 
examples, combines moral consideration, aesthetic practice, and aesthetic experience.  
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 The bad lover’s graceless leave-taking is, as Saito says, inconsiderate: he fails to 
recognize or accommodate the feelings of his lover. He does what he has to do, rather 
than finding balance between two kinds of necessity in his daily life. The good lover, 
however, is graceful and tactful because he balances the needs of his life with and 
without his lover. This balance, which involves considering others’ needs and adjusting 
your behavior in order to meet those needs, is what I think will be characteristic of 
graceful aesthetic labor. The good lover leaves, but the manner of his leave-taking 
involves other-regarding effort, not only through his gentle and quiet progress around 
and out of the apartment, but through the way he gets dressed. His aesthetic labor not 
only meets the needs of his life in society, but it meets the needs of his lover – and, one 
imagines, his need and desire to have a close relationship with her.  
The Netflix show Queer Eye is clearly about aesthetic labor and self-
presentation in a way Saito’s example is not. Additionally, it engages social disparities 
in a way that Saito’s example, though Heian Japan’s gender roles were not precisely 
egalitarian, does not. Like the original show, the current iteration of Queer Eye is a 
makeover reality show. The premise of the show is that a group of savvy gay men (The 
Fab Five) informs less savvy people – usually but not exclusively straight men – 
through aesthetic labor and self-presentation. Each member of the group has an area of 
expertise: fashion, grooming, interior design, cooking, and culture.67 Over the course of 
each episode, the Fab Five share their expertise with the subjects, usually culminating in 
a party or group celebration where the episode’s subject shares their transformation and 
what they’ve learned with their friends and family. Two themes recur in Queer Eye: the 
                                                 
67 It’s not really clear what the show understands “culture” to mean, but in practice it seems to have 
something to do with psychological well-being and event-planning.  
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aesthetic labor involved in the makeover is meant to make the subjects more themselves 
and the subjects are explicitly interested in making the people who matter to them 
happy. Queer Eye views aesthetic labor as important to individual well-being and to 
maintaining relationships with other people. Queer Eye encourages graceful aesthetic 
labor in two ways: first, by underlining its subjects’ reliance on their community, 
second by having them recognize the work they need (and often want) to do. 
The subject of the third episode is Cory, a cop and former Marine, married and 
with two children. A different reality show might seek to “correct” some of Cory’s 
physical characteristics, like his weight, or his personal quirks. For example, he holds 
riotous NASCAR parties in his partially finished basement (the episode begins after a 
party for which black tablecloths were attached to the ceiling to hide the insulation). 
Instead of “fixing” Cory, or even his basement, the show’s experts decide to focus on 
integrating him into the rest of the house and helping him get a handle on personally 
meaningful aesthetic labor. Cory describes a typical date night with his wife as a walk 
around a big box store (so they’re inside, in the air conditioning, and away from the 
mosquitos) for which she dresses up and he wears his usual non-uniform clothes: ill-
fitting shorts (often gym shorts), t-shirt, flip-flops. He describes this outfit as his 
“comfort zone . . . I just care about being comfortable.” Their status quo does not 
involve graceful aesthetic labor. Though Cory’s many costumes for his NASCAR 
parties indicate his awareness of the fun to be had in dressing up, he can’t connect that 
sense of fun to his everyday life or his family. He also has a poor sense of the options 
available to him, particularly when buying clothes – in part because most of his clothing 
comes from a grocery store.  
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Again, the point of the show is not to “fix” Cory, and I don’t offer this 
description of his approach to aesthetic labor (and life in general) at the beginning of the 
episode to set him up for mockery. The show often invites sympathy for the degree to 
which its subjects feel out of their depth, at a loss as to how aesthetic labor should 
feature in their lives, and therefore less capable of meeting their partners’ needs. 
Understanding where Cory begins gives us a sense of the ways Cory’s relationship to 
aesthetic labor could be adjusted for the better. Cory himself is willing to be adjusted; 
he describes the experience as getting him out of his comfort zone. At the same time, 
the Fab Five want him to recognize the ways in which his approach does leave 
important gaps and inequities in his relationship with his family, particularly his wife.  
Cory’s lessons in self-presentation suggest grace because of the ways the lessons 
guide him to a better understanding of the needs of the people around him. The show 
divides its focus among his relationships with his wife, his daughters, and his mother. 
Because his relationship with his mother does not play out in way that is relevant to the 
points I want to make, I’ll discuss the show’s approach to Cory’s relationships with his 
wife and daughters. In both cases, Queer Eye takes time to address the disparity 
between Cory’s level of aesthetic labor, even on special occasions, and his family’s. I 
also want to note the shared limitations of both the Queer Eye and Saito’s example in 
their ability to make recommendations: both deal with intimate relationships. Although 
I have identified some ethical principles that guide aesthetic labor in these situations, it 
is not clear how to adapt those principles to other contexts. The question of how to 
approach aesthetic labor outside personal relationships or in explicitly political contexts 
may receive a different answer than the one suggested here. 
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The disparity between Cory’s self-presentation and his wife’s gets special 
mention. In addition to taking him clothes shopping, the show contextualizes Cory’s 
new clothes through his marriage. Tan France, the show’s clothing expert, is also 
married and describes the daily aesthetic labor he performs as, in part, a gesture to his 
husband. He suggests Cory approach his clothing in a similar way, as a way of signaling 
to his wife that she is important to him. When the show addresses Cory’s personal 
grooming, it takes the traditional route of freshening his haircut and giving him some 
pomade – but also introduces him to DIY exfoliation, framing it as something he can do 
with his daughters. Making and using your own cosmetics is usually a feminine activity, 
something female relatives share with each other. Whether or not Cory and his 
daughters develop a facial night routine (I think we all hope they do), the exercise 
challenges the notion that aesthetic labor, particularly communally, belongs to one 
gender. Cory becomes a participant in communal aesthetic labor, rather than merely 
observing aesthetic labor for his benefit. Further, though the show has a light comic 
tone, it never makes a joke of a straight father mixing up a scented sugar scrub with his 
daughters. In this case, the show handles aesthetic labor gracefully by teaching its 
subjects how to perform it sincerely and take the relationships the labor looks after 
seriously. I don’t think Cory has to develop a love for exfoliants or spa days in order to 
gracefully perform aesthetic labor, but if he understands the full meaning of these 
practices to the people he cares about, he is less likely to shirk the work or sulk his way 
through it.  
This approach to aesthetic labor emphasizes Cory’s community relationships by 
pointing out the people he values and highlight his own role in sustaining those 
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relationships by indicating techniques, particularly aesthetic techniques, for maintaining 
the relationships and communicating the value he places on them. Queer Eye gives 
Cory guidance on kinds of aesthetic labor to perform and on techniques of self-
presentation (how to find clothes that fit, for example), but encourages grace by 
contextualizing that labor and self-presentation so that Cory understands what his 
aesthetic practices mean to other people. He has learned, in a very different context, the 
lessons in Saito’s reading of The Pillow Book: the way we approach our material world 
and our embodiment affects the well-being of the people we care about. Taking that 
well-being into consideration allows us to perform aesthetic labor gracefully. 
My argument for grace calls back to the most pragmatic formulation of the case 
for performing aesthetic labor: it makes life easier for everyone. We need to shift 
expectations about whose life should be easier. Rather than placing the expectations for 
aesthetic labor primarily on members of oppressed groups, we should focus on 
members of privileged groups. Additionally, privileged people should consider graceful 
aesthetic labor as something directed toward, or “for,” members of oppressed groups, 
rather than as something they owe primarily to their confederates. 
VII. Conclusion 
My project in this paper has been both to highlight some common problems with 
aesthetic labor in the context of oppressive structures and to offer an account of the way 
aesthetic labor links with human wellbeing. The link persists even for people at the 
intersection of multiple oppressions; in fact, people in just this position have offered 
some of the richest articulations of the relationship. While we have good reason to be 
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critical of many kinds of aesthetic labor and the way they perpetuate or rely on 
economic injustice, simply railing against aesthetic labor is both ineffective and 
unfulfilling. Additionally, rather than focusing only on the ways oppression and 
aesthetic labor interact, we should turn our attention to the way privilege and aesthetic 
labor interact. This will give us a fuller picture of the way aesthetic labor features in our 
lives. I have also argued that grace is a useful “guide” to the attitude one should take 
towards one’s own aesthetic labor when one assumes a relatively high position in a 
hierarchy. Since many of us will, one time or another, occupy that position, the guide is 




I’ve argued throughout these papers against a view that our everyday aesthetic 
experiences are distractions from more important things, that they deceive us about 
where our attention properly belongs, and that they impede justice projects. Instead, 
I’ve pointed to situations of injustice where aesthetic experience, attention, and activity 
help us resist that injustice. I’ll use this conclusion to recapitulate the arguments I made 
in support of this claim, indicate some ways my projects here might develop in future 
works, and conclude by explaining some of the goals I had for this project. 
1. Aesthetic Resistance 
A few points need revisiting. First, I want to emphasize what it is about the aesthetic 
that I think is so important for these resistance projects. Second, I want to reiterate the 
connection between diverse varieties of lived experience and aesthetics. Third, I want to 
revisit the ways in which each of the papers suggests we can understand our bodies as 
something other than a problem or impediment to meaningful and ethical lives. 
 As mentioned at various points in the three papers, aesthetic values and 
judgments often play a prominent role in certain kinds of oppression and injustice. 
Although objectification is a moral wrong, it incorporates aesthetic judgments, 
particularly judgments of taste. Both respectability politics and the conditions of 
injustice to which respectability politics respond enlist aesthetic standards and ideals as 
a justificatory tactic. Aesthetic labor clearly focuses on aesthetic practices, experiences, 
and ideals, often to ends that at least seem to perpetuate various kinds of inequality. 
Given the troubling use to which the aesthetic is put in these kinds of situations, we 
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might be skeptical about the possibilities of the aesthetic for furthering projects of 
justice. Yet, the three papers also point out ways aesthetic attention, practice, and 
experience enables or facilitates resistance – and the ways some kinds of aesthetic 
practice have constituted resistance. In such cases, the aesthetic promotes justice, rather 
than impeding it. 
The aesthetic can enable resistance because of its value orientation: to observe 
something’s aesthetic qualities is, firstly, a way of paying attention to it, which is a form 
of valuing it. As philosophers of everyday aesthetics like Yuriko Saito have argued, 
attending to things like dishes, housework, and human bodies can be a way of 
countering notions about what kinds of things are “worth our time.” Attending to the 
aesthetic qualities of under-valued portions of our life can positively alter our 
orientation toward them. Secondly, aesthetically appreciating something can be a way 
of valuing it in the honorific sense. On this model of aesthetic appreciation, the 
appreciator develops a positive attitude toward the object. I understand this attitude to 
include a range of positive responses, including quite mild ones like satisfaction and 
curiosity, that promote an understanding of the richness of the object being appreciated. 
Such a dynamic differs sharply from objectification, which might look like a mode of 
attending to and appreciating a person’s aesthetic qualities, but the aesthetic response is 
narrow and meager, circumscribed by social dynamics that make the objectifier into a 
poor appreciator. For those on the receiving end of an objectifying gaze, aesthetically 
appreciating their somatic rejection of the gaze reframes the power dynamics and 
expands notions about which aesthetic properties of human bodies matter. 
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That expansion is particularly important for improving our attitudes toward 
human bodies and countering ideas about what certain bodies are worth. The project 
requires we recognize the both the diversity of human embodiment and the ways 
community inflects those diverse experiences of embodiment. Rather than replicating 
the traditional, and art-oriented, notion of aesthetic appreciation and experience as 
relying on disinterested and atomic judges, acknowledging and exploring the diversity 
of human bodies facilitates a multidimensional, flexible aesthetic approach to 
embodiment. It also helps avoid over-generalizations about what bodies and 
embodiment are like – or should be like. Approaching embodiment as a feature of 
bodies, rather than a feature of “the body,” improves body aesthetics by pushing back 
against abstractions and universalized assumptions about what is possible for body 
aesthetics. Calling attention to racialized, gendered, and/or disabled people’s aesthetic 
experiences with their bodies also reminds us of the insights marginalized voices can 
offer. Importantly, such insights will be specific, making them more likely to receive 
uptake or meaningfully challenge existing power structures. 
Finally, understanding body aesthetic practices as means of resistance to 
oppression helps counter the long history of negative attitudes toward bodies and the 
kinds of injustice that disdain for embodiment has supported. It also helps avert 
pessimism about the fact of embodiment, which is useful given that embodiment is (so 
far) inescapable. In the case of objectification, aesthetic appreciation of bodily 
responses underlines the way embodiment and ethical action intertwine and offers a 
vivid counter to objectifying narratives. Although respectability politics has a complex, 
and sometimes troubling, relationship with the bodies of racialized and gendered 
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people, it also treated bodies as instruments of resistance, not just sites of oppression. 
Furthermore, the inciting issue for respectability politics was the bodily dangers black 
women faced. Respectability politics acknowledged the close link between bodily well-
being and community well-being. Similarly, although aesthetic labor can also 
equivocate on the proper way to understand embodiment (sometimes positioning it as a 
problem), the examples from writers like Keah Brown and Kayla Whaley show that 
aesthetic labor can also bring us to a kind of bodily ease and self-acceptance. Writing as 
disabled women, Brown and Whaley are keenly aware of the ways self-acceptance and 
bodily ease are denied them, in part through cultural scripts that don’t recognize their 
bodies as capable of eliciting certain kinds of aesthetic responses. By claiming those 
responses for themselves, Brown and Whaley refute the idea that the problem lies in 
their bodies and not in the way the world frames their bodies. 
2. Next Steps 
Given body aesthetics’ relative newness, at least as a self-aware philosophical 
subdiscipline, there are a number of different directions in which these papers point us. 
In general, and in keeping with the overall project of turning our attention toward 
under-explored aspects of our lives, these next steps direct attention to areas that have 
seen, so far, little philosophical analysis. The projects I suggest also draw connections 
between different disciplines and theoretical approaches. Finally, because the work I’ve 
done here has mingled ethical and aesthetic concerns, the future projects I suggest here 
will be both ethical and aesthetic projects.  
a. First-Personal Body Aesthetics 
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The projects suggested by the paper on first-personal body aesthetics lean more toward 
ethics than aesthetics. However, they could all speak to issues in body aesthetics and, 
perhaps, in other areas of aesthetics as well. The first project has to do with explicitly 
diversifying the kinds of bodies that feature in and inform philosophical understanding 
of embodiment. The second project looks at ways self-objectification might differ 
across communities. 
 Closer attention to first-personal body aesthetic experiences from traditionally 
marginalized people is in line with my continued interest in recognizing the diversity of 
human bodies and experiences of embodiment. There are vibrant academic 
communities for disability and fat studies, for example, and looking toward academic 
and non-academic work from people with disabilities and fat people might provide 
useful insight. Certainly, more work needs to be done to connect the discussion in my 
paper with work in disability studies. Disability is a highly diverse category, so closer 
attention to work in disability studies would go a long way toward filling in gaps in the 
aesthetics literature.    
Turning our attention back to objectification and self-objectification also underlines 
the need to explicitly consider the bodies of people in marginalized communities. There 
are experiences of objectification that I was only able to gesture at. For example, racial 
fetishes and patterns of objectification look different in gay and straight communities. 
What might self-objectification look like if you belong to a group that is traditionally 
desexualized? Heeding the experiences of members of such groups – for example, fat 
and disabled people, mothers, East Asian men, the elderly – might bring new insight 
into the way subjectivity pervades self-objectification. Additionally, objectification and 
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self-objectification, or perhaps Cahill’s derivatization, seems to feature in certain kinds 
of tokenizing. How does attending to embodiment deepen our understanding of the 
experience of tokenization? Can embodiment facilitate inclusivity? If tokenizers attend 
to their experiences of discomfort, can they come to a better understanding of 
tokenizing processes? A more extended consideration of the way first-personal body 
aesthetics can feature in those different experiences might yield philosophically 
interesting work. Additionally, explicit, sustained, scholarly attention to members of 
marginalized groups is an important step toward a more equitable scholarly community.   
b. Respectability Politics 
The projects suggested by the paper on respectability politics deal with ways 
respectability politics itself may be interesting to issues in everyday aesthetics and body 
aesthetics. Additionally, respectability politics has not received much attention in social 
and political philosophy either, but the projects suggested here might be interesting to 
philosophers working in those fields. 
 One issue philosophers might take up is a more thorough taxonomy of different 
kinds of respectability politics. My paper suggests some ways the politics of 
respectability were used to further racial uplift, but it would be interesting to more 
thoroughly explore respectability politics as one strategy among many in the Civil 
Rights movement. Gay communities have also used respectability politics as a political 
strategy, and it would be worth seeing to what extent the approaches overlap. Does 
aesthetic activity feature as prominently when respectability is a strategy for gay rights? 
Is there a similar striving toward aesthetic neutrality? What does it mean when that 
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neutrality is coded as straight and middle class in addition to white and bourgeois? How 
do calls for respectability balance more radical political strategies?  
 In the topic of everyday aesthetics, respectability politics gives a starting point 
for expanding the small body of philosophical literature on domesticity. Domestic labor 
and household management in one’s own home were preoccupations of respectability 
politics, but I did not discuss them with the same detail as I discussed self-presentation. 
Housework features in everyday aesthetic activity, though admittedly it is hard to get in 
the habit of thinking of washing the dishes as an aesthetic activity. Even those of us 
unable to come to that view might recognize social-political and ethical significance in 
respectability politics’ interest in housework and domestic labor as labor issues, and as 
feminized and racialized industries.  
c. Aesthetic Labor  
The topic of aesthetic labor is particularly novel to philosophy, perhaps more than any 
other idea discussed in this dissertation. In the future, I am interested in developing a 
more robust account of aesthetic labor, particularly its role in community relationships. 
In addition, “The Case for Aesthetic Labor in Everyday Life” focuses on a few specific 
aesthetic practices, further consideration of which might make for more fruitful 
philosophical investigations. Future work might fuse those two interests. 
For example, I briefly discussed perfume as an occasion of aesthetic experience 
and aesthetic labor that positively contributes to our well-being. Part of that enrichment 
is due to perfume’s longevity and intimacy, making it an interesting addition to 
everyday activity. However, perfume can also be an object of specific aesthetic interest 
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and appreciation, often in community with other people. Like other non-art aesthetic 
activities, perfume is under-analyzed in philosophical literature. A thoughtful treatment 
of perfume aesthetics could explore what is characteristic about perfume as an aesthetic 
object, what the norms of appreciation are, and how a community’s appreciative 
practices influence aesthetic evaluations of perfume. Perfume’s cultural contexts, 
including the ways perfumers appropriate and adapt ingredients and aesthetic cues from 
other cultures, would also make for interesting work, both expanding work in aesthetics 
and offering insights into perfume. 
Additionally, there is probably more to be said about the link between self-
presentation and liberation. Both liberation movements and varieties of self-presentation 
are diverse. Given this diversity, a more thorough exploration of the specifics of 
liberatory self-presentation would be philosophically interesting. For example, 
liberatory self-presentation might be a strategy consciously adopted in order to advance 
a political aim, but it might also be self-presentation that happens to contradict 
prevailing norms about the way one “ought” to perform aesthetic labor. Additionally, 
liberatory self-presentation is going to be, of necessity, highly contextualized. Are there 
principles, aesthetic or ethical or otherwise, that underlie various kinds of liberatory 
self-presentation? To what extent does liberatory self-presentation overlap with (or 
conflict with) methods of self-presentation that seek safety and survival?  
Finally, my discussion of aesthetic labor focused on self-presentation. Other 
kinds of everyday aesthetic activity also seem to qualify as aesthetic labor: preparing 
and consuming food, for example. Food has received plenty of philosophical attention, 
including in aesthetics, and it would be interesting to see what that scholarship has to 
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say on the issues that arise when we consider food as an instance of aesthetic labor. 
Food production, preparation, and consumption have complex relationships with ethical 
and political concerns – perhaps considering these experiences as, at least in part, 
aesthetic labor could yield further insight. I think that more can be said about 
outsourcing aesthetic labor, too. 
3. Conclusion 
I took up this research project because it was interesting, but as I pursued it I found it 
was also helpful. In particular, I wanted to work out how it was that our aesthetic 
experiences seemed to function in ways they weren’t “supposed” to. By now, the idea 
that caring about literature and art positively impacts your life and the world around you 
is common. There is plenty of work in philosophy and other disciplines about the way 
artworks interact with moral experience and self-cultivation. Additionally, there is a 
long tradition within literary and artistic communities of thinking about art as something 
that promotes a just world. In this sense, the aesthetic is generally accepted as aiding 
ethical projects. Art work and justice are compatible projects.  
By contrast, caring about clothes is not “supposed” to help you dismantle 
injustice. And yet, that example helps point the way to the conclusions at which these 
papers eventually arrived, since we might think that caring about the way clothes are 
made is a big part of caring about clothes. And caring about the way clothes are made 
leads you, pretty quickly, not only to a history of craftsmanship and artistry – in the 
couture context and in the mundane context – but to a system of economic and 
environmental exploitation and to your position within it. It also leads to rich cultural 
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histories of clothing, and related craft or art forms, across the globe. Clothing pretty 
clearly does mean something in our attempts to resist injustice and oppression. In 
addition to clothing’s status as a product, it has significance as a cultural practice. 
People wear clothing to indicate pride in their cultural identity, alliance with political 
causes, and their relationship with gender. Self-expression and political or ethical 
convictions convene in our clothing. 
Other everyday aesthetic practices, experiences, and choices share this mix of 
ethical, social, political, and community significance. Although philosophy as I 
understand it is well-suited to exploring those intersections, there has been relatively 
little work that does so. Still less has philosophy acknowledged the role of the aesthetic 
in these everyday cases. When the role of human bodies is acknowledged, that 
acknowledgement generally has little to say about bodies’ aesthetic facets. Rather than 
separating out the aesthetic components from the rest (bodily, ethical, cultural, and so 
on), the three papers I wrote here tried to treat the tangle as philosophically interesting 
and capable of improving our understanding of the narrow slices of everyday life I 
picked out. Focusing on the mundane does not mean sacrificing significance: the three 
papers made it clear that the stakes are high in everyday life.  
By taking this approach, I was able to write three papers that helped me. The 
papers allowed me to explore and investigate philosophical work, as well as work in 
history, literature, and sociology, that contribute to a more nuanced understanding of 
objectification, respectability politics, and aesthetic labor. I was lucky to carry out these 
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